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Preface 
This dissertation could not have been written without the help of a number people. First of all, I 
would like to thank my wife, Anne. In the mountains of Nepal, back in the summer of 2002, she 
convinced me that I should study economics. Later on she patiently read my papers and corrected 
any number of errors.  
Thanks to my children, Hannah and Karen, for healthy distractions and for the immense joy they 
give us. 
Also a great thanks to my supervisor, Professor Finn Tarp. Finn has been outstandingly helpful 
throughout the project, reading my drafts over and over again, and providing all kinds of 
important advice. He has been extremely forthcoming in terms of accommodating the many 
practical issues that came up as a result of my relocations to first the U.S. and then Kenya.  
My most important sources of learning during my time as a PhD student have been my co-
authors. They include Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Henrik Hansen, Finn Tarp, Jean-Robert 
Tyran and Katleen Van den Broeck. Being somewhat solitary by nature, I am grateful that I was 
lucky enough to participate in joint projects with these extremely smart people. I hope to 
continue working with all of them in the future. 
Thanks for excellent assistance from the secretaries to DERG, Vibeke Kovsted, Leise Kjer and 
Zanne Romanoff, and for many inspiring discussions with all my colleagues at DERG. 
A special thanks is due to Rachel Ongaro, who as our nanny and housekeeper was the bedrock of 
my family’s life during the time we spent in Kenya, from 2006 to 2008. There was a strange and 
sad coincidence during this period: This thesis is an academic discussion of two main themes, 
namely political economy and property rights to land. In Kenya during January and February 
2008, a rotten political economy combined with deep-seated grievances over land rights to 
produce a massive, violent upheaval. During these events, Rachel and her family, among 
600,000 others, were displaced from their homes, and lost all their possessions. While Rachel 
herself is now doing well, many of her family members and friends are still struggling to recover. 
This should remind us what our work as students of institutions and political economy should 
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ultimately be about: To contribute to avoiding such catastrophes, and the poverty, inequality and 
corruption that underlie them. 
 
2
Introduction 
 
Two of the most significant trends in development economics research in the last few decades is the 
increasing significance of “New Institutional Economics” (e.g. North 1990) and, related to that, of 
“New Political Economy” (e.g. Besley 2007). Development economists now appreciate that formal 
and informal rules, such as property rights or electoral rules, play an important role in guiding 
economic activities. They also acknowledge that a key precondition for economic development is 
the availability of a competent and honest government, and that such availability cannot be assumed 
a priori. Rather, the preconditions for good government need to be examined as a theoretical and 
empirical question. The focus on institutions and on good government are intimately linked, both 
because strong political, legal and social institutions are preconditions for well functioning 
government, and because one of the most important characteristics of good government is that it 
upholds good economic institutions, such as well defined property rights and transparent systems of 
taxation and subsidy.  
 
The present dissertation includes five chapters which span a rather wide range of issues. All take 
their lead from the New Institutional- and Political Economics. By means of mostly empirical but 
also theoretical methods I investigate how specific institutions function, in order to understand how 
they can be improved. The papers are divided into two distinct groups. Three of them deal with 
different topics in political economics, while two investigate the effects of formal, individual 
property rights to agricultural land. 
 
Political economy 
The field of modern, political economics, or New Political Economy, initially focused on politics in 
mature democracies, primarily at the level of the national government. The main textbooks in the 
field (e.g. Mueller 1989, Persson and Tabellini 2000, Drazen 2000) mostly apply this focus. Many 
of the insights from this line of research carry over to politics in developing countries with less-than 
mature democracies, and to sub- and supranational levels of government. However, it is also 
necessary to develop new analyses that focus specifically on political systems in the developing 
world, and deal explicitly with politics outside the level of national government. For example, the 
standard, democratic rules of the game, such as the presence of independent courts or “one man, 
one vote”, cannot be assumed with the same level of confidence in the typical, developing country, 
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or at the international level, as it can in Western democracies. Formal institutions often constrain 
actors less severely at the international- or local level, and in immature democracies and 
dictatorships, than they do at the national level in mature democracies. Therefore, the need to focus 
on issues such as informal institutions, corruption and executive discretion is stronger in these 
settings. The papers in this dissertation follow in the footsteps of those researchers who have 
attempted to take these issues seriously (e.g. Bardhan 1997, Basu 2000, Besley 2006).  
 
Chapter 1, co-authored with Thomas Barnebeck Andersen and Henrik Hansen, is a study of the 
international, political economy of aid allocation. The paper investigates the allocation of loans by 
the International Development Agency (IDA) arm of the World Bank. IDA lends money on highly 
concessionary terms to countries with GDP per capita below a certain threshold. We argue that the 
allocation of these loans is affected by the political interests of the World Bank’s major stakeholder, 
the United States. In particular, we demonstrate that countries who vote in line with the U.S. in the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), on issues considered important by the U.S., receive 
more funds than other countries. The definition of UNGA votes, which are important to the U.S., is 
surprisingly precise, because the State Department each year publishes a list of “key votes” in the 
UNGA, and records whether each country voted with or against the U.S. We show that the 
correlation between voting and aid allocation is robust to a wide range of controls for institutional- 
and economic factors that might also affect loan eligibility and voting patterns.  
 
Chapter 2 investigates the political economy of local government in a developing country, namely 
India. It studies the relatively unexplored topic of interactions between leaders and rank-and-file 
members of political parties. I argue that these interactions, combined with the logic of electoral 
democracy, may give rise to a bias in the allocation of public resources in favour of members of the 
governing political party. I term this bias “party capture”. My results, based on survey data, suggest 
that party capture exists in the context of an important poverty alleviation program administered by 
local governments in the four southernmost states of India, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu. Villagers who are members of the same political party as the leader of the local 
council are more likely to benefit from the program than other villagers. Also, I demonstrate the 
presence of an important interaction effect: party capture is only important in communities with a 
relatively unequal distribution of agricultural land. In line with the findings of other studies (e.g. 
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Knack and Keefer 2000, Galasso and Ravallion 2005, Easterly 2007) this suggests that high 
economic inequality hampers good government. 
 
Chapter 3, joint with Jean-Robert Tyran, is a theoretical investigation of “political selection”. It 
studies how electoral institutions, combined with institutions governing access to information about 
political candidates, affect the probability of appointing a leader with intrinsic preferences for good 
governance, rather than preferences for corruption. While the model in principle applies to many 
different settings, the issue of political selection is most important when leaders have a high degree 
of discretion. Such discretion is generally higher in developing democracies than in mature ones, 
and in that sense the model is more relevant for developing- than for developed countries. In the 
model, benevolent candidates coexist with egoistic ones. Voters prefer a benevolent leader, but 
egoists may imitate benevolent ones, although imitation is costly. We show that the quality of 
political selection increases with the amount of civic virtue in the pool of candidates, and with the 
effectiveness of the public sector. The interpretation of the latter result is that when the public sector 
is ineffective, a career outside politics is unrewarding. The economic success of a private citizen 
depends on the effective provision of public services. Therefore, when the public sector is 
ineffective, egoistic types are attracted to politics and corruption increases. So, while we normally 
assume that corruption is a cause of ineffective public services, the model shows that it might also 
be an effect of it. Another finding in the paper is that increasing the transparency of politics, defined 
as the ability of voters to obtain information about candidates’ pre-election behaviour, does not 
necessarily improve political selection. Essentially, when transparency is high, it also becomes very 
attractive to imitate, and increased imitation might cancel the positive effects of increased 
transparency. 
 
In sum, while the three papers on political economics are quite different, they all depart from the 
paradigm of focusing on national governments in mature democracies, and in that sense they all 
contribute to the construction of a genuinely comprehensive, political economic theory of 
development. 
 
Land rights 
One of the primary applications of New Institutional Economics in analyses of development is the 
study of property rights to agricultural land (Deininger 2003, Pande and Udry 2005). There are both 
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substantive and methodological reasons behind the strong growth of this field. First, the continued 
predominance of agriculture in the economies of many developing countries means that equitable 
and efficient use of land resources remains a primary concern in itself. Access to land, and 
incentives to use it efficiently, is the key to escaping poverty for millions of families. Second, the 
study of land rights offers rare methodological benefits. The typical units of observation, farms or 
fields, are more numerous, similar and simple than most other types of units we may study, such as 
companies or governments. Furthermore, institutional analyses often suffer from a lack of variation 
in institutional characteristics. For example, all citizens in a country are often subject to the same 
constitution, and to the same type of legal system. Therefore, the effects of such institutions cannot 
be studied without including observations from different countries. In contrast, there are many 
settings where the nature and strength of land rights varies significantly, not only within a single 
country, but even within a single community. This is a highly convenient fact when we attempt to 
isolate the effects of certain institutions. The two papers about land rights in the dissertation make 
strong use of it. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the effects of formal property rights to land in rural Cambodia. Using a 
national living standards survey, I show that plots of land which are held with an official paper 
documenting ownership are more productive than other plots. The interpretation is that secure 
property rights facilitate productivity enhancing investment. Identification is a major concern in this 
context. The incentive to seek stronger property rights is higher on a more productive field, and 
rights may therefore be an effect as well as a cause of productivity. I attempt to solve this problem 
by using the mode by which a plot of land has been acquired as an instrument for property rights. I 
furthermore investigate, in a community-level analysis, whether the spread of individual, private 
property rights leads to deterioration in the access to common property resources. One might 
suspect that strengthening the private rights of one individual leads to the exclusion of other 
individuals from using resources that they previously had access to. For example, a farmer who 
attains formal rather than merely informal property rights to a plot of land may use his strengthened 
claim to prevent other households from collecting firewood or fodder on the land. I only find very 
limited support for this hypothesis. The main contributions of the paper are to present analyses from 
a country, Cambodia, which has not previously received much attention in this field, and to show 
that formal property rights may be important even in an environment of weak state capacity. 
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Chapter 5, joint with Finn Tarp and Katleen van den Broeck, also investigates the effect of formal 
land rights on agricultural productivity, in this case focusing on rural households in Vietnam. The 
paper departs from other papers in the literature, including Chapter 4, by stressing the distinction 
between different types of property rights. In particular, most studies focus on security against 
expropriation and other “transfer rights”, such as the right to rent, mortgage or bequeath a plot of 
land. Following the revolutionary changes to the Vietnamese Land Law in 1988 and 1993, these 
rights are reasonably well protected for most land in Vietnam. However, an equally important 
category of land rights, which has received very limited attention, consists of “use rights” – the right 
to determine what to grow on the land, or wow to use it otherwise. In most countries, strong transfer 
rights imply strong use rights, but in transition economies such as China and Vietnam, the situation 
is different. We use survey data from 12 provinces in Vietnam, and show that although more than 
75 percent of plots have strong transfer rights, freedom to determine land use is severely restricted 
on more than half of the plots in the sample. We hypothesize that restrictions on land use lead to 
lower productivity, and that the effect of strong transfer rights are lower when use rights are 
restricted. Restrictions on use limit the scope for profitable investment. The latter hypothesis is 
supported by the data, the former is not. Identification is challenging in this case. The tentative 
conclusion is that while the Vietnamese land use restrictions regime does not have a severe, direct, 
negative effect on productivity, it may have an indirect impact by muting the effects of improved 
transfer rights. It is important to note that the results show than when use rights are not restricted, 
transfer rights do in fact have a strong, positive effect on productivity. 
 
In sum, the two papers about land property rights mostly confirm the fundamental assumption in 
mainstream, institutional economics about the importance of private property rights. However, 
Chapter 5 makes the additional point that the effect of one type of property rights is likely to be 
conditional on the strength of other rights. 
 
General lessons 
The main aim of the dissertation is not to produce a single message which is supported by all five 
chapters. Rather, each chapter was written to make a contribution of its own. One general theme, 
which is pursued in at least three of the papers, is the contingent nature of institutional effects. 
Chapter 2 shows that local governments function better when economic inequality in the 
community is low. Chapter 3 shows that the tendency for democratic institutions to promote the 
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selection of benevolent leaders depends on civic virtue and public sector effectiveness. Chapter 5 
shows that the effects of transfer rights to land depend on the strength of use rights. The implication 
is that general statements about the effects of decentralisation, democracy, property rights or other 
institutions should often be accompanied by statements specifying the conditions under which the 
alleged effects are likely to be realized. 
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US Politics and World Bank
IDA-Lending
THOMAS BARNEBECK ANDERSEN, HENRIK HANSEN, &
THOMAS MARKUSSEN
University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
Final version received April 2005
ABSTRACT This paper studies the role of US political factors in the allocation of World Bank
concessional lending, where US political interests are proxied by voting similarity in the United
Nations General Assembly on issues identiﬁed as important by the US Department of State. In
contrast to previous studies we ﬁnd that the US exerted a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on IDA lending
during the period 1993–2000. We demonstrate that the inﬂuence was both statistically as well as
economically signiﬁcant. Finally, we demonstrate that our result is robust with respect to the
omission of the IDA Country Performance Rating index.
I. Introduction
Responding to the critique of the Meltzer Commission Report, Charles Calomiris
notes that there is a (silent) debate as to whether these international ﬁnancial
institutions should have narrowly deﬁned objectives or, alternatively, be used as
tools of ad hoc diplomacy.1
Behind closed doors critics are candid about their primary reason for objecting
to our proposals: ‘Forget economics; it’s the foreign policy, stupid’. For our
proposed reforms to succeed, then, they must face the challenges posed not only
by economic logic, but by the political economy of foreign policy. (Calomiris,
2000:86)
An increasing number of academic studies indicating that political factors – in
particular US political factors – do play a role in determining who receives IMF
loans have emerged recently (see Thacker, 1999; Barro and Lee, 2002; Andersen
et al., 2005). With respect to World Bank lending, however, there are only a few
recent studies oﬀering evidence indicating that ﬂows are under the inﬂuence of the
US. For instance, in an interesting paper Fleck and Kilby (2005) ﬁnd that US
Correspondence Address: Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Institute of Economics, University of
Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark.
Email: Thomas.Barnebeck.Andersen@econ.ku.dk
Journal of Development Studies,
Vol. 42, No. 5, 772–794, July 2006
ISSN 0022-0388 Print/1743-9140 Online/06/050772-23 ª 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/00220380600741946
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commercial interests inﬂuence the geographical distribution of total World Bank
lending (measured as the sum of IDA, IBRD and IFC loans). Moreover, they ﬁnd
that this inﬂuence diﬀers across diﬀerent presidential administrations.2 Yet, with
respect to the soft loan window, IDA, there is to our knowledge no clear evidence of
US interference.
At ﬁrst glance, this is not surprising since IDA’s allocation criteria are (arguably)
more explicit than those of any other donor, rendering a direct political inﬂuence
more diﬃcult. However, since the crucial CPIA and ARPP scores governing the
allocation of IDA funds are not publicly available, the scope for political inﬂuence is
clearly present despite explicit allocation criteria.3 At the same time, the secret nature
of country performance scores makes a proper statistical analysis somewhat diﬃcult;
one must establish that the omitted variables problem does not invalidate the
statistical inference.
Notwithstanding statistical problems, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence
suggesting that the US can exert an inﬂuence on IDA lending. Kapur (2002), for
instance, argues that the US enjoys pre-eminence within the World Bank despite a
sharp decline in voting power from 35% in 1947 to 16.5% in 1999. Kapur lists three
reasons for the continued US pre-eminence. First, the US has been more than willing
to exercise power. Second, there are few countervailing pressures from other
shareholders. Third, it is an inevitable outcome of what Nye (1990) has dubbed the
‘soft power’ of the US: Today a much higher percentage of World Bank staﬀ is
educated in the US compared to the early years, and the shaping of World Bank
policies are heavily inﬂuenced by a number of US-based civil society actors
(academia, think tanks, NGOs, etc).
There are also clear cases of politically motivated World Bank lending decisions.
For instance, the Bank turned down lending to Vietnam in 1977 despite the fact that
staﬀ members admitted that project implementation was much better there than in
many countries actually receiving loans. Even more starkly, the suspension of
lending to Chile during the Allende years 1970–1973 were cited in a US Treasury
report as a signiﬁcant example of the successful exercise of US inﬂuence on the Bank
(Gwin, 1997). More recent examples include the Bank’s decisions not to lend to
Nicaragua in the 1980s and Iran in the 1980s and the 1990s (Gwin, 1997; Kapur,
2002). Finally, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing military campaign
in Afghanistan, World Bank ODA to Pakistan, a key ally of the US in its ‘War on
Terror’, tripled from USD 226 million in 2001 to USD 860 million in 2002 (UN
System Pakistan, 2004).
In this paper, we ask whether IDA lending is inﬂuenced in any systematic way by
US political factors. Our measure of political interest is that used by Thacker (1999)
in a study of the role of US foreign-policy factors in IMF lending. Thacker relies on
the degree of coincidence between the votes of the sample country and the US in the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on issues, which the US Department of
State deﬁnes as ‘key votes’. The precise deﬁnition given by the State Department is:
‘all such votes on issues which directly aﬀected important United States interests and
on which the United States lobbied extensively’ (US Department of State, 1994: 1).
Key votes are listed in the annual US Department of State publication ‘Report to
Congress on voting practices in the United Nations’. The ﬁrst report from 1985 notes
that the: ‘only votes that can legitimately be read as a measure of support for the
US Politics and World Bank Lending 773
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United States are those which we identiﬁed as important to us, and on which we
lobbied other nations’ (quoted in Thacker, 1999: 53).
Moreover, the report from 2000 states that:
[A] country’s behaviour at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral
relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State regularly
makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors. This is also why copies
of this report are presented to UN member foreign ministries throughout the
world and to member state missions to the United Nations in New York. The
Security Council and the General Assembly are arguably the most important
international bodies in the world, dealing as they do with such vital issues as
threats to peace and security, disarmament, development, humanitarian relief,
human rights, the environment and narcotics - all of which can and do directly
aﬀect major U.S. interest. (US State Department, 2000: 8)
Speciﬁcally, the State Department lists identical votes, opposite votes, and
abstentions and absences. Voting coincidence is then calculated by dividing the
number of identical votes with the number of identical and opposite votes. Voting
coincidence is listed for all countries in the Report to Congress, where an overall
ranking is also provided. Hence voting behaviour on key UNGA votes is publicly
available and easy accessible.
Using voting coincidence on UNGA key votes as a proxy for US-political
inﬂuence, we demonstrate a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on World Bank IDA-lending in a
data set covering 1993–2000. The inﬂuence is not only statistically signiﬁcant; the
gain or loss in terms of USD is noticeable for the recipients. Moreover, we
demonstrate that the omission of the (secret) country performance ratings is unlikely
to cause signiﬁcant bias in our results.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section II we provide a discussion of
IDA, including a discussion of IDA allocation criteria and of the diﬀerent ways in
which the US can exercise inﬂuence within the World Bank. Section III contains a
brief selective survey of the empirical literature on aid allocations with a view to
World Bank lending, while Section IV provides the empirical analysis. Section V
concludes.
II. Background
The World Bank and IDA
IDA, which was established in 1960, is the arm of the World Bank that lends to the
poorest developing countries on concessional terms. Loans are normally interest
free, with a service charge less than 1 per cent (currently the charge is 0.75 per cent),
and have a 10 year grace period with maturities of 40 years (35 years for IBRD–IDA
blend countries). These loans are categorised as ODA (Oﬃcial Development
Assistance); and by this deﬁnition, IDA is one of the most important aid donors. In
the period under study, IDA allocated about 11 per cent of total ODA; more
than any bilateral donor save Japan. In 2002 the total value of IDA lending
was USD 8.1 billion, distributed to 62 recipient countries. Moreover, because of the
774 T. B. Andersen et al.
11
well-documented ‘bandwagon eﬀect’ by which bilateral donors tend to support
countries with IDA loans, the importance of the Bank’s allocation policies is actually
ampliﬁed by bilateral allocations (Ranis, 1997; Sender, 2002).
Allocation Criteria
IDA’s allocation criteria are probably more explicit than those of any other donor.
In order to be eligible for IDA lending, the per capita GNI of a country must fall
below a certain threshold;4 the country must lack access to international capital
markets; it must adhere to certain policy and institutional standards set by the Bank;
and it must be a member of the World Bank. Some countries that do have access to
international capital markets but are very poor, such as India and Indonesia, are
eligible for IDA funds. These are referred to as ‘blend’ countries, since they receive
funds from both the IBRD (the arm of the World Bank that lends on commercial
terms) and from IDA. Moreover, exceptions are given to several small island
economies (IDA, 2003a).
Among eligible countries funds are allocated according to poverty (as measured by
GNI per capita) and to the CPR (IDA Country Performance Rating). The CPR is an
index calculated as a weighted average of a country’s score on two indices: the CPIA
(Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) and the ARPP (Annual Report on
Portfolio Performance), where the former weighs 80 per cent and the latter 20 per
cent.
The CPIA is the average of a country’s score on 20 indicators grouped in four
categories: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion/
equity, and public sector management and institutions. On each of the 20 indicators,
countries are rated between 1 and 6. The ARPP measures the performance of past
World Bank projects in the country. To produce the ﬁnal CPR, the weighted average
of the CPIA and the ARPP is multiplied by the ‘governance factor’, which is
composed of seven governance indicators, six of which are also included in the
CPIA.
Based on the CPR and the GNI per capita, a formula exists to calculate how much
IDA funding a country can expect to receive if it maintains its policies and
institutions at a stable level, assuming that high-quality projects are available (IDA,
2003a). This level of funding is however not an entitlement, and it is not always
adhered to strictly. Exceptions are given to countries emerging from protracted
violent conﬂict, which under certain circumstances may be eligible for more funds
than their CPR would otherwise indicate (IDA, 2003b). Allocations to blend
countries are adjusted downward, since these countries also have access to funds
from the IBRD and from commercial sources.
The allocation mechanism has developed gradually over the years, with
progressively higher weight put on policies and institutions. Policy-based lending
has been practiced at least since the debt crisis in the early 1980s (Gwin, 2002), but
institutional indicators were not added to the CPIA until 1998 (Neumayer, 2003a).
Unfortunately, the Bank does not disclose countries’ exact scores on the CPIA,
ARPP and CPR; only quintile distributions are available (covering only the very
recent past). However, since countries are themselves informed about their own
scores, it would appear from the above description that the allocation mechanism of
US Politics and World Bank Lending 775
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IDA is impartial, detailed and transparent. We shall argue that contrary to this
appearance, the political interests of the US do in fact play a systematic role in the
allocation of IDA funds.
US Inﬂuence
The US has several avenues for inﬂuencing the decisions of IDA and other parts of
the World Bank Group. The general management of the Bank is undertaken by
the Board of Executive Directors, which is responsible for the approval of all loans
and decides on policy issues that guide the general operations of the Bank. The US
is one of the ﬁve countries with a permanent representation in this body; the other
countries are the UK, Japan, Germany and France. The board of Executives elect
the President of the World Bank, who is by custom always a US citizen (a part of
an informal agreement, which also says that the managing director of the IMF is
always a European).5,6 Voting in the World Bank is based on shareholding, and
since the US is the largest shareholder in IDA, it has the largest voting power in
the organisation, currently 14.3 per cent. World Bank institutions are governed
according to a set of Governing Articles that deﬁne their purpose, organisation
and operations, and since changing these Articles requires a qualiﬁed majority of
85 per cent, the US comes close to having veto power with regards to Article
amendments in IDA. The US has seen its voting shares in the Bank’s institutions
decline steadily over the years, but arguably this has not led to a decrease in its
actual power in the organisation. For example, in response to declining vote
shares, the US in 1989 managed to push through a proposal to increase the
qualiﬁed majority required for changing the Governing Articles of the Bank to
the above mentioned 85 per cent, allowing it to maintain its near veto power
(Woods, 2000). Because IDA lending is on concessional terms, IDA resources must
continually be replenished by the donors. Accordingly, donors meet every three
years for replenishments negotiations. At these meetings donors also agree on
overall policy directions for IDA. These meetings therefore represent crucial
opportunities for exercising political leverage. The last negotiation round (the
IDA-13 Replenishment) was concluded in 2002, with the US contributing the
largest share of funds (just over 20 per cent). In cumulative terms, the US and
Japan are the largest IDA donors. Obviously, the IDA-replenishment negotiations
are part of a much larger foreign policy game, and the US can increase its
inﬂuence beyond what springs directly from the size of its monetary contribution if
it links issues of World Bank policy with other foreign policy issues. According to
Woods (2000), the US has increased pressure for inﬂuence at the replenishment
negotiations from the 1990s onwards.
Moreover, the US has maintained its dominance in the World Bank because it has
increasingly been willing to exercise power, while other countries have done little to
resist US pressure, and because of the increasing soft power of the US. Concerning
the latter, one study of professional staﬀ in the Policy, Research and External Aﬀairs
Departments in 1991 showed that 62 per cent of employees with graduate-
level education had their degrees from US institutions (Stern and Ferreira, 1997).
The geographical location of the World Bank headquarters in Washington DC
means that American players have privileged access to the Bank, all of which
776 T. B. Andersen et al.
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combines to create a pressure for American ideas and values to inﬂuence decision-
making processes in the Bank.
The presence of strong US inﬂuence, which is hardly doubted by anyone, does not
necessarily imply that the US uses this inﬂuence actively to make the allocation of
IDA funds deviate from the oﬃcial allocation criteria described above. However, as
mentioned in the introduction, anecdotal evidence suggests that it has sometimes
inﬂuenced allocation criteria. Examples serve to illustrate that US political interests
do sometimes override considerations of poverty alleviation and development in the
loan-allocation policies of the World Bank in general and of IDA in particular.
However, they do not provide systematic evidence.
III. A Brief Survey of the Econometric Literature
There is a large literature on the determinants of aid allocation in general. A survey is
found in Neumayer (2003a), but most studies focus on bilateral donors, in particular
the US, while only a few studies look at the World Bank.
Early studies of the inﬂuence of donors’ political interests on aid allocation include
McKinlay and Little (1979) and Maizels and Nissanke (1984). Both studies focus on
the US and ﬁnd that a set of political-interest indicators such as strategic and
commercial ties are much stronger predictors of US aid allocations than a set of
development-interest variables such as GDP per capita and the Physical Quality of
Life Index. Among the many, more recent, studies, Schraeder, Hook and Taylor
(1998) analyze the allocation of aid from the US, Japan, France and Sweden, and
show that political-interest variables are signiﬁcant for all four donors although
diﬀerent variables are important for diﬀerent donors. Alesina and Dollar (2000)
study a broad set of bilateral donors and ﬁnd that political interests, measured by
colonial history and voting similarity in the UNGA, are generally more important
determinants of aid allocation than institutional and policy performance variables,
such as the level of democracy and the degree of trade openness in the economy.
With particular relevance for the present paper, Alesina and Dollar report that
voting similarity with the US in the UNGA is signiﬁcantly correlated with the
allocation of US bilateral development assistance.
There is some debate as to whether policy and institutional performance play any
role at all for bilateral aid allocation. Alesina and Dollar (2000) ﬁnd that while they
are less important than the political-interest variables, openness and democracy are
signiﬁcant predictors of aid allocation for some countries, including the US, but not
for others. Svensson (2000) and Alesina and Weder (2002) ﬁnd that there is generally
no relationship between corruption and aid allocation. Neumayer (2003a) looks at
all the important aid donors and investigates a broad set of institutional (or
governance) variables, including democracy, human rights, corruption, military
expenditure, rule of law and regulatory burden. He ﬁnds that none of these variables
show a consistent pattern of signiﬁcance across the group of bilateral and
multilateral donors, although all of them are signiﬁcant for some donors.
Studies of other multilateral agencies apart from the World Bank have indicated
that these are often aﬀected by the political interests of major contributors.
Tsoutsopolides (1991) shows that aid allocation by the European Community (EC)
from 1975 to 1980 is aﬀected by colonial aﬃliation with the original six EC members.
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Neumayer (2003b) reports that the Asian Development Bank, UNICEF and UNTA
share a tendency of several bilateral donors of giving more aid to former colonies of
large donor countries, although the opposite eﬀect is found for The African and
Inter-American Development Banks, and possibly for UNDP. Interestingly, he also
ﬁnds that the UN agencies tend to counteract certain biases of bilateral donors.
Whereas bilateral donors tend to give more aid to countries geographically close to
themselves, the UN agencies give more aid the further away from the United States,
Western Europe or Japan a country is located. Neumayer (2003c) also shows that the
Arab-dominated multilateral aid agencies are aﬀected by potential recipients’ voting
similarity with major Arab donors in the UNGA.7 Furthermore, Islamic countries
have a larger probability of receiving positive amounts of aid from these agencies.
Studies of the IMF have demonstrated that the probability of receiving IMF loans
is aﬀected by the political interests of the US and other major donors. In particular,
Thacker (1999) shows that countries that move closer to the US policy stance on
issues considered important by the US in the UNGA increase their probability of
receiving loans. Barro and Lee (2002) show that voting similarity in the UNGA and
intensity of trade with the US and major European shareholders signiﬁcantly
increases the size of IMF loans a country receives.
Turning to studies of the World Bank, Frey and Schneider (1986) provide an early
example.8 In a study of the determinants of IBRD loans as well as IDA credits, they
ﬁnd that both economic needs of the recipients and political interests of major World
Bank shareholders are signiﬁcant determinants of the Bank’s allocation of funds in
the period 1972–1981. Among donor-interest variables, they ﬁnd that the amount of
IDA funds received by a country is signiﬁcantly related to its share in exports from
the UK, France, the US and the Benelux countries, and to being a former colony of
France, or being a country ‘dominated’ by the US.9 Frey and Schneider also provide
evidence in favour of the hypothesis tested in this paper: viz. that US political
interests aﬀect the allocation of IDA funds. These ﬁndings are not reproduced in
more recent studies, however.
Burnside and Dollar (2000) ﬁnd that World Bank aid is more sensitive to
economic needs (measured by GDP per capita) and to an index of good policies than
is the aid from bilateral donors; and that it is less sensitive to the strategic interests of
donors (measured by regional dummies and a dummy for Egypt).
Dollar and Levin (2004) study the sensitivity of aid allocation to institutions and
policy. They ﬁnd that IDA, like many other donors, has become more sensitive to
policies and institutions in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. They also ﬁnd that
IDA is among the donors with the highest sensitivity to these factors. These results
are found both when institutional- and policy performances are measured by the
CPIA (the World Bank’s own indicator, as discussed above) and when indicators
produced independently of the World Bank are used.10 No variables measuring the
political interests of donors are included in the models of the paper, however. Only
population and GDP per capita are controlled for.
Fleck and Kilby (2005), mentioned in Section I, ﬁnd that US commercial interests
inﬂuence the geographical distribution of total World Bank lending (measured as the
sum of IDA, IBRD and IFC loans).
Finally, looking at the period 1991 to 2000 and using the model speciﬁcation and
data that we shall build upon in this paper, Neumayer (2003a) ﬁnds that IDA aid
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allocations are responsive to GDP per capita, population and institutions in the form
of human rights standards. Importantly, he ﬁnds that no donor-interest variables are
signiﬁcantly related to the allocation of IDA lending.
In sum, the small group of recent studies of World Bank lending tend to portray
IDA as a donor institution, which is responsive to economic needs, rewards good
policy and institutional performance, and as being unaﬀected by the political
interests of major shareholders.
IV. Empirical Analysis
Data
In our empirical analysis we rely on a slightly expanded version of the Neumayer
(2003a) data set. The dependent variable is ODA commitments (as opposed to ODA
disbursements). One advantage of using commitments when attempting to explain
the allocation of aid is that commitments are fully controlled by the donor, whereas
disbursements partly rely on recipient behaviour. The dependent variable is then
total aid committed (in real terms) to a given country.
The explanatory variables include measures of recipient needs, institution and
governance indicators and donor interests. Recipient needs are captured by per
capita income and a quality of life index. Indicators for institutions and
governance include a combined freedom index (political rights and civic liberties)
based on Freedom House data; a human rights index based on two political terror
scales; a measure of corruption; a measure of rule of law; a measure of the
regulatory burden imposed on the private sector; and the share of government
expenditures spent on military purposes. Donor interests are captured by colonial
status; a weighted average of donor countries’ export to the recipient country,
where weights are equal to the share of the donor’s contribution in total DAC aid;
the percentage of Christian people living in the recipient country; and, our variable
of interest, a measure of political similarity based on voting behaviour in the
UNGA.
Neumayer (2003a) relies on a broader political-similarity measure developed
by Signorino and Ritter (1999) and compiled by Gartzke et al. (1999) using all
UNGA votes (i.e., key votes and non-key votes). Neumayer does not ﬁnd
evidence of political inﬂuence using this measure. However, in our view this
measure suﬀers from two drawbacks: First, by using voting behaviour on all
UNGA resolutions, the political-similarity measure does not discern important
votes from less important ones. Second, political similarity is a weighted average
of voting coincidence with all DAC donors, which renders a direct interpretation
somewhat diﬃcult. Using voting similarity with the United States on key UN
votes (calculated by dividing the number of identical key votes with the number
of identical and opposite key votes) is in our view a more direct measure of
political factors. Therefore, we employ this measure to study US inﬂuence on
allocation of IDA lending. All variables and sources are further described in the
Appendix.
In 2005 there are a total of 81 countries eligible for IDA funds. In this paper, we
have data for 76 IDA countries over the period 1993–2000 in the most parsimonious
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empirical speciﬁcation. In our most elaborate speciﬁcation, data coverage drops to
54 IDA countries; the reason is lack of publicly available data on institutional
quality for a number of IDA countries.
Regression Results
The basic empirical speciﬁcation used in this paper follows Neumayer (2003a),
although we depart from the Neumayer study in several ways. First, we use levels of
real ODA commitments as opposed to shares of total donations. The main reason
for doing so is to avoid violating the adding-up constraint when using the log-
transformation. Second, as explained above, we use the US State Department
classiﬁcation of key UNGA votes as our political-interest variable. Third, we include
two additional allocation indicators: viz. external debt to GDP and trade openness
(the sum of merchandise imports and exports relative to GDP). Finally, we estimate
a Heckman sample-selection model to account for the eventuality of sample-
selection bias. It should be noted that only six sample countries (out of 76) never
received any IDA funds over the period.11
Estimation results are reported in Table 1. In all estimations, the explanatory
variables are lagged one year, save the UN key-voting coincidence, which is lagged
two years.12 Column 1 in Table 1 excludes several variables in order to maximise
country coverage.13 Columns 2 and 3 include additional variables progressively and
country coverage decreases accordingly; Column 4 is the OLS estimation of the
model corresponding to Column 3.
Our main ﬁnding is that UN voting on key issues is positive and signiﬁcant at 5 per
cent in the speciﬁcation with maximum country coverage (Column 1) and at 1 per
cent in Columns 2 and 3. We interpret this as strong evidence in favour of the
hypothesis that US political interests aﬀect the allocation of IDA resources.
Moreover, UN voting is insigniﬁcant at the selection stage in all estimations.14
Finally, OLS on the selected sample (associated with Column 3) gives similar results
to the selection-corrected estimation reported in Column 3.15
Several other results from Table 1 are noteworthy. The coeﬃcient on log
population is positive but signiﬁcantly below one in all level estimations, indicating
the often-found small-country bias. The log of GDP per capita is insigniﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. This is a result of the role of GDP per capita at the eligibility stage:
since only poor countries are eligible for IDA lending, there is only limited variation
in this variable. The physical quality of life is signiﬁcant in Columns 2 and 3, but
enters with the ‘wrong’ sign. Countries with a higher physical quality of life receive
more aid, indicating that this variable should not be regarded as a measure of the
need for aid, as in Neumayer (2003a), but rather as an indicator of good policies.
Keeping GDP per capita constant, countries that achieve better performance in
health and education are expected to have more eﬀective, pro-poor policies. Among
the indicators for institutions and governance, we repeat the ﬁnding in Neumayer
(2003a) that the human rights variable is positive and signiﬁcant. Political freedom is
signiﬁcant at 1 per cent in all regressions, but has the ‘wrong’ sign. Somewhat
surprisingly, trade openness is insigniﬁcant. However, this is in accordance with
other studies. Finally, the debt variable in Model 3 points towards that those
countries with high debt ratios receive more aid. We interpret this as an indication of
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the much discussed defensive lending by the IFIs in the 1980s and 1990s (see Birdsall
et al., 2003).
Using the least squares result in Table 1 we look into the robustness of the
impact of UN voting behaviour. In Figure 1 the horizontal axis shows the average
UN voting behaviour for each country across time. The vertical lines indicates
the overall average UN voting behaviour (0.53) and the central part of the
distribution, i.e., the range covered by the distance of one standard deviation from
the mean. The vertical axis shows the parameter estimates obtained when a
Table 1. Heckit and least squares results for IDA commitments to developing countries
Dependent variable: IDA commitments (log)
Heckit
OLS
Model: 1 2 3 4
Log (population) 0.449*** 0.578*** 0.649*** 0.634***
(0.087) (0.122) (0.113) (0.091)
Log (GDP per capita) 0.037 70.202 70.195 70.178
(0.224) (0.220) (0.177) (0.169)
Physical quality of life 0.007 0.011* 0.010* 0.012***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Former Western colony 0.001 70.002 70.003 70.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log (DAC export to recipient) 0.102 0.037 0.060 0.026
(0.106) (0.120) (0.110) (0.093)
Percentage Christian 0.003 0.003 0.003* 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Political freedom 70.099*** 70.110*** 70.095*** 70.046**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022)
Human rights 0.156** 0.137* 0.198***
(0.079) (0.075) (0.068)
Military expenditures 0.004 70.004 70.004
(0.012) (0.010) (0.007)
Trade openness 70.224 70.136 70.336**
(0.198) (0.177) (0.161)
External debt 0.118 0.104* 0.171***
(0.074) (0.062) (0.053)
Corruption 0.200 0.052
(0.178) (0.134)
Rule of law 0.041 0.191
(0.177) (0.161)
Regulatory burden 70.252 70.020
(0.174) (0.129)
UN voting on key issues 0.782** 1.191*** 1.208*** 1.324***
(0.382) (0.404) (0.444) (0.395)
Constant 74.113 74.075 75.288* 74.371
72.911 73.441 (3.153) 72.860
Total number of observations 553 420 389 299
Number of uncensored observations 362 312 299 299
Number of countries 76 60 54 51
Note: Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; Asterisks
*, **, *** denote signiﬁcantce at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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country in the sample is excluded from the regression. The horizontal line
represents the full sample estimate. As seen from Figure 1, the parameter estimates
ranges from 1.08 when Gambia is excluded to 1.47 when St Lucia is the excluded
country. In general, the point estimates are between 1.2 and 1.4 when the countries
are excluded one-by-one, showing that the full sample result is not driven by a
single country. This observation is conﬁrmed by calculations of the scaled changes
in the estimated impact of UN voting behaviour.16 None of the scaled changes in
the parameter estimate exceeds one in absolute value. Furthermore, it is clear from
Figure 1 that extreme voting behaviour, such as Laos or Georgia, does not aﬀect
the estimated impact. In this sense the regression results are very robust to changes
in the sample.
In conclusion, the results indicate that considerations of need and of the quality of
institutions do matter for the allocation of IDA lending, but that US political
interests also play a decisive role IDA lending. The next section addresses the
economic importance of these factors.
Implicit Incentives in IDA Lending
Using the speciﬁcation in Column 3 of Table 1, we can estimate the rewards
associated with changes in the UN voting coincidence, the physical quality of life,
and in human rights. These three variables are all signiﬁcant in Column 3; they are
all, at least to some extent, under the discretion of recipient governments; they are
also insigniﬁcant at the selection stage (not reported); and ﬁnally, the correlations
between the three variables are quite small whereby comparisons of counter-factuals
in which the measures are changed one-by-one are empirically meaningful (see
Table A2).17
Figure 1. The estimated impact of un voting on key issues when countries are omitted
one-by-one
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In Table 2 we report three measures of the economic impact of changes in the
three variables. In the last column in Table 2 we report the gain from a one standard
deviation change in the explanatory variables – evaluated at the average level of
IDA lending.
The UN voting coincidence variable is continuous on (0,1), where zero
indicates no alignment with the US in the UNGA. The standard deviation of the
UN voting variable is reported in Column 2 in Table 2. The reward facing an average
country from a one standard-deviation increase in alignment with the US in the
UNGA is an increase of approximately USD 33.8 million of ODA commitments
from IDA.
Compare this to an improvement in the physical quality of life. This variable is
continuous on (0,100), where one hundred is best. The estimated increase in IDA
lending following a one standard-deviation improvement in the physical quality of
life is an increase of USD 23.8 million.
Changes in the physical quality of life are probably harder to obtain than
voting coincidence. Therefore, a comparison with human rights may be
more interesting. The human rights variable is continuous on (75, 71), where
minus one is the best and the sample average is 72.95. An increase in the
human rights index of one standard deviation leads to an estimated reward of USD
17.8 million.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that an increase in voting alignment with the US in the
UNGA on key issues is more important (in the sense of being more rewarding) than
comparable increases in both human rights and the physical quality of life. Thus, in
addition to statistical signiﬁcance, the UN voting variable also has economic
signiﬁcance.
Robustness of the Interpretation of Key Votes
As described in Section II, IDA’s oﬃcial allocation criteria rely heavily on the policy
and institutional performance of recipient countries, as measured by the Country
Performance Rating (CPR), which is a combination of the CPIA index and the
Annual Report on Portfolio Performance (ARPP) as described in Section III. Since
none of the three indices are publicly available we cannot include these ratings in our
model. Consequently one should worry that the UN voting variable is eﬀectively a
Table 2. Estimated partial eﬀects on IDA lending
dDODA
b^ sd(x) USD million, 1995 prices
UN voting on key issues 1.208 0.20 33.8
Physical quality of life 0.010 17 23.8
Human rights 0.137 0.93 17.8
Notes: The estimated rewards are calculated as dDODA ¼ b^ sdðxÞ ODA where sd(x) is a one-
standard deviation change in x. Average ODA, ODA, is USD 140 million (1995-prices) for
IDA loans.
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proxy for the CPR index – or for some aspects of it – and that may be the reason why
we record a positive impact. However, there are strong indications that this should
not be a cause for concern.
First note that the regressions in Table 1 contain a large number of institutional
and policy variables, which may be expected to capture most of the variation in the
CPR index; we show below that this is indeed the case. Second, the UN voting
variable is much more signiﬁcant when it is lagged two periods than when the one
year lag or even the current value is used. This squares well with the story that
commitments in year t are decided in year t-1, based on voting performance in year
t-2. Related, if UN voting was merely a proxy for institutions and policies, we should
not expect the twice lagged value to be a stronger predictor of aid allocation than the
lagged or current value.
An even stronger argument can be made by looking at the variation in the
voting behaviour and the institutional and policy variables across the CPR-2001
country quintiles.18 Table 3 lists the means and standard deviations for the central
variables in the regression model according to the CPR country quintiles, and the
ANOVA F-test for equality of the means across the country groupings. Table 3
shows that the UN voting behaviour is not systematically related to the CPR
country ratings. If anything, US alignment is far more pronounced in the second
quintile compared to the top and bottom quintiles. In contrast, political freedom,
the regulatory burden and the rule-of-law are all signiﬁcantly related to the CPR
in the way one would expect. In particular, the mean of these three indicators
are decreasing systematically and signiﬁcantly from the second to the ﬁfth CPR
quintile. Moreover, military expenditures are also (marginally) related to the CPR,
with larger expenditure shares in the lower quintiles compared to the upper
quintiles.
As we only have the CPR for 2001 we use averages over 1995–1999 for the UN
voting behaviour, political freedom and the military expenditures.19 Even though the
CPR is expected to be very persistent over time (being mainly a function of the
CPIA) the averaging may blur a systematic relationship between the UN voting
behaviour and CPR. In order to look into this issue we use a set of other indicators
of institutions and policies available from the World Bank for which we have data
from 1996, 1998 and 2000. Speciﬁcally, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton
(1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) have collected a large set of
governance indicators from various sources, and summarised them in six indicators
of diﬀerent dimensions of governance using an unobserved components model. We
refer to these measures as the KKZ indices. The six indices measure voice and
accountability, political stability, government eﬀectiveness, regulatory quality, rule
of law and control of corruption. For several reasons, we expect them to capture a
large part of the variation in the CPR index. First, since they originate from the same
institution and are intended to measure broadly similar phenomena, we should
expect them to be correlated. Second, the CPIA is listed as one of the sources of the
KKZ indices. Speciﬁcally, the KKZ measures of government eﬀectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption all include some of the
items from the CPIA index (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003). Third, the
KKZ indices are conceptually similar to the CPIA items, both focusing on rule-
based, accountable, transparent and incorrupt government, and market-friendly
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economic policies. As the KKZ indices are only available for 1996, 1998 and 2000
including them in our model would entail a severe loss of observations. Hence,
instead, we use an indirect argument to show that the results on the importance of
voting coincidence with the US on key issues would most likely not be aﬀected if the
KKZ variables were to be included.
Table 4 reports the means and standard deviations of the six KKZ indices across
the CPR country quintiles, analogues to the results in Table 3. As seen, we ﬁnd a
very strong systematic association between the CPR country ranking in 2001 and the
KKZ indices in 2000. This supports our hypothesis that the KKZ indices and the
CPR are highly correlated measures.
Moving further to a comparison of the KKZ indices and the variables included
in the regressions in Table 1, we report the sample correlations between the
KKZ indices and our UN voting variable and of institutions and policies, using
observations from 1996, 1998 and 2000 in Table 5. The table reveals two important
pieces of information. First of all, the correlations between UN voting and the
KKZ variables are very moderate in size suggesting that UN voting is a poor proxy
for the CPR index. Second, the KKZ indices are all very highly correlated with one
or more of the measures of policies and institutions included in our model. For
example, the variable most highly correlated with UN voting, ‘Voice and
Accountability’, has a correlation of 0.95 with the measure of Political Freedom
included in our model. Moreover, notice that the pair wise correlations between the
measures of Regulatory Burden (quality), Rule of Law, and Corruption are all in
excess of 0.9, implying that we have almost perfect indicators. This means that
most of the variation in the KKZ indices – and by implication most of the variation
in the CPR index – is already accounted for by the variables included in our
model.20
We take these results as a strong indication that most of the variation in the CPR
index is captured in our model, and that it is not closely correlated with the UN
voting variable. This strengthens the interpretation of the UN voting variable as an
indicator of US political interests.
V. Concluding Remarks
Compliance with US political interests in the UNGA aﬀects the allocation of aid
ﬂows to developing countries. This is well known from anecdotal evidence and
backed by empirical work on USAID allocations and IMF lending. However, the
World Bank, and in particular IDA, is by many perceived as a donor escaping
strong US inﬂuence. Speciﬁcally, while US inﬂuence has been detected in empirical
work covering the 1970s and early 1980s, none of the recent econometric studies of
IDA lending, covering the 1980s and 1990s, have found signiﬁcant eﬀects of
compliance with US policies using UNGA voting coincidence as the proxy for
compliance.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that, when key votes (deﬁned by the US State
Department) are used to proxy compliance, it is possible to capture a statistically
signiﬁcant US inﬂuence on IDA lending. This result carries economic signiﬁcance
and is robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Moreover, our results are not inﬂuenced
by the omission of the secret CPIA index.
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Notes
1. The report is a blueprint for reforming the IMF, the World Bank, and the other multilateral
development banks. Allen H. Meltzer chaired the commission; Charles Calomiris was one of the eight
members of the bipartisan majority who signed the report.
2. Related, work (in progress) by Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm explores to what extent G7
countries have been able to buy votes from countries with IMF and World Bank money.
3. CPIA is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment while ARPP is the Annual Portfolio
Performance Rating. Both ratings are made by World Bank staﬀ.
4. In the ﬁscal year 2004 the threshold was USD 865.
5. Although originally born in Australia, former World Bank President James Wolfensohn is a
naturalised US citizen.
6. The nomination of candidates is considered suﬃciently important by the US so that the task is
undertaken by the White House, and not by the Treasury, which otherwise is responsible for most
interactions between the US and the Bank (Fidler, 2001).
7. The Arab dominated aid agencies include the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC
Fund for International Development.
8. Other early studies of World Bank aid allocation include Cline and Sargen (1975) and Isenman (1976).
9. Dominance is deﬁned as the value of a country’s export to the US relative to GNP (i.e., it is just trade
dependence).
10. The authors have access to the CPIA data because they are at the World Bank.
11. IDA countries that did not receive any funds during the sample period include Afghanistan, Kiribati,
Liberia, Myanmar, Samoa and Uzbekistan.
12. In Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix we provide summary statistics of the variables used in the
estimations and the correlation matrix.
13. There are no exclusion restrictions in the Heckman model; identiﬁcation relies on the non-linearity of
the model.
Table 5. Correlations between institutional and policy variables in the model and the
KKZ indices
Institutional and policy variables
KKZ indices
UN voting
(t-2)
Political
freedom
Military
expenditure
Regulatory
burden
Rule
of law Corruption
Voice and
accountability
0.34 0.95 70.56 0.81 0.86 0.84
Political stability 0.02 0.70 70.48 0.69 0.81 0.76
Government
eﬀectiveness
70.10 0.69 70.38 0.80 0.92 0.93
Regulatory quality 70.07 0.75 70.47 0.91 0.86 0.83
Rule of law 0.00 0.78 70.41 0.82 0.97 0.93
Control of
corruption
0.02 0.74 70.37 0.79 0.92 0.95
Source: KKZ indices are from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi [2003].
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14. The selection equations are not reported but, naturally, they can be obtained from the authors on request.
15. A natural step further would be to ask whether the UN voting variable indicates that actual vote
buying in the UN plays an important role for aid allocation, or whether it is a proxy for alliances with
the US in a broader sense. In this paper, we leave this as an open question; see also endnote 2.
16. The scaled change, often denoted DFBETAS (Belsley, Kuhn and Welsch, 1980), is calculated as
DFBETAS(i)¼ (b7 b(i))/sd(b(i)), in which b is the full sample estimate and b(i), sd(b(i)) is the estimate
and standard error, respectively, when country i is excluded from the sample. The scaled change is a t-
like statistic. In Vellerman and Welsch (1981) it is suggested that statistics exceeding one in absolute
value indicate inﬂuential data points.
17. Needless to say, in this comparison one should also consider the costs associated with changes in UN
voting, quality of life and human rights to make it meaningful. However, we conjecture that the cost of
changes in UN voting does not exceed the costs of changes in the two other variables.
18. The countries in each quintile are listed in Table A4 in the Appendix. Note that for the ﬁve variables
using only 55 countries in Table 3 the loss is mainly in the ﬁrst quintile in which we have only
observations for 8 countries compared to 11, 13, 11, and 12 countries in quintiles 2-5. This probably
explains why the mean of the ﬁrst quintile is often lower than the mean of the second quintile. Hence,
we conjecture that the systematic relationship is stronger in the population compared to our sample.
19. The regulatory burden, rule of law and corruption measures are time constant.
20. An important reason for the high correlations is of course that the measures in part build on the same
surveys and polls. For example, theFreedomHouse indices of political rights and civil liberties, whichwe
use as a measure of political freedom, is one of the components in the KKZ index of voice and
accountability.
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Appendix
A. Description of variables, summary statistics and IDA country performance ratings
Table A1 provides a description of variables employed in the empirical analysis. All
variables, except UN voting, IDA lending, debt and openness, are taken from
Neumayer (2003a). Since this author provides a very detailed account of the data, we
only provide the original source and a brief description. Neumayer should be
consulted for further details.
Table A1. Description of variables and sources
Variable Source Description
Real IDA World Bank (2002) The amount of Real ODA commitments in
millions of USD 1995 pledged by the
International Development
Association (IDA).
Population World Bank (2001) Population (not scaled).
GDP per capita World Bank (2001)
and WHO (2000)
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity
units.
Physical quality
of life
World Bank (2001) Quality of life index ranging from 0 (worst)
to 100 (best). It consists of three weighted
components: literacy, infant mortality
and life expectancy.
Former Western
Colony
Alesina and Dollar
(2000)
Number of years a country has been a DAC
country colony in the period 1900–1960.
DAC exports to
recipient
OECD (2002c) Weighted measure of DAC countries’
exports to a recipient country as a share
of total exports. Weights equal the shares
of respective donors DAC contribution.
US military grants USAID (2002) Percentage share of total US military grants
a recipient country receives.
UNGA voting on
key issues
US State Department
(various years)
Voting coincidence on key UNGA issues
as deﬁned by the State Department. The
measure ranges from 0 (no coincidence)
to 1 (voting in complete accordance with
the US).
Per cent Christian La Porta et al. (2000) Percentage of Christians in the
population.
Political freedom Freedom House (2000) A combined freedom index based on adding
the two Freedom House indices: political
rights and civic rights. The combined
index was reverted such that it ranges
from 72 (best) to 714 (worst).
Human rights Gibney (2002) A combined human rights index based on
adding the two Purdue Political Terror
Scales (PTS). The combined index ranges
from 71 (best) to 75 (worst).
Military
expenditures
World Bank (2001),
US Bureau of Arms
Control (1995, 1998)
and Encyclopedia
Britannica (2001).
Percentage of government expenditure used
on the military.
(continued)
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Table A1. (Continued)
Variable Source Description
Corruption Kaufman et al.
(1999a,b)
Corruption is based on the graft
indicator created by the World Bank. It is
based on subjective measures of corrup-
tion obtained from surveys of residents
and entrepreneurs within the country
and polls of experts. The indicator is
normalized such that is ranges from –2.5
(worst) to 2.5 (best), and has mean zero
and a standard deviation of one.
Rule of Law Kaufman et al.
(1999a,b)
Measure of ‘respect for law and order,
predictability and eﬀectiveness of the
judicial system, and enforceability of
contracts’. The indicator is normalized
as the corruption indicator above.
Regulatory
burden
Kaufman et al.
(1999a,b)
Measure of the ‘burden on business via
quantitative restrictions, price controls
and other interventions in the
economy’. Normalized as above.
Openness World Bank (2002) Openness is the sum of merchandise exports
and imports, measured in current US
dollars, divided by the value of GDP in
US dollars.
Debt World Bank (2002) Debt is debt owed to nonresidents repay-
able in foreign currency, goods, or
services, divided by the value of GDP in
US dollars.
Table A2. Summary statistics for the sample of IDA countries
Mean Std. deviation Min Max
Real ODA 140.38 192.43 0.21 1231.80
Population (million) 70.2 229 0.47 1125
GDP per capita 1653.07 880.55 436.07 4579.97
Physical quality of life 55.16 16.52 10 90
Former Western colony 40.76 25.80 0 60
ln (DAC export to recipient) 0.113 0.413 0.0002 2.91
Per cent Christian 26.16 31.22 0 99.1
Political freedom 79 2.74 714 73
Human rights 72.92 0.93 75 71
Military expenditures 11.40 7.23 0 53.26
Corruption 70.54 0.39 71.57 0.35
Rule of law 70.52 0.45 71.62 0.27
Regulatory burden 70.25 0.51 71.82 0.88
Openness 4.11 0.48 2.72 5.64
Debt to GDP 1.10 0.97 0.03 6.71
UN voting on key issues 0.52 0.20 0 1
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Table A4. IDA country performance ratings 2001
First quintile Benin, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Grenada, Honduras, India, Maldives,
Mauritania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Tanzania, Uganda
Second quintile Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Dominica,
Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique,
Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Vanuatu
Third quintile Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, Guyana, Indonesia, Kenya, Kirgyz
Republic, Lesotho, Mali, Nicaragua, Niger, Vietnam, Zambia
Fourth quintile Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Cote
d’Ivoire, Gambia, The, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Nigeria, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sierra Leone, Tonga, Yemen, Rep.
Fifth quintile Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo,
Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Solomon Islands, Sudan, Tajikistan, Togo, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe
794 T. B. Andersen et al.
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Uncovering how they function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for 
good governance. I describe in a theoretical model how interactions between candidates 
for political office, rank-and-file party members and voters may lead to "party capture", 
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strongly affected by economic inequality. 
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1. Introduction1 
    What is the role of political parties in local governments in developing countries? Are they forces 
for social change, or vehicles of patronage? The significance of democratically elected local 
councils in the developing world has grown dramatically in recent decades, making it essential to 
understand how local governments work and what explains the wide differences in performance 
between them (Manor 1999, Bardhan 2002). Current debates about good governance at the 
community level tend to neglect the role of political parties, and instead focus on (other) non-
governmental organizations, such as user groups or religious organizations. For example, in a 
recent, comprehensive review of the literature on community driven development, political parties 
are not mentioned at all (Mansuri and Rao 2004). However, parties continue to be key players in 
both local and national democracies almost everywhere, and knowing how they function is essential 
for understanding the preconditions for good governance. 
    This paper investigates the role of political parties in local governments by studying the 
phenomenon I term "party capture", defined as a bias of public policy in favor of members of the 
governing political party. The main contributions of the paper are (i) to investigate party capture 
theoretically, (ii) to show that it is empirically important in the context of local governments in 
India, and (iii) to demonstrate that party capture is strongly affected by economic inequality -- more 
unequal communities are more prone to capture. 
    Studies in political economy usually assume that political parties are monolithic actors. The 
theoretical part of the paper departs from this assumption by looking inside political parties and 
examining the interaction between candidates for political office and rank-and-file party members. I 
augment the model of interest groups and electoral competition developed by Baron (1994) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1996) to describe this interaction, and show how it affects candidates' 
policy-choice. Essentially, non-candidate party members offer support for the candidate's election 
campaign in return for policy favors. In equilibrium, this leads to party capture. The strength of 
party capture depends on how susceptible the electorate is to the influence of campaign activities. I 
argue that this susceptibility is higher in more unequal societies and derive the model prediction that 
party capture increases with inequality. 
    The implications of the model are tested on data from a survey of local governments and 
households in four South Indian states, namely Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu. I exploit a data set collected by Tim Besley, Rohini Pande and Vijayendra Rao. My empirical 
                                                 
1 I am grateful for comments from Anne Christensen, Kalle Moene, Eva Rytter Sunesen, Finn Tarp, Radu Ban and 
seminar participants at the Universities of Copenhagen, Oslo and Cornell. The usual caveats apply. 
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approach also ows a great a deal to the papers published by these authors based on the dataset, 
although my focus is different than theirs (Besley et. al. 2004, Besley, Pande and Rao 2005a,b).2 
    The operational definition of party capture is simply the strength of the partial correlation 
between membership in the party of the local government leader (the Pradhan) and beneficiary 
status in a policy program. An advantage of this measure is that both party membership and 
beneficiary status are fairly objective and easy-to-measure variables. This stands in contrast to more 
commonly used measures of the quality of governance, which are often based on informants' 
subjective judgments. For example, the "Governance Indicators" published by the World Bank rely 
"exclusively on subjective or perceptions based measures of governance" (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 2004, p. 19). As Esteban and Ray (2006) point out, such measures are vulnerable to bias 
stemming from "rationalizations" of the observed performance of an economy. 
    Results show that members of the Pradhan's party are more likely to benefit from an important 
poverty alleviation program than others, and that this effect is more important than other forms of 
nepotism, such as nepotism based on shared language, religion or place of living. The presence of a 
strong interaction effect between economic inequality and party affiliation is demonstrated. In equal 
communities the influence of party capture is negligible but in unequal ones it is strong and 
quantitatively important. 
    The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews existing literature and section 3 presents the 
theory of party capture. Section 4 gives background information and presents the dataset, while 
section 5 sets up an econometric model and defines key variables. Section 6 provides descriptive 
statistics, and section 7 presents estimation results. This section first provides evidence on the 
existence of party capture and how it is affected by inequality and economic development. It then 
deals with endogeneity problems. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
    The paper relates to several different strands of literature. First, It distinguishes itself from the 
tradition of political economy which views political parties as monolithic actors and treats 
candidates for political office as more or less synonymous with the parties they represent. For 
example, the dominant approach to the analysis of government capture by special interests has been 
to focus on the influence of interest groups external to political parties such as labor unions, farmer 
groups and business lobbies (see Grossman and Helpman 2001). The analysis carried out here shifts 
                                                 
2 The collection of these data was funded by the World Bank and DFID and directed by Tim Besley, Rohini Pande and 
Vijayendra Rao. I am highly grateful to these authors for giving me access to the data. 
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the focus to interactions within parties, namely those between candidates for political office and 
rank-and-file members. A few other studies have looked at intra-party interactions, but they differ 
from the present paper in several respects. Caillaud and Tirole (1999) assume, as is also done here, 
that candidates are "office seekers" (they only care about being elected), but they also assume that 
the rank-and-file are motivated by ideological values. In contrast, I propose that rank-and-file party 
members are classical "economic men" who are mainly concerned about maximizing their own 
welfare. The studies by Fleck (2001) and Roemer (2005) are other examples of studies looking 
inside political parties, but they both study the rivalry between different factions within parties 
instead of the candidate versus rank-and-file dimension, which is the focus of this study. 
    Second, The paper follows in the footsteps of other empirical studies of local government capture 
in developing countries, summarized by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005, 2006). These authors 
provide an important contribution themselves in their comparison of national and local governments 
in a theoretical model. They find that the relative propensity to elite capture of local as compared 
with national governments depends on a number of institutional and socioeconomic factors, such as 
electoral systems and relative levels of inequality (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2002). 
    A number of recent, empirical studies have in different ways focused on capture of local 
governments in India. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) study local government provision of 
infrastructure in an India-wide sample of rural communities (Gram Panchayats, or GPs). Some are 
democratically governed and some are not. Foster and Rosenzweig argue that the principal 
economic classes in rural India are the landowners and the landless, and they find that the 
introduction of local democracy reduces "elite capture", in the sense that it leads to more pro-
landless public investment. In a similar vein, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003) find that effective, 
political competition leads to pro-poor policies. They show in a study of local governments in West 
Bengal (a state in Northeastern India) that more equal vote shares between the two major political 
blocs (Congress and the Left Front) leads to higher levels of pro-poor land reform. Another 
indication of the potential for openness and democracy to improve targeting of public resources is 
provided by Besley and Burgess (2002). They show that government responsiveness to natural 
disasters is highest in those states of India that have the most well-developed news media. 
    Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b) study the inter-GP and intra-village targeting of public 
resources to the poor in West Bengal and find that intra-village targeting of resources is only 
weakly affected by poverty, land inequality and caste composition. This leads them to conclude that 
there are few signs of elite capture within villages. On the other hand, they find that inter-GP 
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allocation patterns are negatively correlated with poverty and inequality. This indicates that central- 
rather than local government is captured by elites. They also investigate whether political favoritism 
affects inter-community allocations, but find no evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Bardhan and 
Mookherjee's findings on intra- and intervillage targeting echo the results of the Galasso and 
Ravallion (2005) study of a poverty reduction program in Bangladesh, which demonstrates that 
although intra-community targeting at the local level is not perfect, it is significantly better than the 
inter-community targeting achieved by central authorities (which amounts to virtually nothing). 
Galasso and Ravallion also show that intra-village, pro-poor targeting is negatively affected by 
inequality. 
    Several studies have investigated the effects of political reservation in the Gram Panchayats. For 
example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001) find that GPs in West Bengal and Rajasthan, where the 
Pradhan position is reserved for women, prioritize resources differently than other GPs. Besley et. 
al. (2004) find (in the dataset used in the present paper) that programs are better targeted to 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in GPs reserved for these groups. We can interpret this as 
indicating that gender- and caste based capture can be reduced through institutional design. 
    Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a), again using the same dataset as here, find that GP politicians 
favor themselves and their fellow villagers in the allocation of public resources. For example, 
politician households are more likely than other households to benefit from the poverty alleviation 
program also studied in this paper (the BPL scheme). However, more educated politicians are less 
prone to nepotism. They also find that households affiliated with the local political leaders party are 
more likely than others to benefit from the program. However, this result is reported only in a 
footnote (p.24), without further discussion. I follow up on that result by (i) offering a theoretical 
discussion of party favoritism, (ii) including a number of additional, relevant control variables, and 
(iii) exploring interaction effects. 
    In sum, the literature on local government in India has in different ways dealt with government 
capture along lines of caste, class, gender and political position. However, apart from the footnote 
in Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a), capture along lines of party affiliation is unexplored. 
    Third, the focus on economic distribution places the paper in the large literature on the effects of 
inequality on economic development, which has recently been summarized in the 2006 World 
Development Report (World Bank 2005b). With the exception of Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b) 
and Galasso and Ravallion (2005), none of the empirical studies of local government capture 
described above have investigated how capture is affected by inequality. However, in studies of 
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irrigation management and other collective action problems on the local commons (see Bardhan 
1999, Dayton-Johnson 2000 and Khwaja 2002) and on the management of agricultural cooperatives 
(Banerjee et. al. 2001), it has been shown that inequality has an important effect on performance 
levels. This paper builds on these studies in its attempt to investigate the influence of inequality on 
good governance in the Gram Panchayats. 
 
3.  A Theory of Party Capture 
    The theory of party capture presented here is a version of the model of electoral competition and 
special interests developed by Grossman and Helpman (1996).3 Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 
2002) augmented this model in order to study local governments, and I follow their version of the 
theory closely. The innovation is to interpret the model in terms of interaction between candidates 
and rank-and-file party members, rather than interaction between candidates and external interest 
groups. In other words, I suggest we regard party organizations as a type of interest group. 
     
    3.1 Candidates 
    Consider a political jurisdiction in which two candidates, a and b, compete to win an election. 
The candidates simply maximize their probability of winning. The winning candidate selects a 
vector of policies, π. Candidates are able to commit credibly to a policy vector before the election. 
     
    3.2 Voters 
    There are N voters, indexed i = 1 ,...,N. Voters are divided into three groups, indexed g = A, B, C. 
Groups A and B are organized in political parties that support candidates a and b, respectively. To 
simplify the analysis, we assume that all members of groups A and B are members of their 
respective political parties, denoted party A and B. Group C is not organized. The decision to join a 
party is not modeled, but we can imagine that there are fixed economic and non-economic costs 
attached to being a party member, which explain why some people choose not to join a party. 
Alternatively, parties may restrict entry and allow only people with certain ethnic or economic 
characteristics to join, for example for reasons of trust. The population weight of group g is βg. A 
representative voter in group g derives utility Ug(π) from the policy vector π. In each group, a 
fraction of voters, αg, is politically aware. They know the political platforms of the parties, and vote 
according to how these platforms are likely to affect their welfare. The complementary fraction, 1- 
                                                 
3 An important precursor to this paper is Baron (1994). 
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αg, is impressionable. Impressionable voters either do not know the party platforms, or are unable to 
evaluate the potential impact of these platforms on their own well-being. They are therefore easily 
impressed by electoral campaigns. Assume that αA = αB = 1, that is, all party members are aware. 
Denote by α = βA + βB + αCβC the fraction of the entire population who is aware. Aware voters base 
their vote on an evaluation of the candidates' policies, and on their preferences for exogenous 
characteristics of the candidates. These characteristics could either be policy positions that 
candidates are unable or unwilling to change, for example because of strong ideological attachment, 
or they could be personal characteristics. Thus, aware voter i in group g votes for candidate a if: 
   
 ( ) ( )a bg i gU Uπ ε λ π+ + ≥  (1) 
 
    where εi is a voter-specific, fixed preference parameter. The candidates observe only the 
distribution of εi, not the individual values. Assume that εi is uniformly distributed on the interval 
1 1
- ,
2 2f f
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  . Then, the density of the distribution is everywhere f. εi is uncorrelated with group 
membership and awareness-status. λ is a general preference parameter, the value of which is 
realized only after candidates announce policies, but before the election. It is the unpredictable 
swing in relative candidate popularity that might take place in the run-up to an election, for example 
as a result of news-reports or rumors about the private lives of the candidates. Let G(-λ) be the 
cumulated distribution function of -λ. The shape of this distribution is known to candidates at the 
time they set policy. Note that candidate a receives votes from both group A and group B. Hence, 
even though members of group B cannot join party A, some of them still vote for candidate a. This 
could result from the rule of the secret ballot. While party membership might be subject to severe 
social sanctions, voting is not, because it cannot be observed.4 
    Impressionable voters, on the other hand, base their vote only on preferences for the exogenous 
characteristics of candidates. These preferences, in turn, can be affected by campaign activity. 
Impressionable voter j votes for candidate a if: 
                                                 
4 We can allow members of party A to be biased in favor of candidate a without changing the flavor of the result, for 
example by letting εi be distributed on 
1 1
- ,
2 2
m m
f f
+⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , m > 0 in party A (we could do the same for party B with m 
< 0). What matters is that the density of the distribution around the critical point that separates voters for candidate a 
from voters for candidate b is the same in the different groups, and that at least some members of party A vote for 
candidate b, and vice versa. 
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 ( ) 0a b jh C C ε λ− + + ≥  (2) 
 
    Where Ck denotes campaign activity per member of the electorate in favor of candidate k = a, b, 
and h is a scalar representing the effectiveness of campaign activities. Note that h is a technological 
parameter. It measures, for example, how many voters one campaign worker can reach with the 
candidate's message (and bribes) in one day. 
     
    3.3 Parties 
    A crucial distinction is made in this model between those members of a political party who run 
for political office (the candidates) and the rank-and-file members who do not. In essence, the party 
functions as a marketplace where these two types of agents can trade campaign contributions for 
policy favors. 
    Rank-and-file party members can offer campaign contributions, but only to the candidate 
affiliated with their own party. In the model by Grossman and Helpman, campaign contributions are 
offered by external interest groups, and each interest group may contribute to both of the parties, 
and will in general do so. In the context of parties, however, it seems natural to assume that party 
members can only support the campaigns of candidates affiliated with their own party. However, if 
agents' motives for offering campaign contributions are purely instrumental, it is natural to ask why 
they should constrain themselves to supporting only one of the candidates. We can explain this 
either by assuming, as in Baron (1994), that each candidate is constrained in his choice of policies, 
and can only bias policy away from the campaign free outcome in the direction that his own party-
members desire, and not in the direction desired by members of the competing candidate's party. 
For example, for reasons of ideology, reputation or credibility, it may not be possible for a working 
class party to offer extremely business-friendly policies. Alternatively, we can argue from the 
premise that candidates will only respond to promises of campaign support if they believe them. 
The credibility of promises may rely on social or economic ties between the candidate and the 
contributors. Therefore, it may not be possible for potential contributors to give credible promises 
of campaign contributions to all candidates (for example, members of party A might not be able to 
offer credible promises to candidate b). 
    Members of party g coordinate their actions to maximize the common utility function 
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 ( ) (1 ) ( )
k
k k k k
g g
g
CG U G Uπ π β+ − −
   (3) 
    where Gk is the probability that candidate k wins the election, and the last term is the per-member 
level of campaign activity. 
    Party members offer to their candidate a contribution schedule, Ck(πk), which relates the level of 
campaign activity that party members are willing to supply to the policy vector chosen by the 
candidate. Ck(·) is a continuous and differentiable function. 
    The assumption that party members can coordinate on maximizing a common utility function and 
offering a common contribution schedule to the candidate is not trivial, but also not entirely 
unrealistic. First, all party-members are politically aware, and therefore realize that they will derive 
utility Ug(πk) from the policy vector πk. Second, most political parties elect high-ranking party-
officials who do not hold, or attempt to be elected to, any government office, and whom we can 
therefore imagine will represent party members in negotiations with candidates. It is possibly more 
realistic to assume that candidates bargain separately with each local branch of the party. This 
assumption would lead to a more complicated model, where each candidate faces multiple groups 
of potential contributors, in the form of party branches, and each of these branches takes into 
account not only the candidate's response to a contribution schedule, but also the responses of other 
branches. Fortunately, Grossman and Helpman (1996) show that the extension of the model to 
accommodate this assumption is relatively straightforward. Furthermore, it leads to results that are 
qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in the model where each candidate faces only one group of 
potential contributors. I will not pursue this strand of the argument further here. 
     
    3. 4  Equilibrium 
    The timing of the model is as follows: First, party members present contribution schedules. Then 
candidates set policy, and subsequently campaign activity and the swing factor are realized, and 
elections held. Finally, the winning candidate implements policy. 
    A candidate faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, pleasing aware voter and on the other, 
attracting campaign contributions that will allow him to capture votes from impressionable voters. 
In other words, when the party offers a contribution schedule to the candidate, it needs to take into 
account the candidate's participation constraint. The candidate's expected vote share must be at least 
as high if he accepts the contribution schedule as if he ignores the party and targets only aware 
voters. Essentially, the party determines the candidate's policy platform, subject to the participation 
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constraint. When this constraint is fulfilled with equality, party A induces candidate a to announce a 
policy vector, πa, that maximizes the following expression: 
  
 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )a a a aA A B B C C CG U U a Uχ π ββ π πβ + + +  (4) 
 
    where Ga is the probability that candidate a wins the election, and χ = h(1-α) is the product of the 
effectiveness of campaign activity, and the fraction of the electorate that is impressionable. The 
proof of (4) follows standard techniques and is given in appendix A. The expression shows that in 
equilibrium, party A induces candidate a to announce a policy vector which maximizes a weighted 
welfare function, with greater weight attached to the welfare of members of party A than to other 
citizens.5 
πa is only implemented if candidate a wins the election. Hence, (4) leads to the prediction that the 
allocation of public resources will be biased in favor of members of the governing party. Equally 
important, expression (4) implies that the size of this bias depends on campaign activity 
effectiveness (h) and on the weight of impressionable voters in the electorate (1-α). These results 
are summarized in Proposition1. 
 
Proposition 1: In a democratic political jurisdiction, where candidates can commit 
credibly to policies before an election, and where a part of the electorate is susceptible 
to the influence of election campaigns, policy is biased in favor of members of the 
governing party. This bias increases with the share of impressionable voters in the 
electorate and with the technological effectiveness of campaign activity. 
 
3.5 Determinants of awareness and campaign effectivity 
    There may be many determinants of χ. Here I shall focus on two fundamental characteristics of 
an economy that are potentially important, namely inequality and economic development. 
    Assume that the probability that a voter is politically aware is an upward-sloping, concave 
function of her wealth. The positive slope is explained by the fact that more well-off individuals are 
more likely to be educated, and to have access to media and other sources of information about 
politics, and that they are less likely to be affected by the small gifts and bullying techniques often 
                                                 
5 It is assumed that the participation constraint binds. If it does not, members of party A are favored even more strongly 
(see Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002) 
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applied in political campaigns. The concavity of the function relies on the assumption that the 
likelihood of possessing the prerequisites for awareness increases more rapidly with wealth among 
the poor than among the rich -- for example because literacy rates or radio ownership are concave 
functions of wealth.6 These assumptions imply that a mean preserving increase in inequality leads 
to a lower fraction of voters being politically aware. Hence, the fraction α of voters that are 
politically aware depends negatively on the level of wealth inequality. 
    The assumptions also imply that awareness is a positive function of economic development, as 
measured by average wealth in the community. The total effect of economic development on χ is 
unclear, however, because h, the effectiveness of campaign activities, might be higher in more 
developed regions where access to mass communication and transport is more widespread. Hence, 
as communities develop, two countervailing forces come into work. On the one hand, increasing 
education and access to information decreases susceptibility to propaganda. On the other hand, 
better infrastructure and media also make it easier to spread this propaganda. 
    In sum, we expect χ, and therefore party capture, to increase with inequality, while the expected 
effect of economic development is ambiguous. 
 
4. Empirical setting and data 
 
4.1  Background 
    The theory of party capture set out above is tested on data from a survey of local governments, 
villages and households in rural areas of the four southernmost states of India: Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The constitutional basis for decentralized government in India 
has existed almost since the country gained independence in 1947, although in most states local 
governments were extremely weak until 1993 when the constitution was amended to reinforce the 
importance of local level democracy. States were required to set up three layers of democratically 
elected councils at the District, Block and Gram levels, and to divert substantial amounts of tasks 
and funds to these new entities. 
                                                 
6 As a somewhat casual test of this assumption, I take the dataset presented below and regress the number of times per 
week the respondent reads a newspaper (a proxy for political awareness) on an index of durable goods ownership (a 
proxy for wealth), and its square. In a model with village fixed effects, I find a positive coefficient on the linear term, 
and a negative coefficient on the squared term, both very statistically significant. The same patterns of results appear if 
land owned is entered instead of the durable goods index. This supports the assumption that political awareness is a 
concave funtion of wealth. For more evidence on the validity of the assumption, see Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002). 
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    The data cover the lowest level of government, the Gram Panchayat (GP). A GP typically 
comprises between one and five villages, and has a few thousand inhabitants. The responsibilities of 
GPs vary between states, but in all states they serve at least two main functions. First, they provide 
public goods such as roads, street lights and water supply. Second, they select individual 
beneficiaries for state and federal welfare schemes (Besley et. al. 2005). It is this second function 
that we draw upon to investigate the effects of party capture. 
    The GP is subdivided into wards, and elections for GP councils are held at the ward level. The 
leader of the GP is called the Pradhan. In Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu the Pradhan is elected 
directly, while in Karnataka and Kerala the elected ward representatives nominate the Pradhan. A 
council is elected for a fixed term of five years. Council members and Pradhans can seek reelection, 
but the same seat cannot be reserved for the same group in two consecutive elections. 
    A genuinely competitive multiparty democracy is functioning in all four states, at state as well as 
local levels. In no state is one party so dominant as to be able to effectively ignore competition from 
other parties. The Indian National Congress (INC) is a central player in at least three of the sampled 
states. The only exception is Tamil Nadu, where the INC has not controlled the state government 
for several decades and has few members in our sample. Apart from that, the politics of the four 
states are dominated by different parties. In Andhra Pradesh, the regional Telugu Desam Party is the 
major player, challenged only by the INC. In Karnataka, the main competitors of the INC are two 
other, national (as opposed to regional) parties, namely the Janata Party, and the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP). In Kerala, the main parties are the INC and the Communist Party of India (Marxist). In 
Tamil Nadu, several regional parties compete for power, the principal ones being the Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). 
    Anecdotal evidence suggests that party capture is important in South India. Kerala is famous for 
its successful, participatory development strategy, but Platteau and Abraham (2002) report that the 
local government program in Kerala "suffers from an important weakness in that it has become a 
platform for political favoritism in a country plagued by excessive party politicisation down to the 
local level" (p. 126). In a similar vein, Tharakan (2004) concludes that "The evolution of modern 
Kerala society and politics resulted in a process of party-politicisation of associational life, which 
subjected it to the clientelistic principle of winning support by way of partisan favours". In Tamil 
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Nadu, the regional parties that dominate the state's politics are reported to have governed through 
"populist clientelism" (Subramaniam 1999, p. 69, quoted in Harriss 2001, p. 19).7 
     
4.2  Dataset 
    Sampling took place in several stages. Districts were selected in pairs on either side of state 
borders, so that district pairs with similar historical and socioeconomic characteristics were 
selected. More specifically, pairs of districts from two states were chosen so that each were part of 
the same political entity before the restructuring of state borders in 1956. Hence, the sample is not 
representative at the state level. Rather, the strength of the sampling strategy is that it builds in 
controls for historical factors that might influence current outcomes. Nine districts were sampled 
(one district entered the sample twice) and subsequently a total of 201 GPs were sampled from 
these districts. In each of the GPs, all villages were sampled if the GP had no more than three 
villages. If there were more than three villages, the Pradhan's village and two randomly selected 
villages were sampled. In each village a survey was administered to about three local politicians: 
the Pradhan, the Vice Pradhan and an ordinary council member. Village surveys were conducted to 
obtain data on local, public infrastructure, land and caste distribution. In a random sample of 101 
GPs, household interviews were conducted in all the sampled villages. In total, 544 politician 
households and 5,180 ordinary households were interviewed. At least four scheduled caste or 
scheduled tribe households were sampled in each village. For further information on the sampling 
strategy, see World Bank (2005a) and Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a,b). 
    For the purposes of this study, data on households, as well as Pradhans and villages are needed. 
Therefore, only those villages where household surveys were conducted are included in the 
analysis. I use the sample of politicians to construct variables such as whether respondents belong to 
the same party as the Pradhan, but I do not include the politician households in the sample used for 
estimation. The reasons are, first, that the sample is not representative of the GP population when 
the politician households are included - politicians are overrepresented (politician households are 
allowed to enter the sample of ordinary households, if they happen to be sampled). Second, the 
theory to be tested concerns the distribution of public resources among citizens who are not 
candidates for political office. It therefore seems appropriate not to include the sample of elected 
politicians. 
                                                 
7 See also Chandra (2004). Based on the large role played by the state in the provision of services and jobs and on the 
high level of discretion enjoyed by officials in charge of distributing these, he describes India as a "patronage 
democracy". 
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5.  Econometric model and variable definitions 
    To test the implications of the theory presented in section 3, several versions of the following 
regression model are estimated: 
 
 1 2 3 ( * ) 'ijh ijh jh ijh jh ijh k ijhy P K P K x eγ γ γ β θ θ= + + + + + +  (5) 
 
where yijh is an indicator for household i in GP j in district h being a beneficiary of a public welfare 
program, which is described in detail below. Pijh is an indicator for being a member of the same 
party as the GP Pradhan and Khj is a proxy for the parameter χ in the model above. xijh is a vector of 
household characteristics thought to affect beneficiary status, such as official eligibility criteria, and 
proxies for αg in the model above. θ is a constant, θk is a district or GP fixed effect, γ1, γ2, γ3 and β 
are coefficients to be estimated, and eijh is a household specific random error term. eijh is allowed to 
be correlated across households within the same village, but assumed to be uncorrelated across 
villages. The model is in most cases estimated by OLS or 2SLS, even though the dependent variable 
is binary. First, it is easier and requires fewer assumptions to take account of endogeneity problems 
in linear models, as is done in section 7.3, than in non-linear models (Wooldridge 2002, chapter 15). 
Second, the estimated coefficients are more intuitive to interpret. As robustness checks, results from 
using a probit estimator are also presented. 
    I follow Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a) and use the allocation of Below Poverty Line (BPL) 
cards as the dependent variable. BPL-card holders gain access to a number of state and GP welfare 
schemes, such as the right to buy subsidized food from the federal public food distribution system, 
and access to GP administered housing and employment programs. Having a BPL card is estimated 
to increase the income of an agricultural laborer household by about 5 percent in the four sampled 
states (Besley, Pande and Rao 2005a). Choosing BPL card holders is one of the most important 
tasks of the GP. The GP is allocated a fixed quota of BPL cards from authorities at the district level. 
It is subsequently supposed to carry out a household survey to determine who is eligible for the 
program, and produce a preliminary list of eligible households. The list is then officially required to 
be finalized in a village meeting open to all citizens, a so-called Gram Sabha. However, these 
meetings are often not held, and only about 22 percent of the respondents in the survey have ever 
attended one. In practice the GP council members and officials, in particular the Pradhan, have 
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considerable discretion in choosing BPL beneficiaries. In sum, the dependent variable yijh is an 
indicator variable taking the value one if the household has a BPL card. 
    A household is defined as belonging to "the winning candidate's party", in the terminology of the 
theoretical model, if the household head is a member of the same party as the Pradhan. The measure 
of party capture applied is then the partial correlation between membership in the Pradhan's party 
and beneficiary status in the BPL program. 
    An important implication of the theoretical model presented above is that the amount of party 
capture depends on electorate susceptibility to electoral campaigns, (1- α), and on the effectiveness 
of campaign efforts, h, summarized in the parameter χ = h(1 - α). The main proxy for χ used in the 
analysis is the level of land inequality in the GP. As argued in the theoretical section, (1-α) is likely 
to increase with inequality. Furthermore, high quality data on land inequality is available, since the 
village survey asked respondents to record the entire land distribution of their village. More 
precisely, respondents were asked to report how many households fall into each of the following 
brackets: no land, between 0 and 1 acres, between 1.1 and 5 acres, between 5.1 and 10 acres, 
between 10.1 and 25 acres, and above 25 acres. I estimate the GP landlessness rate and land gini 
coefficients by pooling the data from the sampled villages in each GP. The landlessness rate is 
readily calculated as the share of households falling in the "no land" bracket. To estimate the land 
gini, the interval midpoint value is assigned to each household in a bracket, and inequality is 
estimated.8 I use other proxies for χ apart from land inequality, described further below. 
 
6. Descriptive statistics 
    Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the sampled households. Some 22 percent of households 
are BPL card holders. The fraction of households where the household head is a member of a 
political party is 31 percent. This is a remarkably high level of political participation. Calculations 
based on the 1990-91 World Values Survey show that in most Western countries, less than 10 
percent of the adult population are party members.9 This could simply reveal the presence of an 
unusually active civil society, which is not entirely unrealistic in the case of South India. However, 
it may also indicate that membership of a political party serves other functions than it does in the  
                                                 
8 The last, open bracket presents a special problem. However, only one household in the entire sample is in this bracket. 
It is assigned the value 30 acres. 
 
9 For example, the share of the adult population belonging to a political party or group is 2.0 percent in Japan, 4.9 
percent in Great Britain, 6.5 percent in Denmark and 14.5 percent in the United States (World Values Study Group, 
1994). 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics 
  All households Hh head party 
member 
Hh head member of 
Pradhans party 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean 
     
BPL-card holder 0.22 0.41 0.36 0.42 
Paid tax to GP in last 12 months 0.69 0.46 0.59 0.57 
     
Hh head member of political party 0.31 0.46 1.00 1.00 
Hh head member of Pradhan's party 0.14 0.34 0.44 1.00 
Family political history 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.09 
     
Same religion as Pradhan 0.83 0.37 0.82 0.83 
Same caste group as Pradhan 0.64 0.48 0.65 0.65 
Same mother tongue as Pradhan 0.65 0.48 0.69 0.67 
Same village as Pradhan 0.36 0.48 0.42 0.45 
     
Gram Panchayat gini of cultivated land 0.63 0.15 0.66 0.65 
Gram Panchayat landlessness rate 0.37 0.22 0.43 0.42 
     
Scheduled caste or scheduled tribe 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.24 
Head's education (years) 3.42 4.14 3.72 3.14 
Agricultural land owned (acres) 2.07 4.38 1.79 1.55 
Hh size 5.33 2.39 5.30 5.27 
Age of household head 49.10 13.81 47.95 47.53 
Dependency ratio 0.29 0.22 0.28 0.28 
Durable goods (index)* 11.67 13.01 12.70 11.54 
Female household head 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.08 
Hh head unmarried 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.02 
Hh head divorced 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 
Hh head widowed 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.08 
     
Farmers as a share of all workers, 1991 (m) 0.46 0.21 0.37 0.38 
Farmers as a share of all workers, 1991 (f) 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.21 
     
Main source of income:     
Selfemployment in agriculture 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.30 
Agricultural labor 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.24 
Casual labor (coolie) 0.18 0.39 0.23 0.25 
Permanent wage labor 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.06 
Selfemployment in non-agriculture 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.07 
Rents, remittances, interests, pensions etc. 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.03 
Other 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.04 
Note: N = 5,180.   
*This variable is a weighted sum of the durable goods owned by the households. I have not had access to price data 
which I could use to construct weights, and the weights are therefore based on casual estimates of relative value (This 
method was also used by La Ferrara (2002) for constructing a key asset inequality variable for a sample of Tanzanian 
households. For overlapping goods, my weights are roughly proportional to hers). The weights are: Pressure cooker, 
fan, bicycle, pressure lamp, desert cooler: 2,  Radio, transistor, cassette player: 3, Watch, black and white TV: 4, 
Sewing machine, music system, color TV, autorickshaw, refrigerator, freezer, washing machine, camera: 5, Motor 
cycle, moped, telephone set: 6, Motor car: 7. 
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textbook model of democracy, for example by easing access to public resources. Only about half of 
party members are members of the same party as the Pradhan.  
    There is considerable variation in land distribution among communities. The GP Gini coefficient 
of cultivated land has a mean of 0.63 and a standard deviation of 0.15. The GP landlessness rate has 
an average of 0.37 and a standard deviation of 0.22. 61 percent of households rely on either self-
employment in agriculture or agricultural labor as their main sources of income. Another 18 percent 
rely mainly on casual labor (day labor), which is also typically work in agriculture. Only 13 percent 
of households derive most of their income from permanent wage labor or non-agricultural 
enterprises. A closer look at the occupations of members of these households reveals that they are 
mainly employed in traditional crafts and services, petty trade and teaching. In sum, these are rural 
communities and it is meaningful to use land inequality as our indicator of economic inequality. 
    Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics specifically for members of political parties, and for 
members of the Pradhan's party. As predicted in the theoretical model, party members, particularly 
members of the Pradhan's party, are much more likely than the average household to benefit from 
the BPL program. This key result is explored further in section 7.1. Otherwise the table does not 
reveal any dramatic differences between party-member households and other households. Members 
of the Pradhan's party have somewhat smaller average landholdings than the average household and 
are a little more likely to report casual labor as their main source of income. This suggests that they 
are slightly poorer than the average household, which could in itself be a reason why they receive 
more BPL cards. To take account of this possible effect, landholding size, main source of income, 
and other proxies for poverty are included in the regressions reported below. 
 
7. Estimation results 
 
7.1  Existence of party capture 
    Table 2 shows the results of estimating (5) with γ2 and γ3 constrained to zero. In the first four 
columns, a linear probability model is applied, while the last column shows the results of estimating 
a probit-model. The first column shows the same result as the first line in Table 1, namely that there 
is a strong bivariate correlation between membership of the Pradhan's party and BPL beneficiary 
status. Members of the Pradhan's party are much more likely to be beneficiaries. Columns 2 to 5 
investigate whether this relationship is robust to the inclusion of control variables. 
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Table 2: Party affiliation and beneficiary status in a poverty alleviation program 
  Dependent variable: Household has BPL card 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit^ 
Member of Pradhan's party 0.231 0.136 0.061 0.061 0.054 
 (6.49)*** (4.39)*** (2.74)*** (2.74)*** (2.60)***
Member of other party  0.058 0.017 0.018 0.012 
  (2.55)** (0.95) (0.94) (0.64) 
Family political history  -0.048 -0.037 -0.039 -0.046 
  (2.38)** (1.94)* (1.99)** (1.93)* 
Scheduled caste/scheduled tribe  0.141 0.113 0.112 0.159 
  (5.09)*** (6.29)*** (5.76)*** (6.45)***
Education of head in years  -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  -0.41 (2.05)** (2.94)*** (2.01)**
Agricultural land owned, acres  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.019 
  -0.99 (1.88)* (2.33)** (4.98)***
Household size  0.006 0.009 0.008 0.011 
  (2.30)** (3.71)*** (3.29)*** (3.98)***
Age of head  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (1.51) (1.71)* (1.35) (2.35)**
Dependency ratio  -0.094 -0.100 -0.093 -0.108 
  (4.00)*** (4.76)*** (4.48)*** (4.29)***
Index of durable goods ownership  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (4.66)*** (6.24)*** (6.02)*** (4.44)***
Female household head  0.057 0.045 0.04 0.063 
  (2.54)** (1.95)* (1.66)* (1.70)* 
Head never married  0.034 0.045 0.018 0.046 
  (0.72) (1.00) (0.38) (0.99) 
Head divorced or separated  -0.009 -0.004 0.003 -0.037 
  (0.13) (0.05) (0.03) (0.48) 
Head widowed  -0.06 -0.043 -0.038 -0.053 
  (2.55)** (1.92)* (1.67)* (1.82)* 
Main source of income (rfc: selfemployed in agric.)     
Agricultural labor  0.048 0.057 0.052 0.055 
  (2.42)** (3.51)*** (3.14)*** (2.53)**
Casual labor  0.12 0.135 0.134 0.11 
  (4.94)*** (6.65)*** (6.60)*** (4.76)***
Permanent wage labor  -0.057 -0.037 -0.034 -0.053 
  (2.53)** (1.79)* -1.62 (1.98)**
Non-agricultural enterprise  0.054 0.057 0.057 0.062 
  (1.79)* (2.24)** (2.20)** (1.98)**
Rents, pensions, remmittances etc.  -0.027 -0.013 -0.003 -0.019 
  (0.70) (0.37) (0.08) (0.40) 
Other  0.034 0.023 0.02 0.013 
  (0.93) (0.86) (0.74) (0.37) 
      
Same religion as Pradhan    0.042 0.030 
    (2.20)** (1.64) 
Same caste-group as Pradhan    0.009 0.03 
    (0.45) (1.42) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
 
Same mother tongue as Pradhan    -0.014 -0.018 
    (0.99) (1.06) 
Same village as Pradhan    0.005 0.000 
    (0.37) (0.02) 
Constant 0.184 0.119 0.136 0.105  
 (13.15)*** (3.67)*** (5.41)*** (3.03)***  
Fixed effects None District GP GP GP 
      
Observations 5,180 5,140 5,140 4,860 4,860 
R-squared 0.04 0.22 0.36 0.36   
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
^Marginal effects reported      
 
    First, as discussed above, we might worry that membership of the Pradhan's party is merely a 
proxy for the official eligibility criterion for participation in the program, which is poverty. To take 
account of this objection, a number of variables known to be correlated with poverty are introduced, 
namely: (i) whether the household belongs to a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe, (ii) education 
of the household head in years, (iii) amount of agricultural land owned by the household, (iv) 
household size, (v) age, gender and marital status of the household head, (vi) dependency ratio 
(defined as the number of household members below 15 or above 65 divided by the total household 
size), (vii) an index of durable goods ownership, and (viii) dummies for the household's main 
source of income. When these variables are introduced, most of them have the expected sign, and 
many are significant. The only surprising result is that a higher dependency ratio decreases the 
probability of being selected for the program. As noted by Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) the 
significant effect of variables correlated with poverty indicates that, even if various sorts of capture 
exist, GPs do in fact achieve some amount of targeting. 
    Second, we can imagine that membership of the Pradhan's party functions as a proxy for being a 
politician in the GP council. As described in section 2, Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a) show that 
politician households are significantly more likely than other households to be program 
beneficiaries, and surely politicians are more likely than others to be members of the Pradhan's 
party. We therefore introduce a variable measuring whether a member of the household's family 
holds or has held a political position ("members of the family" are not necessarily members of the 
household). This variable enters with a negative coefficient.10 
                                                 
10 Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a) include the sample of elected officials in their estimation sample, whereas I do not. 
They find that households with members who are currently GP politicians are more likely than others to be program 
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    Third, for the results to be in line with the theory presented, I have to check that membership of 
the Pradhan's party is more beneficial than membership of other parties. A dummy for being a 
member of other parties than the Pradhan's is therefore introduced. This variable enters with a 
positive sign, and it is significant in some specifications. This indicates that members of other 
parties are not discriminated against. In light of the theory, the positive coefficient can be read as a 
sign that party members are less susceptible to the influence of election campaigns than others, as 
assumed in the model, and are therefore given relatively high weights in the candidates' 
optimization problems. The point estimate of the coefficient on membership of other parties is in all 
specifications much lower than the coefficient on membership of the Pradhan's party, as the theory 
predicts. In formal tests (t-tests) of the hypothesis that the coefficients on the two variables are the 
same, the null hypothesis of equal coefficients is always rejected (although in one case only at the 
10 percent level). 
    Fourth, it is possible to imagine that membership of the Pradhan's party is a proxy for other kinds 
of affiliation with the Pradhan, such as shared caste, religion or language, and that BPL card 
allocation takes place according to these characteristics rather than party membership. To test this 
hypothesis, I introduce dummies for sharing religion, language, caste-group and village of residence 
with the Pradhan. The caste group variable simply distinguishes between scheduled castes and 
tribes, and other castes. It takes the value one if the household belongs to the same of these two 
groups as the Pradhan. This is a very rough simplification of the complex system of castes in India. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to construct a more detailed measure. The introduction of these 
variables does not decrease the coefficient on membership of the Pradhan's party. The coefficients 
on the variables are always smaller than the coefficient on membership of the Pradhan's party, 
although the hypothesis that the coefficients on membership of the Pradhan's party and same 
religion as the Pradhan are equal cannot be rejected according to statistical criteria. Same religion as 
the Pradhan is significant in both specifications in table 2, and although this result is not robust to 
the additional variables introduced in tables 3 and 4, this gives some indication that favoritism along 
religious lines plays a role in the Panchayats. On the other hand, there is no evidence of favoritism 
along linguistic, caste-group or village lines. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
beneficiaries. My results, on the other hand, show that households where someone in the (extended) family is or was a 
politician are less likely than other to benefit. The difference between the results could be explained by the fact that the 
tendency for politicians to be from an economically privileged background was stronger in the past than it is today (in 
part because of the reservation system). In other words, the "family political history" variable should possibly be 
interpreted as a proxy for poverty. When I add the sample of elected officials to my estimation sample, the effect of 
membership of the Pradhan's party remains positive and significant in all specifications. 
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    Finally, to control for unobservable characteristics at the state, district or GP level, such as the 
total number of BPL cards allocated to districts and GPs, district- and GP fixed effects are 
introduced. 
    The sign and significance of the member of Pradhan's party-variable is robust to the inclusion of 
all these controls, although the point estimate drops as more variables are introduced. The most 
substantial drop occurs when GP fixed effects are introduced (in column three). One way to 
interpret this result is that party favoritism plays a role not only when GP councils allocate BPL 
cards among individuals, but also when quotas of cards are allocated from states to districts and 
from districts to GPs. If leaders at state- and district levels give out more cards to GPs with many 
members of their own party than to other GPs, and if there is a correlation between the electoral 
fortunes of parties at GP- and higher levels, then the member of Pradhan's party variable might 
partly pick up the effect of living in a GP with many members of the same party as the district- or 
state leader. I test this hypothesis by adding a variable to the model in column 2 measuring the share 
of respondents in a GP belonging to the same party as the Chief Minister of the state.11 This 
variable enters with a coefficient of 0.439 and is highly significant (t=3.50). The coefficient on 
member of the Pradhans party drops from 0.136 to 0.094, but remains significant (t=3.85). These 
results indicate that party capture is present at the central as well as the local level. 
    Member of the Pradhan's party is also significant and positive in both the linear probability- and 
the probit models. In the linear probability model with all controls included (column 4), members of 
the Pradhan's party are estimated to be six percentage points more likely to be selected as 
beneficiaries than others. Since 18.4 percent of non-members of the Pradhan's party are 
beneficiaries, this means that joining the Pradhan's party increases a household's probability of 
being selected by approximately 32 percent (0.061 divided by 0.184). The results correspond with 
the footnoted result in Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a, p.24) mentioned in section 2. Possible 
endogeneity of the member of Pradhan's party variable is discussed in section 6.3. 
     
7.2. Determinants of party capture 
    The theory presented in section 3 suggests that party capture will not be the same everywhere. In 
particular, it will be higher where the productivity of campaign activities (h in the model) is high, 
and susceptibility to the influence of electoral campaigns (1- α) is low. In the model, these factors 
                                                 
11 The chief ministers in the four states in 2002 were: C. Naidu (TDP) in Andhra Pradesh, S.M. Krishna (INC) in 
Karnataka, A.K. Antony (INC) in Kerala and O.Paneerselvam, followed by J. Jayalitha (both AIADMK) in Tamil 
Nadu. 
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were summarized in the parameter χ = h(1- α). In this section, several different proxies for χ are 
introduced and interacted with the member of Pradhan's party-variable. 
    In section 3 it was argued that inequality is likely to increase susceptibility to campaign 
influence, and that party capture would therefore be more pronounced in more unequal 
communities. On the other hand, it was argued that the expected effects of economic development 
on party capture are ambiguous, because economic development tends to decrease the susceptibility 
to propaganda, but might also increase the productivity of campaign activities. 
    Tables 3 and 4 show the results of entering proxies for χ, interacted with the member of Pradhan's 
party-variable, into the BPL-allocation model.  
 
Table 3: Determinants of party capture (a) 
(Land gini as measure of inequality) 
  Dependent variable: Household has BPL card 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit^ 
Member of Pradhan's party -0.229 0.043 0.04 -0.208 -0.095 
 (2.84)*** (0.67) (0.68) (2.53)** (1.50)
Member of Pradhan's party*Land gini 0.568   0.690 0.514 
 (4.23)***   (4.04)*** (4.06)*** 
GP land gini -0.225 -0.257 -0.261
 (2.61)***   (2.92)*** (2.98)*** 
Member of Pradhan's party*GP education level 0.026  -0.009 -0.026 
  (1.60)  (0.38) (1.09) 
GP education level  0.012  0.020 0.025 
  (0.85)  (1.21) (1.36) 
Member of Pradhan's party*GP dur. good index  0.008 -0.005 -0.001 
   (1.82)* (0.68) (0.21) 
GP durable goods index   0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
   (0.34) (0.15) (0.60) 
Constant 0.248 0.083 0.108 0.211  
 (3.94)*** (1.35) (1.81)* (2.85)***  
      
Control variables as in table 2, col. 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects District District District District District 
      
Observations 4,860 4,860 4,860 4,860 4,860
R-squared 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24   
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
^Marginal effects reported.      
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Table 4: Determinants of party capture (b) 
(Landlessness as measure of inequality) 
 
  
Dependent variable: Household 
has BPL card 
  OLS OLS Probit^ 
Member of Pradhan's party -0.038 0.022 0.053 
 (0.97) (0.35) (0.74) 
Member of Pradhan's party*GP landlessness 0.430 0.494 0.337 
 (4.34)*** (4.02)*** (3.85)*** 
GP landlessness -0.189 -0.209 -0.207 
 (2.76)*** (2.98)*** (3.12)*** 
Member of Pradhan's party*GP education level -0.016 -0.028 
  (0.64) (1.16) 
GP education level  0.021 0.025 
  (1.30) (1.44) 
Member of Pradhan's party*GP dur. good index -0.002 0.001 
  (0.29) (0.25) 
GP durable goods index  -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.20) (0.61) 
Constant 0.168 0.117  
 (3.99)*** (1.90)*  
    
Control variables as in table 2, col. 4 Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects District District District 
    
Observations 4,860 4,860 4,860 
R-squared 0.24 0.24   
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
^Marginal effects reported.    
 
The two different measures of inequality described above - the land gini (table 3) and the 
landlessness rate (table 4) - are used. Furthermore, the average education of the household head in 
the GP and the GP average of the durable goods index are entered as measures of economic 
development. The regressions include the same controls as in columns 4 and 5 of table 2. To save 
space, the estimated coefficients on the control variables are not shown. In order to not loose the 
main effects of the GP-level measures inequality and development, district fixed effects are used 
instead of GP fixed effects. GP fixed effects are reintroduced in table 5. 
    The first column of Table 3 reveals a significant and numerically strong, positive interaction 
between membership of the Pradhan's party and the land gini. In fact, the model predicts that in 
completely equal communities (land gini = 0) there is a significant negative effect of being a 
member of the Pradhan's party (The coefficient on the same-party-as-Pradhan main effect is 
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significant and negative). However, no GPs in the sample are close to complete equality, and we 
should not attach too much significance to this result. What we should emphasize is this: As GPs 
become more unequal, party capture is predicted to increase rapidly. Party capture is estimated to be 
positive in GPs with a land gini above 0.4. Note from Table 1 that the average land gini is 0.63. 
    In column 2 and 3 the average education level of household heads in the GP and the GP average 
of the durable goods index, respectively, and the interactions between these variables and 
membership of the Pradhan's party are entered. The coefficients on both interaction terms are 
positive, and the interaction between the GP-durable goods index and membership of the Pradhan's 
party is significant at the ten percent level. 
    In column 4 all the interaction terms (and main effects) are entered in the same regression. The 
result is that the interaction between inequality and membership of the Pradhan's party remains 
significant and strong, while the two other interaction terms are now completely insignificant. This 
pattern is repeated in column 5, where a probit model is estimated. It is also repeated in table 4, 
where landlessness is used as the measure of inequality instead of the land gini. As stated in the 
introduction, this is a main result: Party capture is much stronger in unequal than in equal 
communities. On the other hand, there is no evidence that it is affected by levels of economic 
development. In the following sections I focus on further testing the robustness of the inequality-
interaction. 
     
7.3  Endogeneity 
    We might worry that both of the key explanatory variables, membership of the Pradhan's party 
and land inequality, are endogenous. First, membership of the Pradhan's party could be affected by 
BPL beneficiary status if beneficiaries tend to join the Pradhan's party out of gratitude for receiving 
the BPL card, or because they read the benefits as a signal of the party's competence. Note, 
however, that since the resources to which BPL card holders gain access are not procured by the 
GP, but by higher level authorities, the only issue of 'competence' concerns the GPs ability to obtain 
a high number of cards from these authorities. If the total number of cards available to the GP is 
public knowledge, it should affect the judgments of card-holders and others about party competence 
in the same way, and therefore not give rise to endogeneity problems. 
    Still, one would ideally like to find an instrument for membership of the Pradhan's party to be 
able to test these alternative explanations. I have attempted to use a number of variables measuring 
other kinds of affiliation with the Pradhan than party membership as instruments. They include 
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affiliation based on language, caste-group, village of residence, occupation and main source of 
income. However, none of these come close to passing standard tests of instrument relevance.12 
Instead, I shall rely on the reported interaction effects in arguing against the interpretation that 
membership of the Pradhan's party is endogenous. While it is not entirely implausible that some 
households would join the Pradhan's party because they are grateful for receiving benefits, or read 
the benefits as a signal of competence, there seems to be no reason why this effect should be much 
stronger in unequal than in equal communities. On the other hand, the inequality interaction is 
coherent with the model of party capture laid out in section 3. Hence, the significant interaction 
between membership of the Pradhan's party and inequality favors the theory of party capture over 
alternative theories. 
    Second, inequality could be endogenous. I claim that inequality leads to capture, but higher levels 
of capture may also reinforce inequality. I take account of the possible endogeneity of inequality by 
instrumenting current inequality with proxies for inequality in 1991 obtained from the 1991 Census 
of India. The Census did not collect information on land distribution, but it did include a 
classification of full-time workers according to industrial categories. In particular, the Census 
makes it possible to distinguish between people working on their own farm and other workers. I 
assume that workers employed on their own farm as a share of all workers is a good proxy for land 
inequality in 1991. The reason is simple. If land is equally distributed, many people will be small 
farmers, working on their own farm. On the other hand, if many households have no or only very 
little land (i.e. land inequality is high), many people will be working mainly on other people's 
farms, or outside agriculture. 
    The share of workers employed on own family farms can be calculated for both women and men, 
and I use both these variables as instruments for inequality in 2002. Furthermore, because I have 
interacted inequality with membership of the Pradhan's party, I also use as instruments the 
interactions between membership of the Pradhan's party and the shares of workers employed on 
own farms. 
    Table 5 reports the results of this exercise, using both the land gini and landlessness rate as 
inequality measures, with district- and GP fixed effects. In the estimations with GP fixed effects, the 
main effects of inequality drop out because they are measured at the GP level. In all columns, the 
interaction between membership of the Pradhan's party and inequality remains significant and 
                                                 
12 In this exercise (using 2SLS), the coefficient on membership of the Pradhans party in fact rises to 0.43. However, it is 
very imprecisely estimated, and not significant. The instruments pass the Hansen J test of exogeneity, but the F-statistic 
for the test of joint significance of the instruments is only 1.71 (p=0.14). 
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positive. t-statistics and point estimates are lower than in the OLS models (the interaction with 
landlessness in the model with district fixed effects is only significant at the ten percent level) but 
the interaction effects are still numerically important. 
 
Table 5  Party capture and inequality – 2SLS estimation 
  Dependent variable: Household has BPL card 
  IV IV IV IV 
Member of Pradhan's party -0.106 -0.137 0.034 -0.024 
 (0.92) (1.53) (0.65) (0.62) 
Member of Pradhan's party*Land gini 0.370 0.311   
 (2.00)** (2.11)**   
GP land gini -0.092 -   
 (0.30)    
Member of Pradhan's party*GP landlessness   0.247 0.222 
   (1.89)* (2.12)** 
GP landlessness   -0.008  
   (0.04)  
     
Control variables As in table 3 As in table 3 As in table 4 As in table 4
Fixed effects District GP District GP 
     
Observations 4,720 4,720 4,720 4,720 
      
Hansen J test of instrument exogeneity (p-value) 0.310 0.410 0.304 0.395 
     
Tests of instrument relevance     
Partial R-sq of excluded variables in first 
stage regressions: 
    
Land gini/landlessness 0.120  0.161  
Interaction terms 0.551 0.574 0.587 0.578 
Shea partial R-sq of excluded variables in 
first stage regressions: 
    
Land gini/landlessness 0.106  0.141  
Interaction terms 0.489 0.574 0.515 0.578 
F-test of excluded variables in first stage 
regressions: 
    
Land gini/landlessness 9.1  13.0  
Interaction terms 40.7 75.2 57.0 94.8 
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
Land gini and landlessness are instrumented by the share of male cultivators and livestock farmers in all 
male workers in 1991, and the share of female cultivators and livestock farmers in all female workers in 
1991. The interactions between membership of the Pradhans party and land gini/landlessness are 
instrumented by interactions between membership of the Pradhans party and the share of cultivators and 
livestock farmers in all workers (male and female). 
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    At the of bottom the table, tests of instrument exogeneity and relevance are reported. The Hansen 
J statistic test of instrument exogeneity fails to reject the hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous. However, since the two instruments, male and female shares of workers employed on 
own farm, are highly correlated (r=0.77) and conceptually closely related, we should probably not 
attach too much importance to this formal test. Rather, the credibility of the instruments relies 
mainly on the fact that intuitively it seems highly plausible that these proxies for inequality are 
exogenous, since they were measured 11 years before the survey. 
    I present several tests of instrument relevance (in other words, tests for weak instruments). In the 
models with district fixed effects, there are two first stage regressions for each column, one for the 
inequality main effect and one for its interaction with membership of the Pradhan's party. The 
standard, partial R-squared of the instruments from the first stage regressions is reported. I also 
show the Shea partial R-squared, which takes account of correlation between the instruments. If the 
Shea partial R-squared is much lower than the standard partial R-squared, this indicates that the 
instruments are weak (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2003). However, we see that the differences 
between the standard- and Shea partial R-squared measures are in all cases moderate. Furthermore, 
the F-statistics for the tests of joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regressions are 
provided. The well-known rule of thumb provided by Staiger and Stock (1997) is that these F-
statistics should be at least 10. My instruments fall short of this standard in one case, namely in the 
first stage regression for the main effect of the land gini. However, the shortfall is not large. The F-
statistic is above 9. I conclude that weak instrument problems are sufficiently small to be ignored. 
In sum, the IV estimations strengthen the case that higher inequality leads to higher levels of party 
capture. 
 
8. Conclusion and discussion 
    The paper makes three main contributions. First, drawing on the two-party theory of interest 
groups and electoral competition, I have shed new light on the interplay between candidates for 
political office, rank and file party members and voters and shown that this interplay potentially 
leads to "party capture". Second, I have demonstrated the existence of party capture empirically in 
the context of local governments in India and shown that it is economically as well as statistically 
significant. Party capture is equally or more important than favoritism along lines of caste, religion 
and language. The measure of party capture applied is attractive. It is based on objective and easy-
to-measure criteria, as opposed to the perceptions based measures often applied in other studies of 
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good governance. Third, I have documented that party capture is strongly affected by inequality. In 
equal communities party capture is unimportant, but in unequal communities it is pervasive. In 
contrast, there is little evidence that party capture is affected by economic development. 
    The finding of party favoritism does not imply that political parties in general play a negative role 
in development. The four states of South India have done relatively well over the past 30 or 40 
years in terms of reducing poverty (Ravallion and Datt 2002) and political parties have been 
instrumental in this progress in several ways, for example by eroding traditional, caste-based 
patterns of political dominance (Harriss 2000). It is possible to interpret party capture as a 
"necessary evil". Mobilizing the masses to effect change, such as the removal of a repressive 
regime, presents a massive collective action problem, and perhaps the promise of private benefits is 
the only effective means of overcoming this obstacle (cf. Olson 1965). This being said, the 
allocation of public resources according to criteria of political affiliation does not correspond well 
with traditional standards of democracy and good governance. If, as shown in this paper, the 
benefits from a poverty alleviation program are targeted to members of the ruling party rather than 
to the poor, the program will not be effective. 
    I have not directly investigated determinants of the decision to join a party. However, the 
findings indicate that it is often prudent to interpret data on civil society activity with a degree of 
scepticism. While high levels of participation in parties and other civil society organizations could 
indicate high levels of political awareness and desire to affect public life, rent seeking may also play 
a role. 
    To some extent the paper serves as an antidote against the naive "small is beautiful"-romanticism 
which is sometimes behind the push for decentralization. Governance failure exists in local as well 
as national governments. On the other hand, the paper should not be read as a recommendation 
against decentralized government. First, it is entirely possible that capture is at least as strong at 
district-, state- or national levels as it is at the local level, as documented in the studies by Bardhan 
and Mookherjee (2005) and Galasso and Ravallion (2005) reported in chapter 2. Indeed, some of 
the results reported in section 7.1 point in this direction. Future research should focus on testing this 
hypothesis more rigorously. Second, the results reported document that the poverty alleviation 
program under study is in fact to an important extent targeted to the poor. 
    I do suggest, however, that the success of decentralization is likely to depend on implementation 
of complementary policies, such as land reform, policies to secure openness in political and 
administrative decision making, and reforms to strengthen the media. The call for land reform 
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follows directly from the finding that more equal communities are less prone to capture. The 
recommendations on introducing openness and strengthen the media stem from the theory-based 
assumption that party capture is a result of low levels of political awareness and of local politicians' 
misuse of discretionary powers. As demonstrated by Svensson and Reinikka (2005) for Uganda, 
stronger media and better access to information on political and administrative decision making is 
likely to increase levels of political awareness, and reduce the scope for clientelism. 
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Appendix A 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
    We have already noted that candidates will implement the policies they have announced, and we 
have described the voting decision criteria of aware and impressionable voters. Now consider 
candidate k′s problem: how to set policy to maximize his expected number of votes? Look at 
candidate A. We first calculate the vote-share received by the candidate from aware voters. In group 
g, candidate A receives the votes of those voters who fulfill the condition: 
 
 * ( ( ) ( ))a bi g gU Uλ π πε − − −≥  (6) 
 
    Therefore the share of the aware vote in group g that candidate a receives is (remember that εi is 
uniformly distributed): 
 
 ( )*, 1 1 ( ( ) ( )2 2a a bg aware i g gs f f U Uf ε λ π π⎛ ⎞= − = + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠%  (7) 
  
    The share of the total vote that candidate A receives from aware voters in group g is ,
a
g g g awarea sβ % . 
Therefore, the share of the total vote that the candidate receives from all aware voters is: 
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2
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a b
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β β β π π
= + + −
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+ + + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
 (8) 
 
 
    where WI(πk) equals ( ) ( ) ( )k k kA A A B B B C C Ca U a U a Uβ β βπ π π+ + . We can think of WI(πk) as "the 
welfare of aware voters". 
     
    Now focus on the votes from impressionable voters. Candidate a receives the votes of all the 
impressionable voters who fulfill: 
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 * ( )a bj h C Cε λ≥ − − −  (9) 
 
Therefore, the share of the impressionable vote that candidate a receives is: 
 
 *1 1 ( )
2 2j
a a b
imps f f fh C Cf
ε λ⎛ ⎞= − = + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (10) 
 
The share of the total vote that candidate a receives from impressionable voters is 
 
 
 ( ) 11 ( )
2
a a b
imp A A B B C Cs f fh C Cβ βα α α λβ ⎛ ⎞= − + + −− ⎜⎝− ⎟⎠  (11) 
 
    We can now calculate candidate a's total vote share, sa: 
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    where = = (1(1 ) )A A B B C C hh α β α β α βχ α− + −+  measures the weight of campaign activity in the 
vote-share function. Clearly, this weight depends on the effectiveness of campaign spending and on 
the share of voters that are impressionable. ( , ) ( )k k k kIV C W Cπ π χ= +  measures the total 
effectiveness of candidate k's electoral strategy. The candidate faces a trade-off between attracting 
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aware voters on the one hand, and inducing campaign contributions, which will allow him to attract 
impressionable voters, on the other. 
     
    Finally, the probability that a wins the election - the objective function of candidate a - is now 
given by: 
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    Remember that G(·) is a cumulative distribution function and hence monotonically increasing. 
This expression therefore implies that the dominant strategy for candidate k is simply to maximize 
( , )k kV Cπ . 
     
 
 
    We can now turn to the party's problem. Remember that we distinguish between the candidate 
and the party that (may) support him. Focus on party A, which maximizes 
 
 ( ) (1 ) ( )
a
a a a b
A A
A
CG U G Uπ π β+ − −  (14) 
 
    If candidate a receives no campaign contributions, he sets policy to maximize WI(πa). Denote the 
policy vector that solves this problem by π*. In order to induce the candidate to set an alternative 
policy vector, πa, the following participation constraint needs to be fulfilled: 
 
 *( ) ( ) ( )a a aI IW C Wπ χ π π+ ≥  (15) 
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    Essentially, the party sets candidate a's policy, subject to the participation constraint of the 
candidate. In the out-of-equilibrium situation where the participation constraint is not satisfied, the 
candidate runs without support from a party. For example, he could threaten to run as an 
independent. Now, assume that the participation constraint is satisfied with equality in equilibrium. 
Then, campaign contributions do not change the parties' winning probabilities, it only changes their 
policies. The probability that candidate a wins the election is therefore fixed. Denote this fixed 
probability by aG . From party A's point of view, the policy of candidate b is also fixed. Therefore, 
maximizing (14) is the same as maximizing ( )
a
a a
A
A
CG U π β− . Insert the participation constraint into 
this objective to find that the party maximizes 
*( ) ( )( )
a
a a I I
A
A
W WG U π πβπ χ
−− , which, since WI(π*) is 
fixed from the party's point of view, is equivalent to maximizing ( ) ( )a a aA A IG U Wβχ π π+ , which in 
turn is the same as maximizing (4). 
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1  Introduction 
Economists routinely assume that all players in the political process, including political 
leaders, are strictly self-interested. According to this view, political leaders are not 
intrinsically benevolent but their policy choices may or may not be in line with public 
interest, depending on how the prevailing political institutions shape their incentives. It is 
therefore crucial to impose institutional rules that restrain egoistic leaders from extracting 
rents (e.g. Brennan and Buchanan 1980). We agree that political leaders often behave in 
self-serving ways and that institutions need to be set appropriately. However, we disagree 
with the standard assumptions which, in the words of James M. Buchanan1, are that all 
“individuals must be modeled as seeking to further their own narrow self-interest, narrowly 
defined, in terms of measured net wealth position, as predicted or expected” and that “there 
is no suggestion that improvement lies in the selection of morally superior agents who will 
use their powers in some ‘public interest’”. In fact, the purpose of our paper is exactly to 
analyze the difficulties of selecting “morally superior” candidates – we call them 
benevolent – into office.  
In this paper, we assume that some of the candidates for political office are benevolent 
and that many are egoistic. Once elected, the “president” has much discretionary leeway 
over a budget, and can use it to provide a public good or for his private benefit. By 
assumption, egoistic presidents seek “to further their own narrow self-interest” which, at 
least in the baseline version of our model, means total rent appropriation by the president. 
In contrast, a benevolent president spends the entire budget to provide a public good which 
is both efficient and fair. In that sense, a benevolent president uses his powers to serve a 
well-defined “public interest”. Given these assumptions, egoists prefer to govern rather 
than to be governed, and all voters obviously prefer to be governed by a benevolent rather 
than an egoistic president. However, the voters’ problem is that candidates’ types cannot be 
directly observed, but must be inferred from their behavior. And this inference is imperfect 
due to strategic behavior by egoistic candidates. We analyze when strategic imitation by 
egoistic types hampers the ability of the political system to vote benevolent leaders into 
office.  
                                                 
1 Quoted after Besley (2006: 29). 
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The baseline version of our model has three stages. In stage 1, candidates choose 
whether to make a “pro-social” action which is costly to the candidate. Voluntarily joining 
the army or working as a “community organizer” in a poor neighborhood are illustrative 
examples of pre-election activities of the main contenders in the 2008 U.S. presidential 
contest. Choices in stage 1 can be observed by voters with some probability which 
depends, for example, on the effectiveness of investigative media. In stage 2, a leader 
called “president” is elected, and in stage 3, the president is in control of a budget. The 
president chooses between providing a public good, i.e. a policy which is in the “public 
interest” in the sense that it is efficient and fair, and a policy which only benefits the 
president but not the rest of society. 
We assume two “types” of candidates and that the shares of these types among 
candidates are common information. Benevolent types are non-strategic and find it optimal 
to pick the pro-social action in stage 1 and to provide the public good in stage 3. Egoistic 
types face a trade-off between making a costly pro-social action in stage 1 to appear as a 
benevolent type in the eyes of the voters and thus to increase the chances of rent 
appropriation in stage 3. We say that “strategic imitation” prevails if an egoist picks the 
pro-social action in stage 1. The incentives for strategic imitation are straightforward in the 
baseline model. Intuitively, an egoist balances the costs of behaving pro-socially in stage 1 
against the expected benefits of rent appropriation in stage 3. The difficulty in this calculus 
is that the expected rent in stage 3 depends on the imitation behavior of the other egoistic 
candidates which in turn depends on the share of benevolent types.  
The baseline model yields two main insights. First, we show that strategic imitation is 
less likely if the political system is likely to produce good governance. On average, the 
governed fare well if the share of benevolent candidates is high, the president has little 
discretion over the budget, and the public sector is effective in the sense that public goods 
provision yields large efficiency gains. In this case, the net gain from governing rather than 
being governed is relatively low, and strategic imitation is therefore relatively unattractive. 
Second, we find that more effective investigative media which foster “transparency” in the 
sense of improving voters’ information about candidates’ pre-election behavior, have 
ambivalent effects on political selection. While higher transparency improves the chances 
of telling benevolent from non-imitating egoistic candidates, it also provides incentives for 
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egoistic candidates to pose as benevolent types. We find that more transparency improves 
selection at low levels, but hampers political if the level of transparency is already high.  
We extend the baseline model by allowing incumbents to be re-elected to investigate 
if re-election is a remedy against the failure in political selection diagnosed above. In line 
with an extensive literature in political economy (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks 1993, 
Besley and Case 1995), we find that incentives to seek re-election tend to discipline 
egoistic presidents. However, the effects of re-election are ambiguous and depend on how 
far-sighted candidates are. If candidates are relatively patient, the incentive to seek re-
election disciplines egoistic presidents in the first term and decreases the amount of 
strategic imitation. If candidates are relatively impatient, the possibility of re-election 
further aggravates the problem. In this case, the incentive to seek re-election does not curb 
rent extraction and may induce more strategic imitation.  
The basic assumptions of the model are that (i) presidential candidates are 
heterogeneous with respect to social preferences, (ii) policy choices are in important ways 
shaped by the social preferences of presidents, and (iii) candidate’s social preferences 
cannot be directly observed, and inferring them from behavior is fraught with difficulties. 
We now discuss these assumptions in turn by relating them to the literature and to 
empirical observations. 
Assumption (i) is that people, including voters and political candidates, are 
heterogeneous with respect to social preferences. Mounting evidence from experimental 
economics suggests that pro-social preferences exist and that individuals are heterogeneous 
with respect to their concern for others (see Camerer 2003: Ch. 2 for a survey). Recent 
evidence shows that this also holds for representative samples of the general population 
(e.g. Bellemare, Kröger and van Soest 2008). While we assume that benevolent candidates 
exist, we consider the possibility that their share is small. Papers studying the selection into 
the political arena (e.g. Matozzi and Merlo 2007, Caselli and Morelli 2004, Messner and 
Polborn 2004) emphasize that “bad” types may select into the pool of candidates, perhaps 
because they find a career in the political arena more attractive than one in the market 
place. As a result, the share of benevolent types among candidates is smaller than in the 
general population. 
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Assumption (ii) is that policy choices depend on the “type” of the president selected. 
This assumption is well in line with empirical studies showing that the identity of policy 
makers shapes policy choices and economic outcomes (e.g. Jones and Olken 2005, Lee, 
Moretti and Butler 2004, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). Assumption (i) that candidates 
are heterogeneous together with assumption (ii) that voters care about this heterogeneity is 
consistent with the observation that “personal qualities” like the “integrity” of political 
candidates often play an important role in political campaigns. For example, in exit polls 
taken in connection with the Republican presidential primary elections in the U.S. in 2008, 
around 45 percent of voters stated that “personal qualities” were more important for their 
vote than “issues”2 (see also Mondak 1995).  
Assumption (iii) is that political selection through elections is hampered because of 
strategic imitation. Our paper complements the literature on political selection through 
elections (e.g. Besley 2006: Ch. 3, Fearon 1999, Coate and Morris 1995, Banks and 
Sundaram 1993). In contrast to this literature, we consider “citizen-candidates” (e.g. 
Osborne and Slivinsky 1996) which implies that candidates carefully consider the expected 
utility of governing vs. being governed. Besley (2006: Ch 3) provides an excellent 
exposition of the relevance of political selection in general and presents some empirical 
evidence supporting its relevance.  
One implication of our model is that voters will often be disappointed about the 
“character” of a president in the sense that they inferred from his pre-election behavior that 
he was benevolent but discover that he is not when in office. Examples of such 
disappointment abound. Ferdinand Marcos, the notoriously corrupt president of the 
Philippines, was a decorated war hero from World War II. Robert Mugabe, the president of 
Zimbabwe, was a widely admired hero of his country’s liberation struggle but gradually 
revealed himself as one of the most self-serving leaders in Africa. Eliot Spitzer, the 
Governor of New York State from 2007 to 2008, built a reputation as a defender of clean 
government before being elected, only to be forced to step down as governor when he was 
caught buying illegal services from a prostitution ring. Strategic imitation offers a potential 
explanation for such disappointment. 
 
                                                 
2 Information found on the webpage “election center 2008” of CNN.com 
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2 The model 
The baseline model has three stages (see figure 1): In stage 1, n candidates out of a 
population of size N run for president. Since the present paper focuses on selection through 
voting rather than entry, we assume that candidates are randomly selected from the 
population. Candidates can make a pro-social action at some cost c to themselves (donating 
money to a charity, volunteering etc.) and with a social benefit b. For simplicity, we set b to 
zero. (we discuss on the size of b and c in section 4). We assume two types of candidates. 
Candidates of a given type are homogenous. Benevolent types always choose the pro-social 
action because they value the resulting social benefit b more than the private cost c. 
Egoistic types choose the pro-social action if it maximizes their expected payoffs in the 
entire game. The share of benevolent types among the candidates is θ > 0, and we assume 
that θ is public information. Candidates’ choices in stage 1 are observed by voters with 
probability r ≥ 0 and we assume that r is public information. We refer to r as the 
“transparency of politics” which is shaped by, for example, the strength of investigative 
media or by legislation requiring politicians to disclose information. 
In stage 2, a president is voted into office by N – n voters. Voting is compulsory and 
“sincere”, i.e. voters cast their votes according to their material preferences. The president 
is elected by plurality vote or by random draw with probability 1/k if k candidates receive 
the highest number of votes. 
Figure 1:  Political selection game 
 
Stage 1  
(pre-election) 
 Stage 2  
(election) 
Stage 3  
(post-election) 
 
Candidates choose 
pro-social action 
at cost c or private 
action at cost 0 
 
Actions in stage 
1 are revealed 
with probability 
r 
 
President is voted 
into office (n 
candidates, N-n 
voters) 
 
President controls 
budget B. Allocation to 
public good or private 
good. 
 
In stage 3, the president is in control of a budget B which can be used to fund a public 
good or be appropriated for the president’s private benefit. We assume that the public good 
is linear, i.e. has constant returns to scale and benefits all voters equally. The effectiveness 
of the public sector is measured by α, the marginal per capita return of a dollar allocated to 
the public good, where 1/N < α < 1. Allocating the entire budget to the public good is both 
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efficient and fair. It is efficient in the sense that the sum of payoffs to society is maximal 
(αNB > B), and it is fair in the sense that all agents, including the president, receive the 
same payoff, αB. Given that an egoistic president is elected, the entire budget is pocketed 
by the president – kleptocracy prevails. Payoffs in stage 3 are discounted by a factor δ, 0 < 
δ < 1. 
2.1. Equilibrium 
We analyze the determinants of successful political selection in equilibrium, i.e. the 
equilibrium amount of strategic imitation and the resulting probability of selecting a 
benevolent president. The main variables of interest determining equilibrium values are the 
share of benevolent candidates θ, the level of transparency r, the effectiveness of the public 
sector α, and the president’s discretionary power over the budget B.  
Given our assumptions, egoists prefer to govern rather than to be governed, and all 
voters obviously prefer a benevolent rather than an egoistic president. The problem is that 
voters cannot directly observe candidates’ types, and have to base their decision in stage 2 
on beliefs about types. These beliefs are shaped by observed behavior in stage 1. By 
assumption, benevolent types choose the pro-social action in stage 1 with certainty, and 
egoistic types may or may not strategically imitate the benevolent types, depending on how 
much imitation increases their expected rent. We denote the share of all candidates 
choosing the pro-social action in stage 1 by σ ≥ θ. A benevolent president is selected with 
certainty only if σ = θ, i.e. if there is no strategic imitation. In contrast, if σ > θ, a president 
may be voted into office who does not serve the public interest in stage 3.  
From the perspective of an egoistic candidate, the benefits of strategic imitation 
depend on how much the signal increases the probability of being elected, on the difference 
in (discounted) expected payoffs between governing and being governed, and between 
good and bad governance if not elected. More specifically, if egoist i is voted into office, 
his payoff is B. If i is not elected, he earns 0 if the president is an egoist and αB > 0 if the 
president is a benevolent type. We denote the conditional probability that an egoist is 
elected if he imitates by ps and the probability if he does not by p0. We denote the 
probability that a benevolent president is elected by pA. These probabilities depend on the 
transparency of the political system (measured by r), i.e. on whether information about pre-
election behavior is revealed at the election stage. The superscript r indicates that 
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information is revealed, and the superscript u that it is not. For example, rsp  is the 
probability that a candidate is elected if he imitates, and information about pre-election 
behavior is revealed.  
Figure 2:  Optimization problem for an egoistic type 
 
Figure 2 shows the decision tree representing the optimization problem of an egoist. 
Total discounted payoffs are shown at the bottom of the figure. It is clear that an egoist 
strategically imitates if the expected payoff is at least as big as when he does not: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
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δ δα δ δα
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≥
+ − + + − + − +
(1) 
Expression (1) can be considerably simplified by using the following facts. Imitation 
has no effect on the type voted into office if no information about pre-election behavior is 
available (r = 0) in the election stage. In this case, voters randomly select a candidate which 
means that 0 1/
u u
sp p n= =  and uAp θ= . Also, since we assume that there is at least one 
    Imitate  
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benevolent candidate (θ > 0), an egoist is never selected if he does not imitate and 
information about pre-election behavior is available, i.e. 0 0
rp = . Thus, (1) reduces to 
 ( )1   r rs Ar B p p cδ α⎡ ⎤− ≥⎣ ⎦ , (2) 
where the left-hand side is the expected, discounted benefit from imitation, and the 
right-hand side is the cost.  
Note that both rsp  and 
r
Ap  are functions of σ which, in turn, is a function of all 
parameters, including θ, r, α, and B. Remember that the symbol rsp  is the probability that a 
candidate is voted into office in stage 2 given that he chose the pro-social action in stage 1 
and that information about it was revealed. This probability depends on σn, i.e. on how 
many candidates choose the pro-social action in stage 1.  
 1rsp nσ=  (3) 
A key variable in our model is the probability of selecting a benevolent president, Ap . 
This probability depends on the share of benevolent candidates and the tendency of egoists 
to strategically imitate. In particular, when information about pre-election behavior is 
revealed, a benevolent president is elected for sure ( rAp  = 1) if egoists do not imitate (i.e. if 
σ θ= ). In contrast, a benevolent president is elected only by chance, i.e. rAp  = θ if all 
egoists imitate (i.e. σ = 1). In general, it holds that 
 rAp
θ
σ=  (4) 
Inserting (3) and (4) into (2) we get the following condition for strategic imitation: 
 
1    1   0
  
r B c
n
αθδ σ σ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − ≥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  (5) 
We re-write (5) as  
 
2( )  ( ) ( )   0Y cn r B r Bσ σ δ σ δ αθ≡ − + − ≥  (6) 
 which can easily be represented by a parabola (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Strategic imitation equilibria 
We denote the critical values yielding Y(σ) = 0 by σ1 and σ2 and distinguish 3 cases: 
a) No strategic imitation: ( ) < 0  [ ;1]Y σ σ θ∀ ∈ . In this case, the parabola in figure 3 is 
below 0 in the feasible range of σ. Therefore, strategic imitation never pays, and σ* = θ. A 
sufficient condition for this no-imitation equilibrium to occur is that the vertex of the 
parabola, vY , is below zero, i.e. that 
 
( )2 0
2 4v
r Br BY Y r B
cn cn
δδ δ αθ⎛ ⎞= = − <⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . (6b) 
 
Condition (6b) is more likely to be met and strategic imitation therefore less likely to 
occur at all if, for example, the number of candidates n is high or if imitation is very costly. 
Interestingly, inspection of (6b) reveals that strategic imitation is less likely to be attractive 
if the public sector is very effective (α is large), if the president has little discretionary 
θ 1 σ 
Y 
σ1 σ2 
(b) 
(c) 
(a) 
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power of the budget (B is small), or if most candidates are benevolent (θ is large). In other 
words, strategic imitation is discouraged if governance is likely to be good. 
b) Unique equilibrium with strategic imitation at * 1θ σ< ≤ . If the vertex of Y(σ) is 
positive ( vY  > 0) and if Y(σ)│σ = θ  > 0, a unique equilibrium obtains with a positive amount 
of strategic imitation of * 1θ σ< ≤ . In figure 3, this case is illustrated for a situation in 
which only some egoists imitate in equilibrium (σ* < 1). Since all egoists are identical in the 
model, it is natural to assume a symmetric equilibrium. The only symmetric Nash 
equilibrium implies that each egoist plays a mixed strategy, where he imitates with 
probability (σ2 – θ)/(1 – θ). If (1) 0Y ≥ , imitation is dominant for an egoist, and the 
equilibrium is σ* = 1. In this pooling equilibrium, incentives to imitate are so strong that all 
egoistic candidates behave as if they were benevolent before the election, but the elected 
president is unlikely to serve the public interest after the election (if θ is small). Note that if 
Y(σ) > 0 in the entire range, all egoists strategically imitate in equilibrium, and marginal 
changes in parameters do not reduce strategic imitation. 
c) Multiple equilibria. If the vertex of Y(σ) is positive ( vY  > 0) and if Y(σ)│σ = θ  < 0, Y(σ) 
intersects the horizontal axis twice in the feasible range of σ as illustrated in graph (c) of 
figure 3. Multiple equilibria prevail in this case, namely i) σ* = θ, ii) σ* = σ1, and iii) σ* = 
min (σ2, 1). However, only i) and iii) are stable equilibria, and beliefs about σ determine 
which equilibrium strategic candidates coordinate on. Suppose egoists hold an equilibrium 
common prior, σ0 (see appendix A for a discussion of disequilibrium beliefs). If σ0 = σ1, 
then σ* = σ1 is an equilibrium, but it is unstable because if σ0 deviates by ε from σ1, the 
share of imitating candidates converges to either θ or min(σ2,1). This means that 
equilibrium σ1 is unlikely to prevail, and we do not consider it in the remainder of our 
discussion.  
In sum, cases a) and ci) provide a complete description of the conditions for the 
absence of strategic imitation. Thus, when information about pre-election behavior is 
revealed, the elected president serves the public interest with certainty in these cases. In all 
other cases, there is a risk that an egoist is voted into office.  
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2.2. Comparative statics 
We now investigate how the extent of strategic imitation in equilibrium and the 
probability of selecting a benevolent president pA, depend on changes in parameters. We 
concentrate on the equilibrium at σ2. The reason is that the other equilibria are either 
unstable or involve full or no imitation as the discussion above has shown, and are 
therefore not sensitive to marginal changes in parameters. Noting that (6) is a second-
degree polynomial in σ, we see that σ2 is given by: 
 
( )2
2
4
2 2
r B r B cnr B r B D
cn cn
δ δ δ αθ δσ + − += =  (7) 
where ( )2 4D r B cnr Bδ δ αθ= − . The comparative statics below are derived by 
differentiating (7) with respect to the parameter in question.  
The effects of the first three parameters discussed below can be summarized in the 
statement that strategic imitation is less likely if governance is likely to be good. We show 
that a higher share of benevolent candidates, less discretionary power of the president over 
the budget B, and a higher effectiveness of the public sector all improve political selection, 
because they reduce the relative cost of being governed, rather than governing. We also 
discuss the effects of transparency (r) in the political process and find that the effect of 
transparency on the quality of political selection is ambiguous. 
a) Share of benevolent candidates (θ) 
A higher share of benevolent types decreases the incentives for strategic imitation 
[ 2 0r B
D
σ δ α
θ
∂ −= <∂ , see eq. (7)]. The reason is that governance is likely to be good - a 
benevolent president is more likely to be selected - which reduces the cost for an egoist of 
not governing.  
Figure 4 illustrates how the equilibrium probability of selecting a benevolent 
president, pA, depends on the share of benevolent candidates (θ). Our result with strategic 
imitation is compared to a benchmark without imitation in which the cost of imitation c is 
high enough to deter any imitation, but not high enough to deter benevolent types from 
choosing the pro-social action. This implies that  imit. (1 )NoA Ap p r r θ= = + −  (see dashed line 
in figure 4). The figure shows that strategic imitation has the most adverse effects at low 
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values of θ. Suppose, for example, that 1% of all candidates are benevolent and 99% are 
egoistic. If only benevolent types make pro-social choices in the pre-election stage, 
benevolent types are selected whenever their signal can be observed (r is assumed to be 
50% in the figure). In contrast, if egoistic types strategically imitate, only about 1% of 
presidents will serve the public interest. It is only for unrealistically high values of θ (of 
around 60% in the figure) that strategic imitation by egoists ceases to be harmful.  
 
Figure 4: Probability of voting a benevolent president into office (pA) as a function of θ 
 Note: The figure is drawn assuming equilibrium σ2 prevails and falls between θ and 1.  
 We illustrate for parameters n = 10, r = 0.5, δ = 0.9, α = 0.4, c = 0.3, B = 7. 
 
b) Budget size (B) 
Control of a higher budget makes governing, and therefore strategic imitation for 
egoists more attractive [
( )22 0
2 4
D r Br
B cn cnB D
δσ δ +∂ = + >∂ , see eq. (7)]. A higher share of 
strategic imitators reduces the probability of selecting a benevolent type.  
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c) Efficiency of public goods production (α) 
The incentives for strategic imitation fall with α, the effectiveness of the public sector 
[ 2 0r B
D
σ δ θ
α
∂ −= <∂ , see eq. (7)]. The reason is again that the expected cost of being 
governed rather than governing is decreasing in α. The result is that the probability of 
selecting a benevolent president increases with the efficiency of public goods production. 
This resonates well with a number of empirical studies which have found a negative 
correlation between corruption and the effectiveness of public bureaucracies. These 
correlations are usually interpreted as indicating that corruption reduces this effectiveness 
(e.g. Bardhan 1997, Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Our model provides a rationale for why the 
causality may run the other way. If the public administration is ineffective, selfish 
individuals are attracted to seeking political office because life without political power is 
unpleasant. This surprising conclusion might help to explain why countries with highly 
ineffective public bureaucracies, e.g. in some African countries, also seem to attract a 
higher share of corrupt politicians than countries with more effective public 
administrations. 
d) Transparency (r) 
Strategic imitation is more attractive if actions in the pre-election stage are more likely 
to be revealed [ ( )
2
2 0
2 4
D r BB
r cn cnr D
δσ δ +∂ = + >∂ , see eq. (7)]. More strategic imitation means 
that the informativeness of the signal to voters is low. On the other hand, a higher value of 
r also means that a benevolent candidate is more likely to be detected at all. Therefore, the 
overall effect of r on political selection is non-monotonic. The probability that a benevolent 
president is elected is  
 * *
1(1 ) (1 ) 1r uA A A
rp rp r p r rθ θ θ θσ σ
⎛ ⎞= + − = + − = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   (8) 
 
If no information is revealed, 0r = , voters pick a candidate at random which means 
that the probability of electing a benevolent president is θ. For sufficiently low (r < 
4cnαθ/δB ) values of r, imitation is not profitable, i.e. *σ θ= . In this case, pA is increasing 
in r. However, at some point imitation becomes attractive (around r = 0.3 for the specific 
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parameters in figure 5). When all egoists imitate ( * 1σ = ), voters cannot extract useful 
information from stage 1 signals, no matter how high r is, and pA again drops to θ. Hence, 
increasing transparency has positive effects at low levels of transparency, but negative 
effects if the level is already high.  
Figure 5: Investigative media and the quality of political selection 
 
  
Note: Illustration is based on same parameter values as Figure 4, and θ = 0.4. 
 
The intuition for this result is that higher transparency increases the cost of acting 
selfishly in the pre-election stage and therefore increases incentives for egoists to behave as 
if they were benevolent. This, in turn, decreases the quality of information available to 
voters about the type of the candidates. To keep the analysis tractable, we assumed that the 
cost of imitation c is not affected by r. If more effective media increase these costs, the 
negative effect of r on the quality of political selection might be weakened or reversed. 
The finding that higher transparency of politics does not necessarily improve political 
economic outcomes resonates well with Matozzi and Merlo (2007) who find that higher 
transparency can lead to less competent politicians, because it increases the opportunity 
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cost of political activity for highly competent agents. Besley (2006) also finds that the 
effect of transparency on political selection is ambiguous, although the mechanisms driving 
his results are different from the ones in our paper.3 Empirical studies mostly find a 
negative effect of media freedom on corruption (e.g. Brunetti and Weder 2003, Freille et. 
al. 2007), but typically do not test for non-linear effects. Theoretical models, including the 
one presented here, suggest that non-linear effects may exist. 
 
3 Re-election: A cure for corruption? 
We now extend our baseline model to investigate re-election as a constitutional constraint 
on rent extraction by egoistic (corrupt) presidents. While the analysis of incentives from re-
election has been a recurrent theme in the standard public choice literature (e.g. Barro 
1973, Ferejohn 1986), our analysis complements that literature by allowing for a (small) 
share of benevolent candidates for political office. As in Coate and Morris (1995), 
incentives from re-election serve two roles: to curtail rent-extraction by egoistic 
incumbents – a moral hazard aspect – and to select a benevolent candidate – an adverse 
selection aspect. 
We now analyze if re-election is an effective constitutional constraint to rent 
extraction by adding a stage 4 and 5 which essentially replicate stages 2 and 3 in the 
baseline game of figure 1. A key difference is that at the beginning of stage 4, voters learn 
how much of the budget the incumbent allocated to public goods in stage 3.  
The main results of our analysis depend on egoistic candidates’ patience, i.e. by how 
much they discount accruing in later periods payoffs, and are as follows. If candidates are 
sufficiently patient, incentives to seek re-election discipline egoistic presidents and improve 
political selection. More specifically, we show that if re-election incentives discipline 
egoistic presidents in stage 3, they also (weakly) reduce strategic imitation, because the 
benefits from imitation are reaped only with a delay, i.e. after the second election. 
However, if agents are impatient, the incentive to seek re-election might not be strong 
enough to discipline incumbents and the introduction of a second election might lead to 
                                                 
3 He assumes that voters receive an exogenous signal about an incumbent leader’s type, and shows that a 
stronger signal might lead to worse outcomes, because it weakens the incentive for a bad incumbent to 
mimic a good one by choosing good policies. 
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further deterioration of political selection. Strategic imitation is now more attractive 
because imitators get two, rather than one, chances of winning the presidency and capturing 
the budget. We now deduce these results by solving the game backwards. 
In stage 5, egoistic presidents appropriate the entire budget while benevolent 
presidents allocate B to public goods.  
In stage 4, voters choose between the incumbent and a “challenger”. We assume that 
voters prefer the incumbent over a challenger if the incumbent is equally or more likely to 
be benevolent than the challenger. That is the case if the incumbent allocates B to public 
goods in stage 3. If not, it is clear that the incumbent is an egoist and he would not be re-
elected in stage 4.  
Stage 3 outcomes can be understood as follows. We denote by pA5 the probability that 
a benevolent type is elected in the stage 4, given that an egoist was elected in stage 2. We 
assume that pA5 = θ when no information is revealed, and pA5 = rAp  when it is (for 
simplicity, we do not take into account that the particular egoist who won the first election 
is not a viable candidate in the second election. Unless n is small, this changes the results 
only slightly). If an egoistic president allocates B to public goods, his payoff is αB in stage 
3, and δB in stage 5. If instead he pockets the budget B in stage 3, his expected payoff in 
stage 5 is pA5δαB. An egoistic president therefore chooses the benevolent policy in stage 3 
if and only if 5AB B B p Bα δ δα+ ≥ + , i.e. if: 
 *
5
  
1
1 Ap
αδ δα
−≥ ≡−
 (9) 
 
Note that the threshold value for impatience *δ  is decreasing in α and increasing in 
pA5. A more efficient public sector increases the president’s incentive to act in the public 
interest because he himself benefits from the goods produced by the public sector. A higher 
probability of a benevolent president taking office in period 5, on the other hand, decreases 
the expected loss from giving up the chance of re-election. Since rAp θ≥ , more patience is 
required to prevent an egoistic president from capturing the rent when information about 
stage 1 actions is revealed than when it is not. Note that *δ  is endogenous. It depends on 
pA5, and therefore on the amount of strategic imitation. 
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In stage 2, a candidate who chose the benevolent action in stage 1 is elected, whenever 
information about pre-election behavior is revealed. Even if voters realize that an egoistic 
president is going to allocate B to the public good in stage 3, they also know that he will be 
re-elected and keep the entire budget in stage 5. Therefore, voters still have an incentive to 
favor the candidates they believe are most likely to be benevolent. 
In stage 1, an egoist’s incentive to choose the benevolent action depends on his policy 
plans if elected president, and on his beliefs about the policy choices of other egoistic 
presidents.  
(i) *δ δ≥ . If an egoist is sufficiently patient, he allocates B to public goods in stage 3 
according to eq. (10) (below we check if the assumption *δ δ≥ is consistent with the 
equilibrium level of strategic imitation). Strategic imitation affects the probability of 
winning the election in stage 2 in exactly the same way as in the baseline game, but the 
discounted gains from winning the presidency are smaller. In stage 3, all agents earn αB, 
and there is no benefit from holding office. However, the president is re-elected with 
certainty, and earns B in stage 5. The probability that a benevolent president holds office in 
stage 5 is the same as in the baseline game. Hence, the expected gain from imitation is the 
same as in the baseline case, except that it is discounted by δ2 rather than δ. In this case, 
therefore, the introduction of a second election leads to (weakly) less strategic imitation 
than in the baseline case. Denote by σ ′ the equilibrium value of σ in the case where the 
egoist intends to allocate B to the public good, and expects other egoists to do the same. 
The resulting value of pA5 is denoted by 5 /Ap θ σ′ ′= , and the resulting value of 
*δ by
5
1 
1 Ap
αδ α
−′ = ′− . 
(ii) *δ δ< . The problem of a not sufficiently patient egoist is more complicated and 
analyzed in detail in appendix B. Egoistic presidents now grab the public budget in stage 3. 
The gains from imitation which are captured in stage 3 are therefore the same as in the 
original game, for a given value of σ (see appendix B for a proof). The additional benefit 
captured in stage 5 can be positive or negative. On the one hand, imitation provides a 
chance to win the second election, even if information about stage 1 actions is revealed. In 
this sense, imitation buys the egoist an additional chance of capturing the public budget. On 
the other hand, imitation slightly decreases the probability that a benevolent type holds 
85
19 
 
office in stage 5, which has a negative effect on the egoist’s expected payoff in that period.4 
The appendix shows that the net effect might be positive or negative. Denote the 
equilibrium value of σ in this case by σ′′ . The resulting value of pA5 is denoted 
5 /Ap θ σ′′ ′′= , and the resulting value of *δ  by
5
1 
1 Ap
αδ α
−′′ = ′′− . 
If imitation increases expected earnings in stage 5, i.e. if the effect from two rather 
than one chance of winning the presidency dominates, the total incentive for strategic 
imitation is stronger than in the case with only one election. Hence, the introduction of a 
second election leads to more strategic imitation and therefore less effective political 
selection compared to the situation with only a single election. Figure B2 in the appendix 
shows an example where this is the case. 
To complete the analysis above, we need to check whether stage 1 strategies derived 
are consistent with the assumptions about δ* which were used in its derivation. Assume 
σ σ′ ′′≤ . Then δ δ′ ′′≥ . We can now distinguish three cases: 
1. δ δ δ′ ′′≥ ≥ . An egoistic president allocates B to public goods production in stage 3. In 
this case, therefore, the incentive to seek re-election fully discipline egoistic presidents 
in stage 3.  
2. δ δ δ′′ ′≤ ≤ . An egoistic president captures the public budget in both stage 3 and stage 
5. Now, the possibility of re-election might lead to more imitation than in the original 
game, and therefore actually worsen the outcome in stage 3, by decreasing the 
probability that a president is elected who serves the public interest.  
                                                 
4 The probability that a benevolent type holds office in the last stage is higher when the egoist chooses not 
to imitate than when he does. To see that this is the case, denote the probability that a particular egoistic 
agent is elected president in stage 2 when information about pre-election behavior is revealed by rjp , j=s,0. 
The probability that a benevolent type holds office in period 5 is  5 5 5 5(1 ) (1 )(1 )
r r r
j A j A j A Ap p p p p p p+ − + − −  
where the first term is the probability that the egoistic agent is elected in the first election, and a benevolent 
type replaces him. The second term is the probability that a benevolent type is elected in the first election 
and becomes re-elected. The third term is the probability that an egoist other than the one we are considering 
is elected in the first election, and that he is replaced by a benevolent type in the second election.  
Since 0 0
rp = , it follows:  
0 5 0 5 0 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
r r r
A A A A A A A
r r r r
s A s A s A A A s A A
p p p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p p p p
+ − + − − = + −
> + − + − − = + − −
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3. δ δ δ′′ ′< < . In this case there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in stage 3. If all 
egoists base their stage 1 behavior on the assumption that egoists capture the budget in 
stage 3, they will prefer to allocate B to public goods when they observe the resulting 
value of pA5, and vice versa if they base their stage 1 behavior on the assumption that 
egoistic president allocate B to public goods. The only symmetric equilibrium is a 
mixed one, where each egoist allocates the entire budget to public goods with some 
probability ρ, and pockets B with probability 1-ρ, 0 < ρ < 1.  
 
4 Concluding remarks 
This paper sheds new light on the relation between good governance and the selection 
of corrupt politicians (“egoists” in our terminology). While it natural to assume that corrupt 
politicians are a cause of bad governance, our results suggest that causality may also run 
the other way. If governance is poor, life as a citizen is unpleasant and egoists have a strong 
incentive to seek a career in politics to reap the rents available to office holders. Thus, poor 
governance breeds corrupt politicians. If, on the other hand, governance is good, rent 
seeking is relatively less attractive, and individuals with intrinsic preferences for serving 
the public interest strive for public office. Thus, good governance enables voters to select 
virtuous politicians. The parameters of good governance, i.e. the high efficiency of the 
public sector, the lack of discretionary power of the president, and a high share of 
benevolent types in the pool of candidates, determine in our model which outcome obtains. 
In our simple model, these factors are exogenous. However, it seems plausible that the 
causation runs both ways because these factors would be affected by the character of the 
president in power. Presidents with a flawed character may generate ineffective 
administration, raise taxes to increase the size of the budget they control, and destroy social 
capital in the pool of candidates. If this is the case, a vicious cycle results where bad 
governance breeds bad politicians, who in turn breed more bad governance. 
The assumption that some share of candidates is benevolent relates our model to the 
issue of how “social capital” and “political culture” (e.g. Hillman and Swank 2000) may 
shape policy outcomes. If benevolence among candidates is a positive function of 
benevolence in the population at large, the share of benevolent candidates θ can be 
interpreted to reflect social capital in a society. Putnam (1993) argues that differences in the 
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quality of governance between Northern and Southern Italy mirror variations in civic 
culture between the two regions. Our model offers a direct and an indirect explanation for 
such data patterns. Not only are there fewer benevolent candidates around in places with 
weak civic culture (direct effect); our model also shows that strategic imitation is more 
common when θ is low, and strategic imitation makes it more difficult for voters to pick 
them out (indirect effect). 
Strategic imitation has clearly adverse welfare effects in our model because pro-social 
acts are costly and because imitation hampers political selection. However, the welfare 
effects of strategic imitation would be ambiguous if the social return of the pro-social act in 
stage 1 (b) is assumed to be sufficiently high (see Cugno and Ferrero 2004 for a related 
case). 
Overall, our model illustrates that political selection may fail even if benevolent 
candidates exist and all voters prefer to have benevolent presidents, depending on 
institutional and social factors like the discretionary leeway of the president, possibilities 
for re-election and the strength of investigative media. While our simple model of political 
selection yields a number of interesting results, we believe that the model could be 
fruitfully extended to capture additional aspects of selection. First, while we focus on 
political selection of “character”, selection of competence may be equally important 
(Besley 2005, Messner and Polborn 2004, Matozzi and Merlo 2007). Second, we 
investigate political selection through elections from a given pool of candidates but the 
process of recruiting candidates, i.e. who selects into the political arena, is clearly also 
interesting to study. These two selection processes may interact in important ways. For 
example, if egoistic types are more likely than benevolent types to enter the political game, 
as argued by Caselli and Morelli (2004), it seems plausible that the share of candidates with 
benevolent preferences (the parameter θ in our model) is small, and that strategic imitation 
is common. 
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Appendix A  Disequilibrium beliefs 
 
Consider case c) in section 4, where ( ) < 0  and  0vY Yθ >  and 1 1σ ≤ . Suppose egoists hold 
the common prior σ0, where 0 1θ σ≤ ≤ . In contrast with the main text, assume that σ0 might 
deviate from the equilibrium values. We distinguish three cases depending on how the 
initial belief relates to the critical values σ1 and σ2.  
 c1) 0 1σ σ< . In this case, 0( ) 0Y σ <  and the best reply to the belief is therefore not to 
imitate. Since this holds for all egoists, the equilibrium is σ* = θ. The equilibrium is stable 
because it is strict (i.e. a deviation by i reduces i’s payoff). 
c2) 0 2σ σ≥ . As in the previous case, 0( ) 0Y σ <  and the best reply is therefore not to 
imitate. However, when sufficiently many agents refrain from imitating, σ falls below σ2, 
and imitation is again a profitable strategy. The only stable equilibria are σ* = σ2 and σ* = θ.  
c3) 1 0 2σ σ σ≤ ≤ . In this case 0( ) 0Y σ ≥  and imitation is the best strategy. However, when 
the share of agents choosing the pro-social action rises above σ2, non-imitation again 
becomes attractive for egoists. The only stable equilibrium occurs at σ* = min(σ2,1).  
The equilibria obtained coincide with those derived in section 4. Therefore, the predictions 
of the model are the same, whether or not we assume that the common prior is equal to the 
equilibrium value of σ. 
 
 
Appendix B The egoist’s problem when there is a second election 
 
Here we analyze the problem for an egoist who intends to pocket the entire budget if 
elected president in stage 3 and expects that all other egoists to do the same, even when 
there is a second election. Assume that information about behavior in stage 1 is revealed 
before the first election (r > 0). Note, first, that an egoist who does not imitate a benevolent 
type has no chance of winning either the first or the second election. Second, if the egoist is 
elected in the first election, he will not be re-elected since extracting B will reveal him as 
an egoist. If a benevolent type is elected in the first election, she is re-elected with 
certainty, since she allocates B to the public good. If egoist i is not get elected in the first 
election and the elected president j is an egoist, the i’s probability of winning the second 
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election is assumed to be rsp , which is equal to his probability of winning the first election. 
Similarly, we assume that the probability that a benevolent type wins the second election is 
is rAp  if an egoist won the first election.  
Figure B1 illustrates the optimization problem for an egoist who is committed to extract B 
if elected in the first election, and assumes that other egoistic presidents will do the same. 
Note that if r = 0, imitation at cost c does not improve chances to be elected. Therefore, the 
cases for “(1-r)” are omitted in the figure. 
 
Figure B1: Optimization problem for an egoistic candidate when there are two elections 
and egoists appropriate the entire budget 
 
The boxes at the bottom of the figure show payoffs in stage 1 in the first line, payoffs in 
stage 3 in the second line, and payoffs in stage 5 in the third line. It follows from the figure 
that imitation is optimal if: 
Imitate benevolent 
type 
Do not imitate 
r r 1 - r 1 - r 
r
sp  1
r
sp−  
- c 
+ δB 
+δ2αB 
1 rAp−  
r
Ap  1 rAp−  
r
sp  1 rsp−  
r
Ap  1
r
Ap−  
- c 
+ δB 
+ 0 
- c 
+ δαB 
+ δ2αB 
- c 
+ 0 
+ δ2B
- c 
+ 0 
+ δ2αB
- c 
+ 0 
+ 0
r
Ap  1 rAp−  
1 rAp−  rAp  
 0 
+ δαB 
+ δ2αB
0 
+ 0 
+ δ2αB 
0 
+ 0 
+ 0 
r
Ap  
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s a A
r r r r r r
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r r r
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X rp p B B p B
r p p B B p p B p p B
r p B B p p B c
δ δ α δ
δα δ α δ δ α
δα δ α δ α
⎡ ⎤≡ + + −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − + + − + −⎣ ⎦
− + + − − ≥
%
 (10) 
 
Inserting eq. (3) and (4) into (11) allows us to re-write the expression as a fourth-degree 
polynomial in σ. Hence, multiple equilibria continue to exist when a second election is 
introduced but a unique equilibrium prevails for some parameters, as figure B2 illustrates. 
Consider the benefits from imitation which are captured in stage 3 and denoted by 3X  (see 
figure B1): 
 { } ( ){ }3 (1 ) (1 ) 1r r r r r r r rs A A s A A s AX r p p B p B p p B p B r B p pδ δ δα δα δ α⎡ ⎤= + − + − − = −⎣ ⎦  (11) 
 
which is the same as the left-hand side of eq. (2). Therefore, the payoff from strategic 
imitation in stage 3 is independent of having a second election (as claimed in the main 
text).  
Consider the benefits captured in stage 5, denoted as 5X : 
 
( ){ }
{ }
{ }
2 2 2 2
5
2 2
2 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1
r r r r r r r r
s A s A A s s A
r r r
A A A
r r r r r
A s s A s
X r p p B p p B p p B p p B
r p B p p B
r B p p p p p
δ α δ α δ δ α
δ α δ α
δ α
⎡ ⎤= + − + − + −⎣ ⎦
− + −
⎡ ⎤= − − + − −⎣ ⎦
 (12) 
 
This expression is positive if and only if ( )2(1 ) (1 ) 1 0r r r rs s A sp p p pα− + − − > , i.e. if: 
 ( )(1 ) 2 0r r rs A sp p pα− + − >  (13) 
 
Insert eq. (3) and (4) into (14) and rewrite to obtain: 
 
 2 (1 2 ) 0n nσ αθ σ αθ− + + >  (14) 
 
Hence, depending on parameters, for some values of σ, the benefits from imitation captured 
in stage 5 are positive, for other values they are negative. The left-hand side of expression 
(15) is falling in α and θ, and in that sense higher values of those parameters therefore 
make it less likely that the possibility of re-election increases the amount of strategic 
imitation. 
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Figure B2 illustrates the case where the possibility of re-election deteriorates political 
selection with unique equilibrium values of σ. 
 
Figure B2:  Net benefit from imitation, with and without re-election 
 Note: ( )X σ%  shows an egoist’s net benefit from imitation when re-election is possible and when he intends 
to appropriate the entire budget if elected president. X(σ) shows the net benefit from strategic imitation when 
there is only one election. The parameters are: δ = 0.4, θ = 0.3, n = 10, c = 0.6, α = 0.3, r = 0.5,  
B = 15.  
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Land rights in developing countries have re-
ceived much attention in development policy
and research in recent years. In the ﬁscal year
2004, the World Bank committed nearly one
billion US$ to land administration, land titling,
and other land reform projects (Conning &
Deb, 2007). Various studies have investigated
the eﬀect of land rights on agricultural invest-
ment and productivity. 2 This study contributes
by investigating the eﬀects of formal land
rights, deﬁned as government-issued land own-
ership documents, in a country where they have
so far not been studied systematically, namely
Cambodia.
Cambodia is an illuminating case study due to
its special circumstances, and a priori it is un-
clear whether formal land rights can be expected
to be eﬀective. On the one hand, years of Khmer
Rouge rule, civil war, and social upheaval have
severely eroded traditional, informal institu-
tions. In this context, we might expect the intro-
duction of formal rights to be important. On the
other hand, state capacity in Cambodia is weak.
If the ability of authorities to enforce rights is
limited, the introduction of formal rights may
be ineﬀective. This paper analyzes the eﬀects
of formal property rights on owner-operated
plots, which covers a large majority of agricul-227tural land in Cambodia. The results show that
government-issued land ownership documents
do in fact have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the value
of output in crop agriculture, and on land val-
ues. This paper attempts to investigate whether
this eﬀect works through the perceived tenure
security (the ‘‘assurance eﬀect’’), through the
credit market, or the land market. Results indi-
cate that the main channel of causality is per-
ceived tenure security. Land rights are found
to have moderate eﬀect on interest rates (house-
holds with formal rights pay less), although they
have no eﬀect on the propensity to use credit.
The study also investigates whether the
spread of formal, private property rights leads
to decreased availability of common property
resources. This question has so far received lit-
tle attention in the literature. It is particularly
important in Cambodia, where natural re-
sources are an important source of rural liveli-
hoods. The data oﬀer weak support for the idea7
2278 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
96that formal, private property rights lead to ero-
sion of common property resources.
Section 2 discusses how property rights may
aﬀect agricultural outcomes. Section 3 describes
the history of land property rights in Cambodia
and Section 4 presents the data set and provides
descriptive statistics. Section 5 investigates the
eﬀects of land rights on agricultural productiv-
ity. Endogeneity issues are taken into account
through the use of a 2SLS estimator. Section
6 analyzes the eﬀects of property rights on land
values, while Section 7 investigates the channels
of causation from land rights to productivity
and land values. Section 8 tests the hypothesis
of a negative eﬀect of formal property rights
on the availability of common property re-
sources, and Section 9 concludes.2. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS
(a) Theory
Property rights have the potential to increase
agricultural investment, and therefore produc-
tivity and land values, through at least three
channels (Besley, 1995). First, property rights
increase incentives to invest simply by increas-
ing the conﬁdence of the landowner that he will
be able to reap the beneﬁts from investment
(the ‘‘assurance eﬀect’’). This channel might
be important in Cambodia, where problems
of tenure insecurity and land conﬂict are wide-
spread. Massive social upheavals during the
Khmer Rouge regime and decades of armed
conﬂict have severely weakened traditional cus-
toms regulating land use, and modern institu-
tions for handling land disputes remain weak
(Cooper, 2004; Williams, 2000). Land grabs
by powerful individuals are frequently reported
(see, e.g., Phnom Penh Post, 2004, 2005, 2006a,
2006b, 2006c; Economist, 2007). LICADHO,
an NGO that monitors land conﬂicts in 12 of
Cambodia’s 24 provinces, reports that in the
year 2005 alone, 9,832 families in those prov-
inces were aﬀected by land grabs, counting only
the cases that started in 2005 (LICADHO,
2006, p. 3).
Property rights may also aﬀect productivity
by easing access to credit. In order to obtain
a loan, the borrower is often required to pro-
vide collateral, and land is an excellent collat-
eral. It cannot be moved and its quality can
only be changed slowly. Auﬀret (2003) analyze
determinants of productivity in Cambodianagriculture, and found that credit constraints
are the most important obstacle faced by farm-
ers. Until recently, the outreach of formal cred-
it institutions in Cambodia has been extremely
weak, but the importance of not-for-proﬁt ‘‘mi-
cro-ﬁnance institutions’’ (MFIs) has increased
rapidly in recent years (IFC, 2006). In the year
2000 the largest of these institutions, ACLE-
DA, transformed itself into a for-proﬁt bank,
and since then it has continued to increase its
number of borrowers in rural areas at a high
pace. In 2004, when the survey data used in this
paper were collected, ACLEDA had 122,000
active borrowers, with a large share of these
in rural areas (ACLEDA, 2005). ACLEDA al-
ways takes collateral for loans, and so do many
of the MFIs, such as PRASAC Murshid (forth-
coming, chap. 9). Apart from this, it is also
common for informal lenders to take collateral.
Hence, a priori there appears to be some scope
for property rights to aﬀect productivity
through the credit channel.
Finally, property rights can increase agricul-
tural productivity by facilitating trade in land.
The costs of organizing trade will be lower if
clear and comprehensive property rights,
including transfer rights, are deﬁned for each
plot of land. An active market for land poten-
tially increases agricultural productivity by
ensuring that land is held by those who can
use it most productively. This relationship is
conditional on the functioning of other mar-
kets, however. If markets for labor, capital, or
insurance are imperfect, trade need not neces-
sarily transfer land to the most productive
households (Deininger & Feder, 2001, chap.
6). Land markets in rural Cambodia are active
(Ballard & So, 2004). On the other hand,
imperfections certainly also exist in comple-
mentary markets and the incidence of distress
sales appears to be high. For example, Chan
and Sarthi (2002) found in a study of nine vil-
lages that 50% of households who sold land
did so to pay for health expenses.
(b) Empirical evidence
Empirical studies of the eﬀects of property
rights to land on agricultural outcomes have
produced mixed results. Only one other,
unpublished, study has investigated the eﬀects
of property rights in rural Cambodia econo-
metrically. Deininger (2005) (cited in World
Bank, 2006) used the same data set as the one
used in this paper, and found that titles increase
land values (measured as households’ own
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97estimates of value), and that a higher share of
land with title leads to higher consumption. I
modify the measure of property rights as
explained below, and investigate the eﬀects of
property rights on agricultural productivity,
access to credit, land rental market activity
and availability of common property resources.
Analyses from other countries in East and
Southeast Asian countries tend to support the
theory of a positive link from property rights
to agricultural outcomes. For example, Feder
and Onchan (1987) found a positive eﬀect of ti-
tling on agricultural investment and capital
intensity in two of three Thai provinces. They
showed that the eﬀect works mainly through
the credit market. SMERU (2002) found that
a land titling program in Indonesia has led to
increased investment, increased use of collat-
eral-backed credit, and higher land values. Per-
haps even more interesting are the studies from
other countries with past experiences of collec-
tivization in agriculture, such as China and
Vietnam. Do and Iyer (2006) suggested that
land titling in Vietnam has led to increased
diversiﬁcation into multi-year crops and to
higher time-use in non-agricultural activities.
Deininger and Jin (2003) found that improved
transferability rights to land in Vietnam led to
a large increase in activity in both rental and
sales markets, and that transactions have on
average transferred land to high-ability farmers
with small land landholdings. So, the reforms
had beneﬁcial eﬀects on eﬃciency as well as
equity. For China, Deininger and Jin (2002)
compared evidence from a province that intro-
duced relatively radical property rights reform
at an early point (Guizhou) with evidence from
two other provinces. They showed that more
secure property rights increased investment
incentives without having negative eﬀects in
terms of higher household exposure to shocks
(the reforms were hypothesized to lead to high-
er exposure to shocks because a previously
established practice of redistributing land in fa-
vor of households hit by shocks was abandoned
in favor of more secure long-term rights). Jaco-
by, Li, and Rozelle (2002) used data from
north-eastern China and also showed that
increased tenure security leads to higher invest-
ment.
These studies from Asia are interesting from
the Cambodian perspective. Cropping patterns
and agro-climatic conditions in Cambodia are
most similar to those found in neighboring
countries, and the historical experiences of
Cambodia in the 20th in some ways resemblethose in China and Vietnam, even though the
upheavals in Cambodia were in many ways ex-
treme. However, in terms of state capacity and
institutional quality, it is also reasonable to
compare Cambodia to countries in, for exam-
ple, sub-Saharan Africa. One measure of state
capacity is the state’s ability to collect revenues.
Over the period 1995–2004, Cambodia raised
only 7% of GDP in Government revenue, the
third lowest ﬁgure among low-income countries
(World Bank, 2007, chap. 8). The correspond-
ing ﬁgure for Vietnam is 20%. On the six Gov-
ernance Indicators published in Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007), in 2004 Cambo-
dia was in the lowest quartile of countries in
the world on the indicators of ‘‘government
eﬀectiveness,’’ ‘‘rule of law,’’ and ‘‘control of
corruption.’’ It was in the second-lowest quar-
tile on the indicators of ‘‘voice and accountabil-
ity,’’ ‘‘political stability,’’ and ‘‘regulatory
quality.’’ Since the eﬀectiveness of formal prop-
erty rights depends on the ability of the state to
enforce them, this means that studies of prop-
erty rights in Africa, where institutions are also
weak, should also be considered.
These studies have produced a much more
mixed picture than studies from other regions
(Feder & Nishio, 1999). Some studies do ﬁnd
positive eﬀects. For example, Besley (1995)
showed a positive eﬀect of informal property
rights on investment in the Wassa region of
Ghana, although he found no eﬀect in Anloga
region. Hayes, Roth, and Zepeda (1997) dem-
onstrated a positive eﬀect of tenure security on
agricultural productivity in peri-urban areas of
the Gambia. Smith (2004) found similar results
for the Southern province of Zambia. Holden,
Deininger, and Ghebru (2007) found that land
certiﬁcation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia
led to increased land rental market activity.
Goldstein and Udry (2005) found that tenure
security has a strong eﬀect on agricultural
investment in the Akwapim region of Ghana.
On the other hand, Place and Hazell (1993)
found only weak eﬀects of informal land right
on investment, productivity, and access to credit
in survey data from Ghana, Kenya, and Rwan-
da. Place and Migot-Adholla (1998), using a
survey of households in rural Kenya, failed to
detect any eﬀect of land titling on investment
and productivity. Braselle, Gaspart, and Plat-
teau (2002) found no eﬀect of traditional land
rights on investment in the Bobo-Dioulasso re-
gion of Burkina Faso, although they found that
investment aﬀects property rights. The positive
eﬀect of titling on productivity and investment
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and Sjaastad and Bromley (1997).3. BACKGROUND ON PROPERTY
RIGHTS TO LAND IN CAMBODIA
Historical experiences with western style
property rights to land in Cambodia are lim-
ited. During pre-colonial times, all land was
formally owned by the sovereign, but since
population density was low land, could in prac-
tice be freely occupied against payment of a
symbolic, feudal tribute. The French colonial
power attempted to introduce a modern system
of property rights, but succeeded only in lim-
ited areas, particularly the rice growing plains.
The colonial property rights system was contin-
ued after independence in 1953, but still did not
extend beyond the plains. The Khmer Rouge
collectivized all land, and few traces of land
rights systems from before 1975 remain today.
After the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, a
new system of collective land management was
implemented. Privatization started gradually in
the mid-1980s, and private property rights to
land were oﬃcially reintroduced in 1989 (Sik
Boreak, 2000; So et al., 2001). After 1992, land-
holders were encouraged to submit applications
for formal land titles to residential and agricul-
tural land and more than four million applica-
tions have been submitted. However, due to the
limited administrative capacity of the govern-
ment, only a small fraction of these applica-
tions have actually resulted in certiﬁcates
being issued. Households may apply for a land
title on their own initiative (‘‘sporadic registra-
tion’’), but there is evidence that obtaining titles
through this process has often entailed very
substantial costs in terms of informal fees. So
et al. (2001, p. 25) reported that while the oﬃ-
cial fee of registration is 3–4$, the actual fee is
sometimes as much as 300–400$. This is prohib-
itively high for most rural households.
In 2003, the Government of Cambodia re-
newed its eﬀorts to issue land titles with the
launch of the Land Management and Adminis-
tration Program (LMAP). LMAP aims to
facilitate a comprehensive reform of land man-
agement policies in Cambodia, and one of its
main components is a systematic land titling
program, aiming to issue one million titles in
11 provinces in the period 2003–07 (World
Bank, 2002). However, by the end of 2004 only
38,481 titles had been issued (Deutsch, 2006,
Table 3.2.1). There are more than 6 millionplots in Cambodia and since the survey used
in this paper was completed in January 2005, ti-
tles issued under LMAP are generally not cap-
tured in the data.
Plots larger than ﬁve hectares may be given
out by the state as concessions (the so-called
‘‘Economic Concessions’’) for a limited number
of years, for example, to allow the establishment
of large-scale plantations. Formally, conces-
sions are not allowed to be larger than 10,000
ha, but in reality several concessions are above
this limit. Leuprecht (2004) estimated that 2.7
million hectares of Cambodia’s total land area
of 18.1 million hectares are under concession
management.4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The analyses in this paper draw upon the
Household Socio-Economic Survey (HSES)
2003–04, carried out by the National Institute
of Statistics during November 2003–January
2005. The survey is nationally representative
and includes 15,000 households, of whom
12,000 live in rural areas. This section provides
descriptive statistics on the variables used in the
regression analyses in subsequent sections, and
discusses key variables. Tables 1 and 2 show
descriptive statistics at plot and household lev-
els. Table 1 only includes plots owned by the
surveyed households, and Table 2 only includes
household owning at least some land. This is
because the aim of the analysis is to focus on
the diﬀerence between ownership documented
with oﬃcial papers and undocumented owner-
ship, and not on the diﬀerence between owned
and rented or sharecropped land. This focus
is justiﬁed by the fact that more than 95% of
plots in the sample are operated by the owner.
The ﬁrst line of Table 1 shows that 50% of
plots are held with a paper certifying ownership.
This includes proper land certiﬁcates (titles) as
well as receipts for certiﬁcate applications, and
a small fraction of plots where ownership is doc-
umented by a land survey receipt. The survey
does distinguish between these diﬀerent types
of documents but this information is not used
here. The main reason is that the estimated
share of titled plots appears unrealistically high.
In the survey, 21% of plots are reported to be
held with a title. On the other hand, Chan,
Tep, and Sarthi (2001, Table 4.1) showed that
at the end of the year 2000 a total of 518,000
land certiﬁcates had been distributed, with more
than 85% handed out during 1989–95. World
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, plot level (mean, unless otherwise stated)
Variable All plots Plots with paper Plots without paper Observations
Held with paper 0.50 17,308
Area, ha (median) 0.50 0.40 0.50 17,306
Value of output, ’000 riel/ha (median) 673 744 600 15,917
Sales value, ’000 riel/ha (median) 2,500 3,000 2,000 17,239
Irrigated in at least one season 0.32 0.36 0.28 17,308
Type of land:
Wet season land 0.68 0.68 0.68 17,308
Dry season land 0.11 0.12 0.10 17,308
Both wet and dry season lands 0.01 0.02 0.01 17,308
Chamkar landa 0.13 0.13 0.14 17,308
Vegetable garden 0.02 0.02 0.02 17,308
Other types of land 0.05 0.04 0.05 17,308
Mode of acquisition:
Given by the state 0.47 0.57 0.38 17,308
Inherited or given by relatives 0.34 0.26 0.41 17,308
Bought 0.12 0.17 0.08 17,308
Donated by friends 0.00 0.00 0.00 17,308
Cleared or occupied for free 0.06 0.00 0.13 17,308
Other modes of acquisition 0.00 0.00 0.00 17,308
Years had plot 19 19 18 17,257
Conﬂict on plot since 1995 0.01 0.01 0.02 17,308
Rented out 0.03 0.03 0.03 17,308
Note: Sampling weights applied. Only rural households are included, only plots owned by the household are in-
cluded. Area, value of output, and sales value are quite strongly skewed to the right, and medians are therefore more
informative than means.
a Land used for growing vegetables or tree crops.
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99Bank (2002) estimated that there are six to seven
million plots in Cambodia. Hence, for the true
share of titled plots to be as high as 21%, a mas-
sive titling eﬀort should have taken place during
2001–04. This was not the case, and it therefore
seems likely that a signiﬁcant share of the pa-
pers denoted as ‘‘certiﬁcates’’ (titles) in the
HSES 03/04 are actually application receipts
or other non-title documents. So et al. (2001) re-
ported that ‘‘a large number of people consider
the receipts to be titles’’ and ‘‘in the more mar-
ket-exposed locales (. . .) people said that the re-
ceipt was not only an insurance against land
grabbing, but was also useful in terms of land
sale and property inheritance’’ (p. 26). In the
1992 Land Law, an application receipt was suf-
ﬁcient to lock in a possession right for a plot
(Cooper, 2004). This rule was changed in the
2001 Land Law, but may well still have aﬀected
farmers’ perceptions of application receipts at
the time of the survey. Hence, it seems reason-
able to believe that (i) certiﬁcates were often
confused with other documents in the HSES
(especially so because no speciﬁc instructions
are given to the enumerators to distinguish care-fully between certiﬁcates and other documents)
and (ii) certiﬁcates, application receipts, and
other oﬃcial papers documenting ownership
can be expected to have similar economic ef-
fects. I refer to all these papers as ‘‘formal’’ land
rights documents.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for plots
with and without a paper documenting owner-
ship, and Table 2 distinguishes between house-
holds with, respectively, more or less than 50%
of their land held with paper. Consistent with
the view that papers have a positive eﬀect on
investment and productivity, plots with paper
have higher value of output per hectare, higher
reported sales value, and are more likely to be
irrigated. Plots with paper are also less likely
to have been exposed to land conﬂict. House-
holds with more than 50% of their land held
with paper have higher net income per hectare,
use somewhat more inputs per hectare, and
have slightly more non-land agricultural assets
than other households. However, households
with a large share of their land ownership doc-
umented with paper are slightly less likely than
others to have an outstanding loan, although
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, household, and loan level (mean, unless otherwise stated)
Variable All land-owning households Share of land with paper P0.5 Share of land with paper <0.5 Observations
Operated land area, ha (median) 1.0 0.9 1.0 9,352
Share of operated area not owned 0.05 0.01 0.09 9,310
Value of current inputs, excl. hh labor,
’000 riel (median)
225 253 202 9,137
Value of non-land agricultural assets,
’000 riel (median)
1,525 1,565 1,505 9,352
Non-land wealth, ’000 riel (median) 5,138 5,845 4,560 9,352
Hh size 5.0 5.0 4.9 9,352
Dependency ratio 0.84 0.82 0.86 9,352
Years of schooling of hh head 3.8 4.1 3.54 9,293
Age of hh head 45 46 44 9,352
Female hh head 0.20 0.21 0.19 9,352
At least one hh member sought health
care in the last 4 weeks
0.36 0.37 0.36 9,352
Hh has outstanding debt 0.44 0.42 0.45 9,352
Hh has outstanding debt with positive interest 0.26 0.27 0.26 9,352
Hh has outstanding debt with formal lender 0.10 0.12 0.08 9,352
Loans
Amount ’000 riel (median)a 250 300 250 2,562
Interest, pct./montha 6.2 6.0 6.3 2,562
Note: Sampling weights applied. Only rural households are included. Value of inputs, value of non-ag. assets and amount borrowed are quite strongly skewed to the
right, and medians are therefore more informative than means.
a Interest free loans and loans with monthly interest >30 pct. ignored.
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101they are more likely to have a loan with a for-
mal lender (an MFI or a bank). The loans ta-
ken by household with papers are somewhat
larger than loans taken by other households,
and the interest charged is slightly lower. In
general, papers documenting land ownership
are associated with more favorable outcomes.
However, we cannot draw causal inference
from these descriptive statistics. The positive
association between paper status and other
variables might result from the fact that re-
ceipts and titles were less likely to be handed
out in remote locations than elsewhere. Until
1998 many of these locations were not even
controlled by the government, but by the
Khmer Rouge. Also, resourceful households
with fertile land have a higher incentive and
better opportunities for obtaining oﬃcial pa-
pers, and hence the causal relationship may
run from productivity to paper status, and
not the other way. To take account of these
possibilities, I turn to more careful, economet-
ric analyses.5. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
PRODUCTIVITY
One ‘‘reduced form’’ prediction emerging
from the theoretical discussion in Section 2 is
that property rights have a positive eﬀect on
agricultural productivity. In this section, I test
this prediction. The measure of productivity
used is the value of output per hectare. An
important advantage of this variable is that it
is available at the plot level. This makes it pos-
sible to make use of plot speciﬁc information
on property rights. Increasing agricultural out-
put can be an important policy goal, for exam-
ple, in order to secure food supplies, or increase
export earnings.
(a) Model and estimation strategy
The agricultural production function is as-
sumed to take the Cobb–Douglas form, giving
the following expression for agricultural pro-
ductivity:
pY hj
Qhj
¼ pAðxhj; zh; vÞQbQ1hj LbLhj V bVhj KbKhj ; ð1Þ
where Yhj is the output on plot j in household h,
p the price of output, Q the sown area, L the
household labor input, V the variable inputs
other than household labor, K the agriculturalassets and A a measure of total factor produc-
tivity which depends on vectors of plot, house-
hold, and village characteristics (x, z, and v,
respectively). It is furthermore assumed that to-
tal factor productivity, A(Æ), takes the following
functional form:
lnAðxhj; zh; vÞ ¼ lnAþ a0xhj þ c0zh þ h0v:
Property rights, R, are modeled as an element
in xhj. In this perspective, property rights in-
crease productivity by aﬀecting total factor pro-
ductivity, for example, because rights give
stronger incentives or possibilities for produc-
tivity enhancing investment, or because rights
facilitate a process by which plots are trans-
ferred to the most productive farmers. The
measure of property rights used is whether a
plot is held with a paper documenting owner-
ship. Assuming a multiplicative error term,
ehj, the following empirical model emerges for
estimation:
ln
pY hj
Qhj
 !
¼ ln pAþ aRRþ ~a0~xhj þ c0zh
þ h0vþ ðbQ  1Þ lnQhj þ bL
 ln Lhj þ bV ln V hj þ bK
 lnKhj þ ln ehj; ð2Þ
~xhp is simply xhp without R. The model is spec-
iﬁed at the plot level. Measures of labor and
other inputs are available only at the household
level, so they are entered at this level. House-
hold labor is measured by the number of house-
hold members between 15 and 64 years of age.
Land is measured as the area of agricultural
land operated by the household, in hectares.
‘‘Agricultural assets’’ are measured as the value
of agriculture speciﬁc assets, such as cattle, buf-
faloes, horses, ploughs, threshers, and carts.
Furthermore, a variable measuring ‘‘non-
household labor variable inputs’’ is entered.
This variable includes spending on non-labor
inputs (seeds, fertilizer, etc.) as well as on hired
labor. The set of plot characteristics aﬀecting
the total factor productivity ð~xhjÞ includes a
dummy for whether the plot is irrigated (either
during the wet or during the dry season, or
both), and a set of dummies for the type of
land. These variables together with village ﬁxed
eﬀects proxy for soil quality, which would
otherwise be a potentially important omitted
variable. At the household level, I include years
of education of the household head, and the
dependency ratio, deﬁned as the number of
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102household members below 15 or above 64 di-
vided by the number of household members be-
tween 15 and 64. In principle, household ﬁxed
eﬀects could be introduced to remove all eﬀects
produced by diﬀerences between households.
Unfortunately, the data are not rich enough
to allow for this exercise, since most households
have only a few plots (often only one).
Village ﬁxed eﬀects are included to control
for village level characteristics, such as infra-
structure, market conditions, and diﬀerences
in soil quality and agro-climatic conditions.
Importantly, the ﬁxed eﬀects also take account
of the fact that diﬀerent geographical areas had
diﬀerent exposure to the programs under which
titles and other papers were handed out. As in
the descriptive analysis, only plots that house-
holds report to ‘‘own’’ (with or without formal
documentation) are included. Only plots in rur-
al areas are included.
As discussed above, the property rights var-
iable is likely to be endogenous. This means
that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation
may yield biased estimates, and I therefore ap-
ply an instrumental variables (IV) estimator as
well, namely Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS).
The IV method also potentially diminishes the
eﬀects of measurement error. Following Besley
(1995), Braselle et al. (2002), and Deininger
and Castagnini (2004) I use dummies for the
mode by which a plot was acquired as instru-
ments for property rights. The idea behind this
strategy is that, controlling for characteristics
of plots and households that are correlated
with both mode of acquisition and productiv-
ity, there is no reason why choices related to
productivity should be linked to the way a plot
was acquired (i.e., the instruments will be
uncorrelated with the error term). On the other
hand, there is a good reason to believe that the
mode of acquisition aﬀects property rights.
For example, if a plot was bought or given
by the state, there is a chance that obtaining
a legal document for the plot was an integral
part of the process of acquiring the plot. This
would rarely be the case if the plot was granted
by a friend, or acquired by felling trees on land
that was previously held by the community.
Table 1 shows that paper status is quite
strongly related to mode of acquisition. Plots
held with a paper are more likely to have been
given by the state or purchased than other
plots. While the instrument chosen here is the
best one available in the data set, it is not nec-
essarily perfect. First, mode of acquisition may
not only aﬀect property rights through theprobability of having a paper, but could also
have a direct eﬀect on the de facto tenure secu-
rity a farmer has over his plot. For example, a
local community might be more inclined to
recognize a farmers’ claim to a plot if it was
bought than if it was acquired by clearing
communal land. Second, mode of acquisition
might be correlated with unobservable plot
characteristics, such as soil quality. Both these
objections probably apply most strongly to
land cleared by the household. In many places,
it seems that cleared land has a higher proba-
bility than other types of being declared ‘‘state
land’’ and therefore be subject to expropria-
tion by the state (ﬁeld observations). In terms
of soil quality, recently cleared land might be
better than other types of land, because more
nutrients remain in the soil. On the other
hand, clearing forest land with primitive tools
can be a lengthy process, and several years
may pass from the time a plot is acquired until
it is fully cleared. In those years its productiv-
ity might be lower than on other plots. Cleared
land is also much less likely than other types of
land to be held with a paper, as shown in Ta-
ble 1. For these reasons, it is investigated
whether the estimated results are robust to tak-
ing plots acquired by land clearing or ‘‘occu-
pied for free’’ out of the sample (the survey
lumps these two modes of acquisition to-
gether).
(b) Results
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the
model for the value of output per hectare.
The ﬁrst and second columns show the results
of estimating (2) on the entire sample by OLS
and 2SLS. The eﬀect of having an ownership
paper is positive in both models, but only sig-
niﬁcant in the 2SLS-model where it is also
much higher. It is somewhat surprising that
the coeﬃcients are higher in the 2SLS-models
than in the OLS models. One would expect a
reverse, positive eﬀect from productivity to
rights, causing an upward bias in the OLS esti-
mates. The results indicate that the main eﬀect
of instrumentation is to remove measurement
error in the paper variable. Measurement error
might arise from at least two diﬀerent sources.
First, simple misunderstanding, lack of knowl-
edge on the part of the respondent, and record-
ing mistakes can lead to errors. Second,
although the eﬀects of titles and other docu-
ments are likely to be similar, they may not
be identical. If some types of paper provide
Table 3. Land ownership documents and agricultural productivity
Dependent variable: value of output per hectare
(log)
All plots Cleared plots excluded
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Plot held with paper 0.045 0.346 0.038 0.297
(1.51) (3.43)*** (1.17) (1.71)*
Farm size (log) 0.695 0.700 0.691 0.696
(27.83)*** (28.63)*** (26.45)*** (26.66)***
Working age hh members (log) 0.113 0.107 0.11 0.101
(4.53)*** (4.27)*** (4.18)*** (3.75)***
Spending on inputs other than land and hh labor (log) 0.428 0.421 0.435 0.427
(20.79)*** (20.54)*** (20.89)*** (20.48)***
Non-land agricultural assets (log) 0.031 0.031 0.03 0.03
(6.54)*** (6.53)*** (6.29)*** (6.38)***
Irrigated during at least one season 0.089 0.087 0.079 0.076
(2.57)** (2.52)** (2.22)** (2.13)**
Type of land
Dry season land 0.09 0.117 0.112 0.12
(1.73)* (2.25)** (2.06)** (2.26)**
Both wet and dry season lands 0.347 0.351 0.311 0.316
(3.88)*** (3.96)*** (3.67)*** (3.82)***
Chamkar land 0.168 0.178 0.236 0.237
(2.69)*** (2.89)*** (3.54)*** (3.63)***
Vegetable garden 1.055 1.09 1.101 1.132
(5.89)*** (5.87)*** (6.15)*** (6.22)***
Other types of land 0.159 0.161 0.148 0.152
(1.11) (1.14) (1.00) (1.03)
Years of schooling of head 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006
(2.24)** (2.29)** (1.76)* (1.89)*
Dependency ratio 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.011
(1.29) (1.20) (0.96) (0.85)
Female hh head 0.015 0.02 0.015 0.02
(0.63) (0.89) (0.60) (0.85)
Fixed eﬀects Village Village Village Village
Observations 14,534 14,534 13,691 13,691
R2 0.51 0.52
Hansen J-test of instrument exogeneity (P-value) 0.94 0.79
F-test for joint signiﬁcance of instruments in 1st stage reg. 78.4 30.1
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level. * Signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Only rural households included. Only plots owned by the household
included (i.e., plots rented in are excluded). Constant not shown. The omitted category for type of land is the wet
season land. In the 2SLS regressions, plot held with paper is instrumented with the mode of plot acquisition.
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103stronger tenure security than others, the under-
lying notion of property rights will be measured
with error when we assign the same value todiﬀerent types of paper. If measurement error
is indeed the main cause for diﬀerences between
the OLS and IV estimates, we should expect the
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104IV estimates to be upward biased. Kane,
Rouse, and Staiger (1999), showed that in the
case of a binary endogenous variable (such as
‘‘plot held with paper’’), the instruments are
correlated with the measurement error, and
that this correlation leads to an upward bias
in the estimate of the eﬀect of the endogenous
variable. In this interpretation the OLS
estimate is a lower bound and the IV estimate
is an upper bound for plausible values of the
true parameters. Columns three and four show
the results of estimating (2) with the plots
cleared by the household or occupied for free
removed from the sample. The eﬀects of paper
are still positive, although somewhat lower.
The 2SLS estimate remains signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
The instruments perform very well in the for-
mal tests of relevance and exogeneity. The rule-
of-thumb provided by Staiger and Stock (1997)
in testing for weak instruments is that the F-sta-
tistic for the signiﬁcance of the instruments in
the ﬁrst-stage regression should be at least 10.
In the models presented here, the ﬁrst-stage F-
statistics are much higher. The Hansen J-tests
fail to reject the hypothesis of instrument exo-
geneity in the full as well as the restricted sam-
ple.
The economic signiﬁcance of property rights
is quite high, according to the IV estimates of
the coeﬃcient on the paper variable. Plots held
with a paper are on average 30–35% more pro-
ductive than other plots. Even if we assume
that the coeﬃcients are somewhat upward
biased due to measurement error, this eﬀect is
still remarkable. It is higher than the eﬀect of,
say, the plot being irrigated, or the head having
ﬁve extra years of education.Table 4. Land ownership documents an
Zone
Plot held with paper
Fixed eﬀects
Observations
Hansen J-test of instrument exogeneity (P-value)
F-test of joint signiﬁcance of instruments in 1st stage reg
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Only rural
included (i.e., plots rented in are excluded). Constant not s
included (results not shown). Plot held with paper is instru(c) Zone speciﬁc analysis
The discussion in Section 2 implies that the
eﬀects of property rights are partly conditional
on the existence of complementary markets, for
example, for credit, land, and investment
goods. Since these markets are more vibrant
in some regions of Cambodia than others, we
might expect that the eﬀects of property rights
diﬀer between regions. To test this hypothesis,
the productivity model is estimated separately
for each of the four main, geographical ‘‘zones’’
in Cambodia: the Mekong Plains, Tonle Sap,
Coast, and Plateau/Mountain. 3 Of these the
Plains in the low-lying, Southeastern part of
the country has the most developed infrastruc-
ture and markets. The most remote regions are
the Coast and Plateau/Mountain zones. The
Khmer Rouge rebels also generally held out
longer in these zones than elsewhere, although
parts of the Tonle Sap zone were also aﬀected
by conﬂict until the mid-1990s.
Table 4 shows the results of this exercise. Pa-
per status is in all regressions instrumented with
the mode of acquisition dummies. The hypoth-
esis of a stronger eﬀect of property rights in less
remote regions receives some support. The pa-
per variable is only signiﬁcant in the Plains
and Tonle Sap regions, which have the most
developed infrastructure and markets. In the
Coastal zone there is no eﬀect. On the other
hand, the point estimate is higher in the Pla-
teau/Mountain region than anywhere else.
However, since it is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, we may still conclude that property
rights appear to have a stronger eﬀect in the re-
gions with more developed infrastructure and
markets than elsewhere.d productivity by geographical zone
Dependent variable: value of output per hectare
(log)
Plains Tonle Sap Coastal Plateau/mountain
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
0.359 0.360 0.006 0.478
(2.70)*** (2.10)** (0.01) (1.22)
Village Village Village Village
7,505 4,449 1,044 1,511
0.6 0.9 0.44 0.64
. 54.1 30.3 18.1 7.44
adjusted for clustering at the village level. * signiﬁcant at
households included. Only plots owned by the household
hown. The same set of control variables as in Table 3 is
mented with the mode of plot acquisition.
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1056. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND
VALUES
If we assume that the value of a plot is the
discounted sum of future income ﬂows the plot
is likely to generate, then plot value is an
alternative measure of productivity, and the
hypothesis of an eﬀect of property rights on
productivity can be tested by investigating
whether property rights have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on land values. As mentioned in Section 2,
Deininger (2005) found such an eﬀect in Cam-
bodia (reported in World Bank, 2006). The
present analysis complements his analysis by
using a diﬀerent measure of property rights
and a somewhat diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the
econometric model. The HSES 03/04 asks
respondents about the perceived sales and ren-
tal values of their plots. Since there are signiﬁ-
cantly more missing values on the rental value
variable, I focus on sales value. Information
on values of actual sales would probably be
more reliable, but such data are not available
from the survey. Regressions for the log of sales
value per hectare (in ‘000 riel) are estimated.
The measure of property rights included is still
whether a plot is held with a paper document-
ing ownership. The size of the plot is included
as a proxy for soil quality. Smaller plots are
often of higher quality, in part due to the prin-
ciples of distributing land during de-collectivi-
zation. Irrigation status and land type are
important determinants of future productivity,
and are also included. I also include the age,
gender, and education of the household head.
Although these variables do not aﬀect the pro-
ductivity of the plot in case it is sold to another
household, they may aﬀect the bargaining
power of the household in case of an actual
sale. Village ﬁxed eﬀects are included to capture
geographical diﬀerences in soil quality and
market conditions. 4 Paper status is instru-
mented by mode of acquisition, and the robust-
ness of the instrumentation strategy is tested by
estimating the model both with and without
plots cleared or occupied for free included in
the sample.
Table 5 shows the results of this analysis. The
estimated coeﬃcients on the paper variable are
similar to those in the model for value of out-
put. All estimates are positive, and the 2SLS
estimates are higher than the OLS estimates.
An important diﬀerence is that the OLS esti-
mates in this model are signiﬁcant. In the full
sample, the instruments perform less well in
the land value model than in the value of out-put model. The instruments remain highly rele-
vant, but exogeneity is rejected at the 10% level.
However, in the restricted sample (with plots
cleared or occupied for free excluded), the exo-
geneity test is easily passed. The coeﬃcient on
paper status remains signiﬁcant at the 10% le-
vel. The point estimate is 0.38 in the full sample
2SLS model, but drops to 0.20 in the restricted
sample. The OLS estimates are in both cases
around 0.10. These results strengthen the argu-
ments for a positive eﬀect of secure, private
property rights on agricultural productivity.
However, note that (i) the estimated eﬀect of
ownership documents is lower in the restricted
than in the full sample and (ii) the exogeneity
test is only passed in the restricted sample. This
indicates that mode of acquisition does in fact
have a direct eﬀect on de facto property rights,
in the sense that farmers have lower security of
tenure for plots cleared or occupied for free
than for other plots, regardless of whether they
are held with a paper.7. MECHANISMS OF CAUSATION
Section 2 argued that property rights may af-
fect productivity via the ‘‘assurance eﬀect,’’ the
credit market, and the land market. This sec-
tion attempts to investigate which of these
mechanisms are important in Cambodia.
(a) The assurance eﬀect
The assurance eﬀect argument holds that
formal property rights aﬀect productivity by
changing farmers’ perceptions of tenure secu-
rity, and therefore their willingness to invest.
The HSES does not provide information on
farmers’ subjective perceptions of tenure secu-
rity. In a sample of 50 villagers and village
leaders, 94% of respondents believe that the
new land titles distributed by LMAP improve
ownership security (Markussen, 2007; World
Bank, 2007). The LMAP titles are by and
large not captured in the data used for the
present analysis, but the ﬁndings at least indi-
cate that formal land ownership documents
have the potential to aﬀect perceived tenure
security. The HSES does provide an ‘‘objec-
tive’’ measure of tenure security, namely
whether a plot has been exposed to a conﬂict.
However, in spite of the frequent reports
about land conﬂict in other sources (see Sec-
tion 2), only 1% of plots in the HSES have
had a conﬂict since 1995. 5 Table 1 shows that
Table 5. Land ownership documents and land sales value
Dependent variable: Sales value of plot per hectare (log)
All plots Cleared plots excluded
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Has legal paper for plot 0.105 0.381 0.095 0.204
(3.96)*** (4.46)*** (3.44)*** (1.67)*
Plot size, ha (log) 0.672 0.674 0.663 0.665
(42.88)*** (44.59)*** (40.42)*** (41.01)***
Irrigated during at least one season 0.149 0.146 0.144 0.142
(4.98)*** (4.97)*** (4.62)*** (4.62)***
Dry season land 0.068 0.049 0.077 0.075
(1.12) (0.82) (1.21) (1.20)
Both wet and dry season lands 0.05 0.048 0.052 0.052
(0.59) (0.56) (0.61) (0.61)
Chamkar land 0.099 0.104 0.155 0.153
(1.88)* (2.02)** (2.90)*** (2.93)***
Vegetable garden 0.148 0.171 0.174 0.182
(1.54) (1.80)* (1.78)* (1.89)*
Other types of land 0.24 0.254 0.305 0.306
(2.40)** (2.62)*** (2.78)*** (2.86)***
Female hh head 0.075 0.072 0.07 0.069
(3.34)*** (3.30)*** (3.14)*** (3.16)***
Years of schooling of head 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.009
(3.59)*** (3.48)*** (3.18)*** (3.19)***
Age of head 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(3.74)*** (3.06)*** (3.33)*** (2.90)***
Fixed eﬀects Village Village Village Village
Observations 17,025 17,025 15,966 15,966
R2 0.68 0.68
Hansen J-test of instrument
exogeneity (P-value)
0.09 0.60
F-test for joint signiﬁcance of
instruments in 1st stage reg.
97.4 42.3
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Only rural households included. Only plots owned by the household
included (i.e., plots rented in are excluded). Constant not shown. The omitted category for type of land is wet season
land. In the 2SLS regressions, plot held with paper is instrumented with mode of plot acquisition.
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106plots held with a paper are less likely than
other plots to be aﬀected by conﬂict (the
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level), but this correlation cannot neces-
sarily be given a causal interpretation. If the
ownership of a plot is disputed, authorities
are less likely to issue ownership documents
than otherwise, implying that the direction of
causality may also run from conﬂict to paper
status. Given the sparse data on conﬂicts, a
more rigorous identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of
paper status on land conﬂict is not attempted.(b) Credit markets
As argued in Section 2, property rights may
increase productivity by easing credit con-
straints. The HSES includes data on currently
outstanding loans taken by households. Here,
I exploit these data to analyze the relationship
between property rights and access to credit.
Table 2 shows that 44% of landowning, rural
households had an outstanding loan at the time
of the interview. A substantial share of this
debt is interest free loans, usually obtained
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107from friends or family. It is assumed that these
loans are not related to land property rights.
Some 26% of households have an outstanding
loan with a positive interest rate, and 10% have
a loan with a formal lender, that is, a bank or
an MFI. To analyze the relationships between
property rights and access to credit, regression
analysis is again employed. Four independent
variables are analyzed: (1) whether a household
has an outstanding loan with positive interest,
(2) whether a household has borrowed from a
formal lender (given that it has an outstanding
loan with positive interest), (3) the interest rate
paid on loans with positive interest, and (4) the
amount borrowed among loans with positive
interest. The measure of property rights is the
share of owned land held with a paper. In these
analyses, property rights are assumed to be
exogenous. In principle, better access to credit
could aﬀect a household’s ability to obtain land
titles, for example, through the expensive spo-
radic titling procedure. However, the feedback
link from current outstanding debt to land
rights, which have mostly been held for several
years, is likely to be weak. As control variables,
it is necessary to include measures of household
assets, since the ability to oﬀer collateral is an
important determinant of access to credit. Both
land and non-land wealth are included. Find-
ings reported in Murshid (forthcoming, chap.
9) and Markussen (2007) suggest that the rela-
tionship between economic status and use of
credit in rural Cambodia is U-shaped: Poor
households often borrow to cope with shocks,
and to meet short-term production and con-
sumption needs. Middle-income households
do not borrow much, while richer households
take loans for larger investments or buy expen-
sive consumption goods. To take account of
this possibility, land and non-land wealth are
entered in both linear and quadratic forms. Bal-
lard and So (2004, Table 6.1b), show that
health care is the most common way to use
loans in rural Cambodia. To measure health
shocks, a variable indicating whether anyone
in the household sought health care in the past
four weeks is included. The household size, and
the age, gender, and education of the household
head are also introduced. Finally, all models
are estimated with village ﬁxed eﬀects. This is
important because the areas where land papers
were most likely to be handed out are generally
also the areas where formal credit institutions
have the strongest outreach.
Table 6 shows the results of estimating condi-
tional (or ﬁxed eﬀects) logit models for havingan outstanding loan with positive interest rate,
and for having a loan with a formal lender,
conditional on having any loan with positive
interest. In addition to the village ﬁxed eﬀects,
columns 1 and 3 only include the measure of
property rights, whereas columns 2 and 4 in-
clude the full set of control variables. In all
models, the eﬀect of land held with paper is
insigniﬁcant. Hence, there is no evidence that
land papers increase the propensity to use cred-
it or to borrow from formal lenders.
Table 7 shows OLS regressions for the
amount borrowed and monthly interest paid
on loans with positive interest. The units of
analysis in these models are loans, not house-
holds. 6 The right-hand-side variables are the
same as the ones used in the models for credit
use, including village ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition,
the interest rate model includes the amount bor-
rowed as an explanatory variable. Twenty-eight
loans with recorded monthly interest above 30%
are excluded. First, these loans are extreme out-
liers. Second, even though credit is expensive in
rural Cambodia, interest rates above 30% per
month are seldom reported in other sources,
and we may suspect that some of the recorded
numbers result from errors by the respondents
or enumerators. The results show a signiﬁcant,
negative eﬀect of land held with paper on inter-
est rates. Households with papers for all their
land pay around half a percentage point lower
monthly interest than households with no land
papers. 7 The eﬀect of land papers on amount
borrowed is positive, but insigniﬁcant. These re-
sults are consistent with the view that property
rights improve access to credit, although the
estimated eﬀects are of moderate magnitude.
(c) Land markets
Section 2 argued that land property rights
might decrease transactions costs in land mar-
kets, and thereby facilitate a process by which
land gets transferred to more productive users.
It is diﬃcult to test the hypothesis of a negative
eﬀect of property rights on transaction costs di-
rectly. For an indirect test, consider the rental
market for land. If land papers lead to lower
transaction costs, then ceteris paribus plots with
papers should be traded more often than other
plots. Table 1 shows that rental activity is low.
Only 3% of plots owned by households are
rented out. Plots held with a paper are not
more likely than other plots to be rented out.
In a conditional logit model with village ﬁxed
eﬀects, and controls for household size,
Table 6. Land ownership documents and use of credit
Dependent variable
Has outstanding loan Has outstanding loan with formal
lender
(All households) (Households with outstanding,
positive interest-debt)
Conditional logit Conditional logit Conditional logit Conditional logit
Share of owned land
held with paper
0.123 0.099 0.025 0.033
(1.44) (1.16) (0.15) (0.18)
Land owned (ha) 0.024 0.065
(1.39) (0.79)
Land owned, squared 0.00006 0.005
(1.46) (1.50)
Non-land wealth (million riel) 0.037 0.026
(3.84)*** (2.06)**
Non-land wealth, squared 0.000005 0.0001
(3.78)*** (2.28)**
Hh size 0.156 0.016
(9.40)*** (0.41)
Female hh head 0.149 0.224
(1.83)* (1.26)
Age of head 0.010 0.000
(4.70)*** (0.06)
Years of schooling of head 0.025 0.056
(2.48)** (2.47)**
Sought health care in
the last 4 weeks
0.12 0.064
(1.77)* (0.45)
Fixed eﬀects Village Village Village Village
Observations 8,298 8,180 1,386 1,376
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level. * Signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Only rural households included. Interest free loans are ignored. Note
that villages with no variation on the dependent variables are excluded by the conditional logit estimator. Only
households with an outstanding loan with positive interest are included in columns three and four.
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108dependency ratio, and gender and age of the
household head, this result is unchanged: there
is no eﬀect of land papers on rental activity (re-
sults not shown).
It is perhaps more likely to ﬁnd an eﬀect of
land papers on sales market activity. Rental
agreements usually take place among house-
hold from the same community, and informal
mechanisms of contract enforcement may be
suﬃcient in that context. Land sales transac-
tions more often occur between people from
diﬀerent communities, and formal proofs of
ownership may therefore play a larger role.
Section 6 documents that land papers areassociated with higher, perceived land sales
values, but this eﬀect is not necessarily a re-
sult of lower land market transaction costs.
Higher prices may as well result (directly)
from increased tenure security or from access
to cheaper credit. The data do not allow us to
investigate whether plots with papers are more
likely than other plots to be traded in the
sales market. First, we do not know whether
households sold land. Second, while we do
know whether they have bought land, we do
not know whether the former owner held
ownership documents, which is the relevant
variable.
Table 7. Land ownership documents and terms of credit use
Dependent variable
Monthly interest Amount (log)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Share of owned land held with paper 0.52 0.453 0.092 0.04
(2.25)** (1.94)* (1.38) (0.63)
Land owned (ha) 0.042 0.045
(0.86) (2.61)***
Land owned, squared 0.0004 0.0003
(1.27) (2.80)***
Non-land wealth (million riel) 0.045 0.027
(2.20)** (5.54)***
Non-land wealth, squared 0.0002 0.0001
(2.34)** (5.06)***
Amount, ‘000 riel (log) 0.299
(2.56)**
Hh size 0.078 0.056
(1.65)* (3.94)***
Years of schooling of head 0.072 0.035
(2.29)** (4.16)***
Age of head 0.004 0.003
(0.56) (1.42)
Female hh head 0.381 0.182
(1.54) (2.48)**
At least one hh member sought
health care in the last 4 weeks
0.118 0.013
(0.50) (0.20)
Fixed eﬀects Village Village Village Village
Observations 2,572 2,546 2,600 2,574
R2 0.46 0.47 0.42 0.47
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Only rural households included. Interest free loans are ignored.
Constant not shown.
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1098. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMMON
PROPERTY RESOURCES
Even if it can be shown that land rights have
a positive eﬀect on agricultural productivity,
concerns about possible adverse eﬀects on the
poorest members of communities from intro-
ducing private property rights to land should
also be considered (see, e.g., Deininger & Fed-
er, 2001, chap. 6). These eﬀects may come
about because poor community members often
depend on common property resources for
their livelihoods, and the availability of these
resources may in turn decrease when rigid, pri-
vate property rights are deﬁned. 8 Indeed, it iseasy to imagine that some landowners would
seek formal property rights in order to prevent
external parties from extracting resources from
their land. 9 In this Section, I investigate
whether villages with a higher share of agricul-
tural land held with a formal paper have lower
availability or more depletion of common
property resources than other villages.
Common property resources account for a
signiﬁcant share of income among Cambodian
households, and even more so among poor
households (see McKenney & Prom, 2002;
World Bank, 2006, chap. 5). Table 8 shows sta-
tistics on the availability and depletion of eight
diﬀerent common property resources. The data
Table 8. Availability and depletion of common property resources
Resource is legally
available as common
property (%)
Resource is currently
being depleted through
overuse (%)a
Open land for cultivation 31.0 39.6
Wood/charcoal to be collected 15.9 72.1
Timber to be taken 3.7 69.8
Fish to catch 34.1 71.9
Bamboo to be taken 5.5 56.0
Open land for grazing 18.1 44.3
Fruit to be picked 5.3 32.3
Wild animals for hunting 2.1 59.0
Note: Only rural villages are included. Observations are weighted to correct for sampling biases. The number of
observations ranges from 499 to 572 in the ﬁrst column, and from 95 to 333 in the second column.
a Among villages where the resource is available as common property either legally or illegally.
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110are collected in the HSES 03/04 village leader
questionnaire. The units of analysis are villages.
Column one shows data on availability, and
column two shows, given that resources are
available as common property, how common
it is that they are currently being depleted
through overuse. Only rural villages are in-
cluded. It would be highly desirable also to in-
clude data on the quantity available of each
resource, which is a crucial, potential determi-
nant of the role each resource might play in
the livelihoods of rural households. However,
this information is not collected in the survey.
The table shows that land for cultivation and
ﬁsh to catch are the most commonly available
resources, followed by land for grazing and
wood and charcoal to be collected. The second
column shows that depletion of resources
through overuse is widespread. For most re-
sources, more than half of the villages where
the resource is available report that it is cur-
rently being depleted. The ﬁnding of wide-Table 9. Property rights
Common property res
Open land for
cultivation
Wood/
charcoal
Timber to b
taken
Share of village
land owned
with paper
0.117 0.53 0.014
(0.35) (1.49) (0.02)
Population
density
0.12 0.174 0.021
(1.06) (2.09)** (0.24)
Fixed eﬀects Province Province Province
Observations 559 506 331
Note: Robust, absolute z-statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁc
Conditional logit regressions. The dependent variables arespread depletion is consistent with results
presented in McKenney and Prom (2002) and
Ballard (forthcoming, chap. 7). The main can-
didate for explaining this phenomenon is popu-
lation pressure, but the spread of formal
property rights can also play a role if it renders
fewer resources available as common property.
(a) Property rights and resource availability
Table 9 shows the results of conditional logit
regressions with dummies for the availability of
diﬀerent common property resources as the
dependent variables. 10 The explanatory vari-
ables are the proportion of land in the village
held with paper (as estimated from the sampled
households in the village), population density,
deﬁned as the number of people (in hundreds)
per hectare of agricultural land, and province
ﬁxed eﬀects, which are included to account
for diﬀerences in geography. If private property
rights lead to lower availability of commonand CPR availability
ource (resource legally available = 1)
e Bamboo
to be taken
Open land
for grazing
Fruit to
be picked
Wild animals
for hunting
0.248 0.854 0.404 1.533
(0.45) (2.93)** (0.64) (1.44)
0.01 0.15 0.069 0.137
(0.10) (1.24) (0.89) (1.13)
Province Province Province Province
481 437 422 280
ant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
dummies for availability of CPR in village.
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111property resources, one would expect the esti-
mated eﬀect of land held with paper to be neg-
ative. Indeed ﬁve of the estimated coeﬃcients
are negative, although only one is signiﬁcant,
namely in the regression for availability of land
for grazing. Hence, the analysis weakly sup-
ports the claim that formal, private property
rights are associated with decreased availability
of common property resources.
(b) Property rights and resource depletion
Table 10 shows the results of another set of
conditional logit regressions, now with indica-
tors for resource depletion as the dependent
variables. As in column two of Table 8, only
villages where the resources are available as
common property, either legally or illegally,
are included. The hypothesis of a link between
private property rights and resource depletion
leads to the expectation of positive coeﬃcients
on the land paper-variable. In fact, all the esti-
mated coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, and in ﬁve cases the point estimates
are negative. Hence, these regressions do not
lend any support to the theory of an eﬀect of
property rights on common property resource
depletion. One possible explanation is that for-
mal property rights are correlated with strong
institutions in general, and that these institu-
tions are important for common property re-
source management. Strong and competent
local administrations and courts can lead both
to fast implementation of titling programs
and to better protection of common property.
Unfortunately, a measure of institutional qual-
ity at the village level is not available. As ex-
pected, the coeﬃcient on population density isTable 10. Property righ
Common property resource (r
Open land for
cultivation
Wood/
charcoal
Timber t
be taken
Share of village
land owned
with paper
0.668 0.11 0.016
(1.38) (0.32) (0.03)
Population density 0.038 0.266 0.08
(0.62) (1.74)* (0.63)
Fixed eﬀects Province Province Province
Observations 288 320 144
Note: Robust, absolute z-statistics in parentheses. * Signiﬁ
Conditional logit regressions. The dependent variables ar
overuse. Only villages where the resource is available as cousually positive, lending some support to the
idea that population pressure leads to resource
depletion.9. CONCLUSION
The eﬀect of land property rights on rural
economies is an important and controversial is-
sue in development policy and research. Empir-
ical results are ambiguous. Studies from Africa
indicate that formal property rights to land
may have no eﬀect in an environment of weak
institutions because of low capacity for enforce-
ment. This paper investigated the eﬀects of for-
mal land property rights in an Asian country
with low state capacity, namely Cambodia.
The results indicate that the introduction of
formal property rights to land in Cambodia
have an economically and statistically signiﬁ-
cant, positive eﬀect on agricultural productivity
and land values of owner-operated plots. This
suggests that land titling and certiﬁcation pro-
grams can be eﬀective policy instruments, even
when the state is weak. This does not mean that
state capacity is unimportant, but indicates that
titling and certiﬁcation programs are poten-
tially relevant policy measures even at an early
stage of a country’s institutional development.
There is some evidence that formal property
rights are only eﬀective in the least remote re-
gions. This suggests that the success of land ti-
tling in more remote regions is contingent on
complementary policies to improve infrastruc-
ture and market institutions.
I also analyzed the causal mechanisms by
which property rights aﬀect agricultural out-
comes. No eﬀect on land rental market activityts and CPR depletion
esource is being depleted through overuse = 1)
o Bamboo to
be taken
Open land
for grazing
Fruit to
be picked
Wild animals
for hunting
0.089 0.173 0.111 0.317
(0.12) (0.29) (0.16) (0.42)
0.181 0.051 1.265 0.128
(0.30) (0.11) (2.24)** (0.82)
Province Province Province Province
105 179 79 101
cant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
e dummies for CPR currently being depleted through
mmon property either legally or illegally are included.
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112was found, but a moderate eﬀect of land papers
on interest rates emerged. This eﬀect, however,
is too weak to fully account for the rather
strong eﬀect of property rights on productivity
and land values. No eﬀects of land papers on
the propensity to use credit were found. By de-
fault, the ‘‘assurance eﬀect’’ comes into focus.
In spite of the fact that only a small share of
plots in the HSES are reported to have been af-
fected by disputes, a number of other sources
document that land conﬂict is a salient issue
in Cambodia, and is likely to be a concern for
many households. Qualitative evidence suggests
that land papers can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
perceived tenure security. It is therefore plausi-
ble that the assurance eﬀect is an important
channel through which property rights aﬀect
agricultural production. This conclusion con-
trasts with the ﬁndings by Feder and Onchan
(1987). They showed that positive eﬀects of for-
mal property rights to land in Thailand (a
neighboring country of Cambodia) mainly
work through the credit market. This diﬀerence
is likely to be explained by the fact that credit
markets are less developed in Cambodia than
in Thailand, where tenure insecurity is also
much less prevalent.
Common property resources provide an
important basis of livelihoods for poor ruralhouseholds, and it might be feared that the
spread of private property rights would de-
crease the availability of these resources. This
hypothesis has not been tested before. It re-
ceives only weak support from the analysis. Gi-
ven the nature of the data, these results should
be treated as indicative rather than conclusive.
Future research should focus on collecting
more detailed information about the availabil-
ity of common property resources, and about
institutional quality at the local level.
The implications of this paper for the ongo-
ing, large scale titling program currently being
implemented in Cambodia under the LMAP
project are somewhat ambiguous. On the one
hand, the analysis shows that ownership docu-
ments have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on important
outcomes. In that sense, there is encouragement
to continue and expand the titling eﬀorts. On
the other hand, the land ownership documents
analyzed in this paper are largely those that al-
ready existed prior to the present titling pro-
gram, and the results indicate that these
documents were quite eﬀective. In many cases,
the new LMAP titles are handed out to people
who had application receipts or similar docu-
ments already. I therefore conclude by high-
lighting the importance of extending coverage
to households with no ownership documents.NOTES1. An earlier version of this paper was prepared as a
background study for the World Bank Report, ‘‘Halving
Poverty by 2015? Cambodia Poverty Assessment 2006.’’
2. For surveys, see, e.g., Feder and Nishio (1999),
Deininger (2003), and Pande and Udry (2005).
3. Phnom Penh is a ﬁfth zone, but it includes too few
observations for meaningful estimation.
4. Some regions in Cambodia have seen a spectacular
rise in land prices in recent years. Many commentators
interpret the price boom as driven by speculation
(Economist, 2007; Oxfam, 2006). If prices are driven
by speculation rather than concerns about production,
this will weaken the link between land values and
productivity. However, variation in prices due to the
speculation boom can largely be accounted for by
geographical variables (land prices have increased much
faster close to towns and major roads than elsewhere),
and is therefore taken into account by the village ﬁxed
eﬀects in the regressions.5. 2.3% of landowning, rural households has been
exposed to conﬂict since 1995.
6. 157 households had more than one outstanding loan
with positive interest.
7. When the loans with monthly interest above 30% are
included, the coeﬃcient on land papers remains nega-
tive, but becomes insigniﬁcant. Excluding these obser-
vations appears sensible.
8. One well-known historical example of this phenom-
enon is the ‘‘enclosure’’ process in early-industrial
England, where land previously available to villagers
for cultivation and grazing was fenced in by large
landowners to be used exclusively for raising sheep. See
Polanyi (1944).
9. To be sure, private property rights are often
suggested as the solution to the problem of common
property resource depletion, rather than a cause of the
problem. Private property rights tend to eliminate free
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113rider problems. However, my analysis focuses on those
resources that remain common property. Clearly, pri-
vate property rights to other tracts of land will not
decrease free rider problems for these resources, and
since the spread of private property rights potentially
increases congestion on the remaining common property
resources, depletion may follow.10. Compared with Table 7, ‘‘ﬁsh to catch’’ is left out
because the availability of this resource is unlikely to
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Abstract: Studies of land property rights usually focus on tenure security and transfer 
rights and often ignore rights to determine how to use the land. However, in transition 
economies such as Vietnam and China, use rights are often limited. Using household 
data from Vietnam, we find that crop choice restrictions are widespread and prevent 
crop diversification. We find no direct effect of restrictions on cultivation income, but 
we uncover an indirect effect working through the returns to land titling. Titles, which 
in Vietnam entail a comprehensive set of transfer rights, only have a positive effect on 
income among households facing few restrictions on crop choice. 
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1. Introduction 
Vietnam has undertaken comprehensive reforms to liberalize agriculture and many studies have 
focused on the effects of liberalization. For example, a range of studies analyze the effects of moves 
towards privatization of agricultural land management (Do and Iyer 2006, Deininger and Jin 2003, 
Ravallion and van de Walle 2004, 2005, 2006). However, the reforms are still far from “completed” 
by Western standards. For example, authorities intervene heavily in farmers’ choice of crops. While 
the land law gives households the right to sell, rent, mortgage, and bequeath their land, many 
farmers do not have the right to decide what to use their plots for. In our sample, more than 50 
percent of plots have restricted crop choice. Our results suggest the restrictions are binding in an 
economic sense – if they were lifted, many farmers would shift to other crops.  
 
Restrictions may prevent profitable crop diversification, and we hypothesize that restrictions lead to 
lower income from crop agriculture. Furthermore, restrictions may prevent positive effects of the 
ongoing land titling program from being realized. Titles potentially encourage investment but some 
of the most important investments farmers can make in relation to crop agriculture are related to 
taking up new crops. Planting perennial crops is itself an important investment. It often takes 
several years before a crop can be harvested. Also, to grow a new crop it is often necessary to invest 
in land improvements and new equipment. Hence, if crop choice on a plot is restricted, the scope for 
investment is considerably diminished. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that the effects of land 
titling are weaker on farms with restricted crop choice than elsewhere. 
 
Results confirm the second hypothesis, but not the first. Land titles have quite strong effects on 
investment in perennial crops and on income from cultivation on farms with few restrictions, but no 
discernible effect on highly restricted farms. Crop choice restrictions have a direct, negative effect 
on investment in perennial crops, but not on income.  
 
In Section 2 we present a short review of the literature on different types of land rights. We then 
discuss the history and nature of restrictions on crop choice in Vietnam (Section 3). In Section 4 we 
describe the data set used for the empirical analysis, and Section 5 presents descriptive statistics. 
Section 6 analyzes the effects of restrictions and land titles on crop choice, and Section 7 
investigates the effects of these restrictions and titles on income from cultivation. Section 8 
discusses why we find no direct, negative effect of restrictions on income and section 9 concludes. 
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2. Tenure security, transfer rights and use rights – a short review of the literature 
The right to choose which crops to grow is an important aspect of farmer property rights to land. 
However, most studies on the effects of land rights focus on tenure security and transfer rights, such 
as the right to sell, rent, mortgage, and bequeath land, rather than rights concerning use (e.g. Feder 
and Onchan 1987, Place and Hazell 1993, Besley 1995, Hayes et. al. 1997, Braselle et. al. 2002). 
One reason is probably that use rights are often implied by transfer rights. For example, Braselle et. 
al. (2004) study a region in Burkina Faso and report that 91.2 percent of farmers surveyed have a 
permanent right to choose what to grow on their plots, while only about 25 percent have the right to 
rent or give away the plot. Sales are never allowed. It is virtually never the case that a farmer has 
the right to transfer a plot, but not the right to choose what to grow. Yet, in Vietnam and other 
transition economies the situation is sometimes very different. Brandt et. al. (2002) report that in 25 
percent of the villages they surveyed in rural China, villagers cannot freely determine what to grow. 
In addition, 80 to 90 percent of all plots are held as “responsibility land”, which implies that 
households are obliged to deliver set quotas of grain or other specified crops to the commune. 
Hence farmers are forced to grow these crops on at least some of their land.  
 
In our sample from Vietnam, around 80 percent of plots owned and operated by households are held 
with a title, known in Vietnam as a Land Use Certificate (LUC),1 which implies 20 years tenure 
security for annual crops land (50 years for perennial crops land) and a wide range of transfer rights, 
but not the right to determine use. In fact, crop choice is restricted on 52 percent of the sampled 
plots. Moreover, the share of plots with restrictions is higher among titled plots (56 percent) than 
among untitled ones (36 percent). Nevertheless, most studies of land rights in Vietnam analyze the 
effects of land use certificates, and therefore implicitly focus on tenure security and transfer rights 
instead of use rights. Deininger and Jin (2003) study the effects of the land market. They find that 
LUCs facilitate participation in land rental- and sales markets, and that these markets in turn work 
to transfer land from large to small farms, and from less- to more skilled farmers. Ravallion and van 
de Walle (2006) find that land market transactions have worked to decrease inefficiencies brought 
about by the administrative allocation of agricultural land following de-collectivization in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. They do not directly study the effects of land rights, but to the extent that 
land market activities are facilitated by formal transfer rights, their study implies a positive effect of 
such rights. Do and Iyer (2006) combine province level data on the progress of land titling with 
                                                 
1 Ironically for a document that assigns private property rights in a communist country, Land Use Certificates are also 
known as “red books”. 
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household level data from the 1993 and 1998 rounds of the Vietnam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) to study the effects of LUCs, and find that rights have a statistically significant, 
but economically only moderate effect on investment in perennial crops, and on hours of work in 
non-agriculture.  
 
The descriptive report by Brandt et. al. (2005), based on the Vietnam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004, contains descriptive statistics on the prevalence of LUCs. The report 
presents descriptive regressions on land prices, which show that a LUC is associated with a price 
increase of approximately 23 percent. No statistics are reported on restricted crop choice, since data 
on restrictions was not collected in the VHLSS. Pingali and Xuan (1992) study the effect of the 
change from collective farming to “contract farming” implemented in 1981. In the new system 
farmers were individually responsible for delivering a quota of rice or other crops to the commune, 
and were entitled to keep any surplus above the quota for own consumption or sale. Hence, the 
policy change improved farmers’ property rights to the harvested crop, not to the land. The paper 
shows that this program increased productivity.  
 
To our knowledge, ours is the first study to undertake an econometric investigation of the effects of 
restrictions on crop choice in Vietnam. In fact, we are not aware of any studies at all focusing on 
this issue in transition economies. For general surveys of the literature on land rights and other 
policies related to land, see Feder and Nishio (1999), Deininger and Feder (2001), Deininger (2003) 
and Pande and Udry (2005). 
 
3. Background: History and nature of Vietnamese state intervention in land use management  
Many policy areas in Vietnam have been characterized by a gradual process of liberalization since 
the beginning of the Doi Moi reform program in 1986. Policies on agricultural land use are in some 
respects an exception. The important Resolution no. 10 in 1988 and the 1993 Land Law nominally 
granted farmers the right to decide what to grow. As the land law was implemented, however, it was 
questioned whether farmers in rice growing areas should in fact be allowed to shift to other crops, 
and the 1998 and 2001 revisions to the land law clarify that changes in land use purpose are only 
allowed “within the existing physical planning framework adopted by central and local 
governments” (Vasavakul 2006, p. 226). The formal justification for state intervention in crop 
choice is now found in the 2003 Land Law (for example article 11, §1 and article 36). When a plot 
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is held with a LUC, the restrictions are usually written into the certificate, in the sense that the 
certificate mentions the plot’s “land use purpose” (for example “water rice farming” or “cultivation 
of long term plants”). Restrictions are administered by commune authorities, according to the 
commune land use plan. The plan is produced by commune authorities, subject to approval at the 
district level. Formally, households can apply for a change in land use purpose at the district level 
but in practice it is very difficult for farmers to change or remove restrictions on their plots (Dang 
Thu Hoai, CIEM, personal communication). At each administrative level, land use plans must be 
consistent with plans at higher levels. The commune plan must be consistent with the district plan, 
which must be consistent with the province plan, which again must adhere to the national plan. 
Hence, the scope for flexibility in relation to land use is limited.  
 
Some anecdotal evidence exists on disputes over land use between farmers and authorities. In the 
south, conflicts have occurred because farmers were prevented from converting rice fields into 
shrimp raising farms. In the Red River delta, conflicts are reported to have taken place because 
farmers were not allowed to grow fruit trees instead of rice (Vasavakul 2006, p. 227).  
 
Why does the state impose restrictions on land use? In a sense, it is not surprising that the 
government of Vietnam makes use of centralized planning. Still, we may ask why an administration 
which has liberalized in many other fields has chosen to maintain restrictions on land use? 
Originally, the most important reason was probably concerns about food security. In the early 
1980s, Vietnam experienced severe food shortages, and these events continued to affect agricultural 
policies after the initiation of the Doi Moi reforms in 1986. Today, however, export targets seem to 
play a bigger role. For example, the Ministry of Planning and Investment’s Five Year 
Socioeconomic Development Plan states that Vietnam should export 3 to 4 million tons of food 
crop products per year over the period 2006-2010 (p.64). One method for reaching this goal is to 
restrict farmers to growing rice, the most important food crop for export. Compelling farmers to 
growing rice is by far the most common restriction on crop choice. The fact that one of the reasons 
for imposing restrictions is to meet certain production targets means that the government (national 
and local) has an incentive to impose restrictions on the highest quality land, to maximize the 
probability that targets are met. Other reasons for restricting land use mentioned by Vietnamese 
officials include “the fact that local violations [of land use restrictions] may environmentally 
damage the areas developed for rice growing; that in some areas farmers are not equipped to grow 
119
 6
anything other than rice; and that the state has already invested heavily in irrigating rice land” 
(Vasavakul 2006, p. 227). For in-depth descriptions of land policies in Vietnam, see Kerkvliet 
(2006) and Marsh, MacAuley and Hung (2006). 
4. Data 
We rely on data from the 2006 Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS). The 
survey was implemented in 12 provinces in Vietnam between July and September 2006. It re-
interviewed households sampled for the income- and expenditure modules of the 2002 and 2004 
VHLSS in the 12 provinces. For detailed information about sampling procedures, see Van den 
Broeck and Tarp (2007). Provinces were selected to facilitate the use of the survey as an evaluation 
tool for Danida supported programs in Vietnam. Seven of the 12 provinces are covered by the 
Danida business sector support program, and five provinces are covered by the agricultural support 
program. The provinces supported by the agricultural support program are located in the North 
West and Central Highlands, so these relatively poor and sparsely populated regions are over-
sampled.2 The sample is not statistically representative at the national level. The survey covered 
2,324 households in 466 communes. It includes a household as well as a commune questionnaire. 
The commune questionnaire was administered to commune officials. The questionnaires were 
designed in collaboration between the University of Copenhagen and the Institute for Labor Studies 
and Social Affairs (ILSSA) in Hanoi. The household survey collected detailed plot-level 
information on property rights (including restrictions on use), land use, irrigation, mode and time of 
acquisition, and other plot characteristics. It also provides detailed information at the household 
level on agricultural inputs, outputs and investment in addition to general information about 
individuals and households. 
5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents statistics on the extent and nature of land use restrictions in the VARHS sample. 
Only plots owned and operated by the interviewed households are included (i.e. plots rented in or 
out are excluded). Plots used for aquaculture, forestry and residential purposes are excluded. The 
first line shows that restrictions on crop choice are common. More than half of the plots in the 
sample are subject to restrictions. These findings contrast with those reported in To, Nguyen and 
                                                 
2 The sampled provinces are, by region: Red River Delta: Ha Tay. North East: Lao Cai, Phu Tho. North West: Lai 
Chau, Dien Bien. North Central Coast: Nghe Anh. South Central Coast: Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa. Central Highlands: 
Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Lam Dong. Mekong River Delta: Long An. 
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Marsh (2006) who found that only 12 percent of farmers were subject to restrictions. However, their 
results are based on a much smaller sample than ours (369 households sampled in four provinces).  
Restrictions are more widespread among households sampled in the north than among those in the 
south. This resonates with the fact that state intervention in agriculture historically has been more 
far-reaching in the north than in the south, due to the longer period under communist rule in the 
north (see Pingali and Xuan 1992 and Benjamin and Brandt 2004).  
 
Table 1  Restrictions on land use, plot level (percent) 
    All plots  Region   Plot held with LUC
       North South   Yes No 
Crop choice restricted 53.4  59.5 37.9   57.0 37.5 
Type of crop choice restriction (only restricted plots 
included):       
 Must grow rice in all seasons 35.7 31.1 54.6  35.2 39.6 
 Must grow rice in some seasons 56.6 62.4 33.1  57.6 50.2 
 Other restriction 7.5 6.3 12.4  7.1 10.2 
        
n   9,528  6,858 2,666   7,783 1,745 
Note: Only plots owned and operated by the hh are included. Aquaculture-, forestry- and purely 
residential plots are excluded. 
 
Table 1 also documents that plots with a land use certificate are significantly more likely to be 
under restrictions than plots without an LUC. The table also tells us about the nature of restrictions 
on crop choice. Some 36 percent of the plots under restrictions must be sown with rice in all 
seasons, while 56 percent must be sown with rice in at least some seasons, and eight percent are 
subject to other restrictions. This clearly brings out the point that the restrictions regime is mainly 
focused on managing the production of rice.  
 
Table 2 presents several different plot and household characteristics, by restriction status (at the 
household level, the table distinguishes between households with more, or less, than 50 percent of 
their operated agricultural area subject to restrictions). This is the first step in our analysis of the 
effects of restrictions. The median plot size of restricted plots is less than half the median size of 
non-restricted plots. This reflects the fact that plots prepared for rice cultivation are often small. As 
we would expect, restricted plots are much more likely to be planted with rice than are non-
restricted plots. It is very uncommon to grow perennial crops on restricted plots. The table also 
presents data on land values (as estimated by the respondents), and median per hectare value of 
output, income and labor use. The last three variables are measured at the household level. Income 
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is defined as the value of output minus the value of all purchased inputs. The table shows that value 
of output and income per hectare are both significantly higher in households with restricted plots 
than in those with non-restricted plots. At the same time, annual labor input per hectare is also much 
higher in highly restricted households than in other households, reflecting the labor-intensive nature 
of rice cultivation. Land values are somewhat higher on restricted plots. Hence, so far the evidence 
on the effects of restrictions is ambiguous. Restrictions are associated with less diversification away 
from rice cultivation and with higher use of labor in cultivation. However, restrictions are also 
associated with higher land productivity and slightly higher land values. In Section 6 and 7 we 
single out crop choice and cultivation income for further analysis and investigate whether the 
findings in Table 2 are robust to controlling for commune, household and plot characteristics.  
 
Table 2  Plot- and household characteristics by restriction status 
  
Crop choice 
restricted 
Plot level Yes No n 
    
Median size, sqm 360 880 9,528
Planted exclusively with rice in last 12 months (percent) 69.1 36.2 9,218
Planted exclusively with perennial crops in last 12 months (percent) 1.3 25.9 9,218
Median sales value per ha. 120,000 113,636 7,672
        
Household level >50% <50%   
    
Median labor input per ha., days per year 443 274 2,055
Median value of output per ha. 22,356 13,725 2,081
Median income per ha. 12,804 8,025 2,046
Note: All money values are in 000 VND. Income is defined as the value of output minus the value of all purchased inputs. 
Sales values are estimated by respondents. 
In the household level panel, the first column includes households with more than 50 percent of their operated 
agricultural area subject to crop choice restrictions. The second column includes households with less than 50 percent of 
their land under restrictions. 
Only plots owned and operated by the household are included. Aquaculture-, forestry and purely residential plots are 
excluded. 
 
Table 3 is the first step in our investigation of interactions between land titling and restrictions. The 
results are quite striking. The table shows the association between LUC status and five outcome 
variables, separately for restricted- and non-restricted plots/households. On restricted plots, there is 
only a weak correlation between LUC status and the decision to grow perennial crops. On plots 
with LUCs as well as on those without, the share of plots with perennials is very low. In contrast, 
among non-restricted plots, there is a clear, positive association between LUC status and perennial 
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crops. Plots with a LUC are seven percentage points more likely to be planted with perennials. For 
labor, output and income per hectare, we see approximately the same pattern. Among highly 
restricted households, the association between LUC status and the outcome variables is weak. In 
contrast, among households facing few restrictions there is a strong, positive correlation. For 
example, median income is 67 percent higher on plots with a LUC than on those without. For land 
values, the contrast is even starker: there is a strong, positive association between LUC status and 
value among non-restricted plots, and a clear, negative association among restricted plots. However, 
the results on land values should be treated with some caution because the land sales market is very 
thin in some regions, making it difficult for respondents to assess prices. 
 
Table 3  Agricultural outcomes by land title- and restriction status    
  Crop choice restricted   Crop choice not restricted
Plot level LUC No LUC   LUC No LUC 
Planted exclusively with perennial crops in 
last 12 months (percent) 
1.3 1.6  27.5 20.7 
Median sales value per ha. 107,859 140,845   150,000 45,455 
            
 Restric > 50%   Restric < 50% 
Household level LUC > 50% LUC < 50%   LUC > 50% LUC < 50%
Median labor input per ha., days per year 443 437  313 220 
Median value of output per ha. 22,326 22,512  15,556 8,788 
Median income per ha. 12,636 13,371  9,589 5,726 
Note: Money values are in 000 VND. 
In the household level panel, “Restric>50%” refers to households with more than 50 percent of their 
operated agricultural area subject to crop choice restrictions. "LUC>50%" refers to households with 
more than 50 percent of their operated area held with a land use certificate. 
Only plots owned and operated by the household are included. Aquaculture-, forestry and purely 
residential plots are excluded. 
 
These findings are consistent with the view that restrictions on crop choice prevent realization of 
the returns to land titling because restrictions limit the scope for investment. In Sections 6 and 7 we 
investigate the robustness of this conclusion. 
6. Crop choice 
The first task in a more rigorous analysis of the effects of restrictions is to check more thoroughly 
whether restrictions do in fact impose binding constraints on farmers – would they grow something 
else if they were not subject to restrictions? Most restrictions compel farmers to grow rice, but 
obviously many would plant rice even in the absence of restrictions. Natural conditions in most 
areas of Vietnam are very well suited to rice cultivation. If restrictions are binding in an economic 
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sense, there should be a significant, partial correlation between restriction status and the decision to 
grow rice, even when household and plot characteristics are controlled for. The first column of 
Table 4 explores whether this is the case. A regression is estimated explaining whether a plot is 
planted with rice or not. The variable takes the value one only if the plot was planted exclusively 
with rice in the last 12 months. If we let it also take the value one for plots where rice was planted 
along with other crops, results are very similar. The measure of restrictions included is whether the 
plot must be sown with rice in at least some seasons. Household characteristics are controlled by the 
inclusion of household fixed effects. A number of plot characteristics are also controlled, including 
the area, slope, mode of acquisition, irrigation status and distance from the family home. We also 
include a measure of the “quality of land”.3 
 
Descriptive statistics on all variables used are presented in the appendix. The model is estimated by 
OLS (a “linear probability model”). The restrictions variable has a large and highly significant 
effect, indicating that restrictions do impose real constraints on the behavior of farmers. Obviously, 
we have not controlled for all plot characteristics that may affect the suitability of a plot for rice 
growing, but we probably capture a large share of this variation, particularly with the slope and 
irrigation variables. Since most rice grown in Vietnam is “wet rice” (i.e. the crop must grow in 
water for a part of its life cycle), some of the most important conditions for successful rice 
cultivation is that plots are flat and have access to water. The finding that restrictions have a strong 
                                                 
3 Following the 1993 Land Law, most plots in Vietnam were classified for tax purposes. For annual crops land, six 
categories were defined. For perennial crops land there were five categories. Classification depended on five objective 
plot characteristics, namely soil quality, location (i.e. distance from residence), terrain (e.g. slope), climate, and 
irrigation conditions. Higher taxes were due for land in a better category (category one is best). Based on the tax-
classification information, we create a unified measure of land quality applying to both annual and perennial crops land. 
The classification schemes for annual- and perennial land are unified based on the tax rates for each category of land. 
Hence, in each of the four land quality “classes” we define, approximately the same amount of tax was due for all plots. 
The four classes on the land quality variable relates to the tax classification scheme in the following way:  
Class 1: Category 1 of annual land and category 1 and 2 of perennial land. Tax rates: 550-650 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 2: Category 2 and 3 of annual land and category 3 of perennial land. Tax rates: 370-460 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 3: Category 4 and 5 of annual land and category 4 of perennial land. Tax rates: 180-280 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 4: Category 6 of annual land and category 5 of perennial land. Tax rates: 50-80 kg rice/ha/year. 
Source: Le (undated).  
The land tax was temporarily abandoned in 2003. For this reason, plots have generally not been re-classified since 
around 1993/94, although classifications were supposed to be updated every tenth year (Luu Duc Khai, CIEM, personal 
communication). Since some plot characteristics, such as irrigation conditions, may have changed considerably during 
the 12-13 years that passed between the time of classification and the survey, the variable is necessarily not a precise 
measure of land quality. On the other hand, the fact that plots were classified several years ago means classification was 
not affected by current crop choice or productivity (the dependent variables we consider). We can safely treat it as 
exogenous. One problem is that a significant number of plots (17 percent) have either not been classified, or the 
respondent does not know the category of the plot. To avoid losing these plots in the analysis, we include a dummy for 
unknown land category. 
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impact on the probability of growing rice is also reported in Van den Broeck, Newman and Tarp 
(2007). 
 
Table 4  Restrictions, land titles and crop choice         
 Dependent variable: 
 
Plot planted 
exclusively 
with rice  Plot planted with perennial crops 
  Linear prob.   Linear prob. Linear prob. 2SLS 2SLS 
Must grow rice 0.448      
 (26.72)***      
Choice of crop restricted   -0.093 -0.017 -0.039 0.131 
   (8.25)*** (0.75) (3.62)*** (1.89)* 
LUC -0.014  0.108 0.136 0.001 0.142 
 (0.64)  (8.18)*** (9.13)*** (0.02) (1.78)* 
Restricted*LUC    -0.092  -0.197 
    (4.05)***  (2.55)** 
Area of plot, log 0.018  0.031 0.03 0.035 0.034 
 (3.31)***  (9.40)*** (9.21)*** (5.82)*** (5.79)*** 
Slope (rfc: flat)       
Slight (0.05)  0.10  0.10  0.06  0.06  
 (2.69)***  (9.04)*** (8.73)*** (3.76)*** (3.66)*** 
Medium (0.16)  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.10  
 (6.69)***  (7.20)*** (7.32)*** (3.49)*** (3.72)*** 
Steep -0.242  0.251 0.251 0.184 0.186 
 (5.22)***  (8.86)*** (8.85)*** (3.34)*** (3.41)*** 
Mode of acquisition (rfc: given by state)      
Inherited 0.003  0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.15)  (0.13) (0.30) (0.08) (0.42) 
Bought 0.004  0.035 0.037 0.015 0.035 
 (0.12)  (2.01)** (2.13)** (0.58) (1.32) 
Cleared -0.09  -0.052 -0.046 -0.054 -0.015 
 (3.77)***  (3.53)*** (3.14)*** (1.86)* (0.52) 
Exchanged -0.088  -0.033 -0.041 -0.022 -0.024 
 (0.88)  (0.53) (0.68) (0.42) (0.43) 
Other 0.042  0.054 0.059 -0.13 -0.106 
 (0.35)  (0.74) (0.79) (1.62) (1.37) 
Number of seasons with irrigation 0.027  -0.081 -0.081 -0.076 -0.077 
 (4.09)***  (20.14)*** (20.13)*** (10.48)*** (10.70)*** 
Distance from family home, km 0.004  0 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 
 (1.36)  (0.11) (0.32) (1.84)* (1.51) 
Land quality (rfc: class 1)        
Class 2 0.13   (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 (6.23)***  (3.45)*** (3.48)*** (2.09)** (2.01)** 
Class 3 0.03   (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) 
 (1.17)  (7.58)*** (7.57)*** (4.69)*** (4.43)*** 
Class 4 -0.217  0.119 0.119 0.114 0.124 
 (6.80)***  (6.15)*** (6.11)*** (3.14)*** (3.47)*** 
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(Table 4 continued) 
 
Land category unknown -0.277  0.220 0.216 0.235 0.238 
 (10.66)***  (13.59)*** (13.37)*** (8.54)*** (8.85)*** 
Fixed effects Household  Household Household District District 
       
Observations 9,221  9,218 9,218 8,382 8,382 
R-squared 0.62  0.67 0.68   
       
F-test of joint significance of 
instruments in 1st stage regs:       
   Redbook     16.85 25.33 
   Redbook*Restric           9.08 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
In regression 4, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the commune level in districts with more than one 
commune. 
Only plots owned and operated by the household are included. In the 2SLS regression, LUC is instrumented by 
the share of annual land titled in the commune where the household resides. Restricted*LUC is instrumented by 
the interaction between "Restricted" and the share of land titled in the commune. 
Constant not shown. In the 2SLS model, a set of household- and commune characteristics are included. These 
include: Age of head, age of head squared, schooling, gender and ethnicity of head, share of hh's in commune 
using electricity, and a dummy for the presence of a daily market in the commune (results not shown). 
 
Next, we analyze the effects of restrictions and land titles on the decision to grow perennial (i.e. 
multi-year) crops. Columns 2 to 5 in Table 4 present the estimates of models explaining whether a 
plot is planted with perennial crops. The measure of restrictions is an indicator for any restrictions 
on crop choice. To test the hypothesis that the restrictions affect the returns to land titling, we add 
an interaction between land use certificates and restrictions in some specifications. In the literature 
on property rights and agricultural investment, land rights variables are often treated as endogenous 
(e.g. Besley 1995, Braselle et. al. 2002). There are several reasons for this. First, there may be a 
reverse, causal relationship from investment to property rights if farmers can improve their claim to 
a plot of land by investing in it. Second, incentives for seeking to obtain formal property rights are 
higher on plots with higher soil quality. At the same time, the returns to investment might also be 
higher on those plots. If soil quality cannot be fully controlled for, this leads to biased estimates of 
the effects of property rights. Third, more resourceful households may be better able to obtain 
property rights, and also more likely to invest. Again, if household resources are not properly 
controlled, biased estimation follows.  
 
In Vietnam, land titling as well as imposition of land use restrictions is generally conducted in a 
systematic, top-down fashion that does not leave much room for farmers to affect the process. 
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Therefore, concerns about endogeneity of property rights are perhaps less relevant in Vietnam than 
in many other settings. However, a closer investigation reveals that there is a difference between 
land use certificates and restrictions. It appears to be extremely difficult for farmers to affect the 
restrictions imposed upon them in any way (See section 3 above). Therefore, we treat the 
restrictions variable as exogenous. In the case of LUC issuance, however, there is some scope for 
households to affect the process. In order to get a LUC, households actively need to register their 
land. Even though the fee for registration is nominal, some households may have chosen not to do 
this, either because they did not see a need for the titles, because they were not aware of the titling 
program, or because they were intimidated by the process (Brandt 2005, section 4). Since the 
incentive to register is potentially higher for plots with perennial crops, we treat the LUC variable 
as endogenous.  
 
Several studies have used the mode of plot acquisition as an instrument for property rights (e.g. 
Besley 1995, Braselle et. al. 2002, Deininger and Castagnini 2004). However, columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 4 indicate that mode of acquisition is not redundant in the crop choice regression, so this 
variable will not work as an instrument. Instead, we instrument the titling status of a plot by the 
share of annual agricultural land titled in the commune where the household resides, excluding the 
household’s own land. This variable should not affect the household’s choice of crops. On the other 
hand, the share of land titled in the commune is an indicator of the vigilance by which land titling 
programs have been implemented in the commune, which is an exogenous source of variation in the 
titling status of plots. The interaction between restrictions and LUC is instrumented by the 
interaction between restrictions and the share of land titled in the commune (Wooldridge 2002, 
chap. 6, recommends this method of instrumenting an interaction term). Since the instrument is 
measured at the commune level, household or commune fixed effects cannot be included. Instead, 
we use district fixed effects, and include a number of controls at the household and commune level 
(results not shown). The instrumental variables model is estimated by two stage least squares, which 
implies that a linear probability model is used in both the first- and the second stage regressions 
(both endogenous variables are binary). 836 observations are lost in this analysis because some 
communes did not report information on the share of land titled. 
 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 present the OLS estimates of the model with and without the 
interaction between restrictions and LUC-status, while columns 4 and 5 present the 2SLS results. In 
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the specifications without the interaction term, restrictions always have a significant, negative effect 
on the probability of growing perennial crops, as we would expect from the results in column 1. 
Having a LUC is positively related to growing perennial crops in the OLS model, but in the IV-
model, it is negative and completely insignificant. The most notable results emerge from the 
specifications with the restrictions-LUC interaction. The coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative and significant, while the main effect of LUC is positive and significant. This indicates 
that land titles induce investment in perennial crops but that this effect is muted by land use 
restrictions. The positive effect of titles on investment in perennial crops is also reported by Do and 
Iyer (2006). However, they conclude that the effect is “not very large in magnitude” (p. 19). The 
results in Table 4 suggest an explanation why the average effect of titles on investment in perennial 
crops is only moderate, namely that the causal mechanism underlying the effect of titles is only 
active on plots with unrestricted crop choice, which is less than half of all plots. On those plots, 
however, the effect is quite strong. The estimates imply that, all else equal, the share of plots with 
perennial crops is about 14 percentage points higher among unrestricted plots with LUC than on 
unrestricted plots without an LUC. Note that the overall share of plots planted with perennial crops 
is 13 percent. The results indicate that a large part of the potential effect of land titling on 
investment remains untapped, because the scope for investment is limited by restrictions on crop 
choice. 
7. Income from cultivation 
We now turn to an investigation of the effects of crop choice restrictions and land titles on income 
from cultivation. Why do we look at income and not, for example, physical yields, value of output, 
profits or land values? Yields are difficult to work with when we consider more than one crop, 
which is essential in an investigation of the effects of restrictions on crop choice. Income has a more 
direct effect on household welfare than value of output since net income is a key determinant of the 
household’s ability to consume. Profits (i.e. the value of output minus the value of all inputs, 
including household labor and capital depreciation) are in theory interesting as an indicator of 
efficiency, but very difficult to measure accurately. As mentioned above, the data on land values is 
somewhat problematic, because the land sales market is almost non-existent in some regions of 
Vietnam, which makes it difficult for households to estimate the sales value of their plots precisely, 
or even to view this as a meaningful question. Presumably as a result of this, some 20 percent of 
plots lack data on sales values (we also have data for rental values, but here the number of missing 
observations is even higher). 
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Inputs and outputs in cultivation are only measured at the farm level, so we estimate household 
level regressions. The dependent variable is the log of income per hectare. Income is defined as the 
value of output minus the value of all purchased inputs. All variable inputs except self-provided 
manure and household labor are assumed to be purchased. Plot level characteristics are included as 
shares of the net operated area with a given characteristic, for example the share of the operated 
area with a LUC, or the share of the operated area with restricted crop choice.  
 
To capture non-purchased inputs we include farm size (log) and household labor, defined as the 
number of man-days members of the household have spent working in crop-agriculture on their 
own farm in the past 12 months (log). Age and gender of the household head may affect effective 
labor supply and total factor productivity and these variables are also included. To proxy for the 
“abilities” of household members, we include years of schooling of the household head, and a 
dummy indicating whether the respondent (usually the household head) believes that other people 
in the village consider him to be a “good farmer”.  
 
As mentioned in section 3, the authorities have an incentive to impose restrictions on the most 
productive land, in order to maximize the probability that production targets are met. Therefore, it is 
essential to control for land quality in the income model. As in the crop choice models, we include 
the slope and irrigation status of household plots, and the land quality variable discussed in footnote 
3. In the plot level analysis we only included plots owned by the household. In the household level 
analysis, however, we cannot distinguish between output (and inputs) on owned and rented plots. 
Therefore, we use inputs and outputs for the whole farm, and control for the share of land rented in. 
Land rental fees are not subtracted from household income. 
 
Again, we treat restrictions as exogenous and LUCs as endogenous. As in the perennial crops-
regressions, we use the share of annual land titled at the commune level, excluding the household’s 
own land, as instruments for LUC-status. Again, the interaction between restrictions and LUCs is 
instrumented by the interactions between commune level land titling and restrictions. 
 
In the OLS-regressions, we include commune fixed effects. Since the instrument is measured at the 
commune level, we cannot have commune fixed effects in the IV models. Instead, we use district 
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fixed effects, and control for infrastructure characteristics at the commune level by including the 
share of households in the village using electricity, and a dummy indicating whether a daily market 
is present in the commune. 
 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the income model. The first two regressions present the OLS 
estimates, with and without the interaction between LUC- and restriction status. The third and 
fourth columns present the results of the 2SLS estimation. The results generally mirror the 
descriptive findings reported in Section 5. The main effect of restrictions is always positive, and 
sometimes statistically significant. Hence, we do not find evidence that there is a direct, negative 
effect of land use restrictions on productivity, even when we attempt to control for plot- and 
household characteristics. In particular, labor use is controlled. Higher income on restricted than 
non-restricted plots reported in table 2 is therefore not simply a result of higher labor input on those 
plots. The positive effect of restrictions may still be an artifact of a failure to fully control for soil 
quality and other factors that affect plot yields, as discussed in section 8. However, we can at least 
tentatively take the results as an indication that there is not a strong, direct link from restrictions to 
low productivity.  
 
While we find no direct, negative effect of restrictions, the estimates of the coefficient on the 
interaction between restrictions and LUCs indicate, as in the analysis of perennial crops, that 
restrictions may have an indirect, negative effect operating through the returns to land titling. In 
both specifications where the interaction term is included, the main effect of LUC-share is positive, 
significant and quite high, while the interaction term is negative, significant and also of 
considerable magnitude. One way to interpret these results is, again, that land titling has a positive 
effect in an unrestricted environment, but that this effect is muted when crop choice is restricted. 
However, the result is perhaps even more interesting in the case of income than in the case of crop 
choice. It is not surprising that titling does not affect crop choice if crop choice is fixed by the 
authorities. However, land titling might conceivably affect income through a number of other 
channels than crop choice. Even if a farmer is forced to grow rice, he can still in principle increase 
his income by investing in land improvements, machinery, education, and so on, and these 
investments might be cheaper (through access to lower priced credit) or more attractive if the 
household’s land is titled. The results in Table 5 indicate, however, that investment related to new 
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crops, or at least to crops other than rice, is in fact the most important channel through which titling 
affects income – where crop choice is restricted, the effect of titles is small or non-existent.  
 
Table 5  Income from crop agriculture     
  Dependent variable: Income from crop agriculture, log 
  OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Share of land with crop choice resitrictions 0.093 0.353 0.04 0.655 
 (1.65)* (3.39)*** (0.59) (2.01)** 
Share of land with LUC 0.038 0.184 0.631 1.07 
 (0.57) (2.23)** (2.19)** (3.03)*** 
LUC * restrictions  -0.339  -0.806 
  (2.97)***  (1.93)* 
farm size in ha, log 0.625 0.624 0.619 0.624 
 (22.96)*** (22.97)*** (15.44)*** (15.04)*** 
Hh labor input in crop agriculture, log 0.308 0.309 0.323 0.318 
 (10.24)*** (10.30)*** (8.34)*** (8.00)*** 
Other people think you are good farmer 0.284 0.282 0.293 0.285 
 (5.48)*** (5.46)*** (6.03)*** (5.84)*** 
Years of general education of head, estimated -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 
 (1.04) (1.18) -0.77 (1.10) 
Share of land with slight slope -0.117 -0.125 -0.238 -0.244 
 (1.65)* (1.77)* (3.19)*** (3.25)*** 
Share of land with medium slope -0.063 -0.06 -0.15 -0.136 
 (0.65) (0.61) (1.45) (1.29) 
Share of land with steep slope -0.299 -0.303 -0.337 -0.292 
 (2.00)** (2.04)** (1.87)* (1.59) 
Share of land irrigated 0.22 0.205 0.302 0.28 
 (3.10)*** (2.90)*** (3.88)*** (3.51)*** 
Share of land class 2 0.039 0.041 -0.035 -0.028 
 (0.52) (0.54) (0.40) (0.32) 
Share of land class 3 -0.027 -0.012 -0.136 -0.109 
 (0.28) (0.12) (1.35) (1.06) 
Share of land class 4 -0.421 -0.412 -0.449 -0.396 
 (3.28)*** (3.21)*** (2.93)*** (2.50)** 
Share of land with unknown category/class -0.249 -0.25 -0.256 -0.253 
 (2.58)*** (2.60)*** (2.30)** (2.22)** 
Female hh head 0.003 0.009 -0.038 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.20) (0.69) (0.54) 
Age of head 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 (0.14) (0.29) (0.00) (0.18) 
Age of head squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.72) (0.89) (0.56) (0.79) 
Share of land rented in 0.195 0.131 0.624 0.596 
 (1.77)* (1.17) (2.58)*** (2.47)** 
Daily market   -0.093 -0.092 
   (1.40) (1.41) 
Rate of hh using electricity   0.366 0.385 
   (2.52)** (2.55)** 
Constant 7.298 7.167 6.359 5.799 
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(Table 5 continued) 
 
 (26.18)*** (25.46)*** (16.77)*** (12.11)*** 
Observations 1985 1985 1790 1790 
R-squared 0.75 0.75   
    
F-test of instruments in 1st stage reg  
   Red book 23.7 19.4
   Red book*restrictions       6.5 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
In regressions 3 and 4, standard errors are adjusted for commune level clustering in districts with more than 
one commune. In the same regressions, share of land with LUC is instrumented by the share of annual land 
titled in the commune, excluding the household's own land. The LUC-restrictions interaction is instrumented 
by the interaction between restrictions and commune level land titling. 
 
The bottom of the table presents F-statistics for the joint significance of the instruments in the first 
stage regressions. The instruments are always jointly significant at the five percent level.  However, 
the well-known rule-of-thumb is that the F-values should be at least 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
The F-test for the interactions terms in the first stage regression is only 6.5. Hence, we might 
suspect that the coefficients on LUC-share and its interaction with restrictions is estimated with 
some bias. Indeed, the estimates of the coefficients on these variables obtained from the 2SLS 
models appear very high. The estimates in column 4 indicate that a farm going from zero to full 
titling in a restriction-free environment will experience a more than two-fold increase in income per 
hectare. This seems like an implausibly strong effect and it indicates that there might be some 
upward bias in the 2SLS estimates. The quantitative estimates from the OLS regressions are more 
plausible, implying that titles have only a small, insignificant effect on the average plot, but increase 
income by about 18 percent on a farm without any restrictions. Still, it strengthens the interpretation 
that the same, qualitative story emerges from the both OLS and the 2SLS models. 
 
Table 6 shows an alternative way of testing the hypothesis that the effects of land titling depends on 
restrictions. The sample is split in two groups: those with less than 50 percent of their land under 
restrictions, and those with more. Then, the model for income per hectare is estimated for each 
group, with the restrictions variable taken out. The model is estimated by OLS and by 2SLS, again 
using commune level titling as the instrument for LUC-share. The benefit of this method is that the 
effects of all variables, not only LUC-share, are allowed to vary between environments with 
different levels of restrictions. The drawback is the loss in degrees of freedom. The same control 
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variables as in Table 5 are included (except restrictions and its interaction with LUCs). To save 
space, the estimated coefficients on these variables are not shown. 
 
Table 6 land titles and income, by restriction status    
  Dependent variable: log of income per hectare 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
  Restric.<0.5 Restric.>=0.5 Restric.<0.5 Restric.>=0.5 
Share of land with LUC 0.202 -0.188 2.587 -0.149 
 (2.09)** (1.96)* (3.18)*** (0.50) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune Commune District District 
      
Observations 1,018 967 918 843 
R-squared 0.82 0.75    
F-test of joint significance of instrument in 
1st stage reg.     10.30 9.20 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
In regressions 3 and 4, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the commune level in districts with more 
than one commune. In the 2SLS regressions, LUC is instrumented by the shares of annual land titled in the 
commune. LUC*Restricted is instrumented by the interactions between commune level titling and "Share of land 
restricted". The same control variables as in Table 5 are included, except restrictions and the redbook-
restrictions interaction (results not shown).  
 
Both the OLS and the 2SLS estimations show a large difference in the effect of land titles between 
restricted and un-restricted farms. Among farms with few restrictions, LUCs have a quite strong, 
positive and statistically significant effect. Among highly restricted farms, on the other hand, no 
positive effect of land titles can be detected at all. In fact, the coefficient on LUCs is significantly 
negative in the OLS-estimation for the sub-sample of highly restricted households. Hence, this 
analysis further strengthens the hypothesis that the effect of Land Use Certificates is contingent on 
restrictions status. 
8. Explaining the missing direct effect of restrictions 
Here we attempt to explain why our hypothesis of a negative, direct effect of restrictions on 
cultivation income is not confirmed. In the light of the results in Table 4, the absence of such an 
effect is somewhat surprising. If restrictions are binding, as indicated by the results in that table, it 
means that farmers would switch to other crops in the absence of restrictions. There are several 
possible reasons for wanting to grow other crops than rice, such as a desire to diversify risk, to save 
labor or to distribute labor requirements more evenly over the year, but the most obvious reason is 
the expectation that other crops would generate more income.  
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There could be at least three different explanations for the absent effect of restrictions on income. 
First, as discussed above, there is reason to believe that restrictions tend to be imposed on land of 
higher than average quality. As described in section 7, we attempt to control for land quality in a 
number of ways in the regressions. Nevertheless, some variation in relevant land characteristics 
may still be left in the residual. Second, even if restrictions prevent profitable crop diversification, 
they may also have beneficial effects if they solve coordination problems. For example, the yield of 
rice might be lower if the crop grows in the shadow of tree crops. The use of rice fields for shrimp 
production might lead to salinization of the soil, making it unsuitable for crop production. Cross-
pollination between different varieties of crops might also present collective action problems. These 
hypotheses are difficult to test with the available data, and call for further research. 
 
Third, we can imagine that restrictions tend to come with certain benefits from the authorities, such 
as increased access to extension services, irrigation water or price subsidies. The vast majority of 
households sell their output to private traders, and it therefore seems implausible that households 
with restrictions are given subsidies on their output prices. How about input prices?  
 
Table 7. Restrictions and the price of chemical fertilizers  
  
Dependent variable: Unit price of chemical 
fertilizers, log
  OLS OLS 
Share of land with restrictions -0.042 0.004 
 (1.52) (0.16)
Amount of fertilizer purchased, log  -0.104 
  (11.28)*** 
Constant 1.275 1.83
 (82.35)*** (35.67)*** 
Fixed effects Commune Commune 
   
Observations 1,647 1,647 
R-squared 0.55 0.59 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Observations with reported prices of fertilizer less than 1000 VND pr kg. are deemed unrealistic 
and set to missing. 
 
Table 7 presents results of regression models explaining the unit price paid by each household for 
chemical fertilizers, which is an important, purchased input.4 The regressions include commune 
                                                 
4 651 households did not report fertilizer prices. 21 households were excluded because they reported prices below 1000 
VND per kg., which was deemed unrealistically low. The results do not change substantially if they are included. 
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fixed effects. The first column shows that, controlling for commune characteristics, restrictions are 
indeed associated with a lower unit price of fertilizer. However, once the amount of fertilizer 
purchased is controlled for (in column 2) this effect disappears entirely. It seems that households 
simply get a quantity discount (prices drop by 10 percent when the purchased amount doubles), and 
that households under restrictions use more fertilizer than others. Hence, the results do not support 
the hypothesis that restricted households are subsidized. 
 
Table 8 Restrictions and access to extension services and irrigation 
  Dependent variable: 
 
Hh used 
extension 
services in last 
12 months=1 
Share of land 
irrigated 
Hh dependent 
on public or 
cooperative 
irrigation=1 
Always 
sufficient 
irrigation 
water=1 
Irrigation water 
always 
timely=1 
Never too 
much water 
from irrig. 
system=1 
  All households 
Households dependent on public or coop. 
irrigation  
Share of land with 
restrictions -0.03 0.171 0.187 0.044 0.008 -0.089 
 (0.86) (8.46)*** (8.12)*** (1.17) (0.22) (2.08)** 
Constant 0.425 0.59 0.552 0.369 0.575 0.601 
 (23.05)*** (55.37)*** (45.63)*** (15.24)*** (24.61)*** (22.05)*** 
Fixed effects Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune 
        
Observations 2081 2081 2081 1324 1324 1324 
R-squared 0.38 0.65 0.72 0.55 0.59 0.45 
All models are estimated with OLS.      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
Table 8 shows the effect of restrictions on access to extension services and irrigation in OLS 
regressions with commune fixed effects. The share of land with restricted crop choice is not 
positively related to the probability of using extension services. In contrast, restricted farms are 
much more likely to have access to irrigation. In particular, they are more likely to use public or 
cooperative irrigation infrastructure. This might be the result of either i) a higher tendency for 
irrigated plots to be put under restrictions, or ii) a higher willingness on part of the authorities to 
supply irrigation water to restricted plots. Note, however, that access to irrigation is already 
controlled for in the income regressions. The VARHS survey collected information on the 
perceived quality of irrigation services among households dependent on public or cooperative 
irrigation. The last three columns of Table 8 show that there is no significant relationship between 
restrictions and the perceived quality of these services. In fact, restricted households are somewhat 
less likely than other households to report that their plots are never flooded with excessive amounts 
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of water from the irrigation system. Hence, among households who receive public or cooperative 
irrigation, there is no tendency for restricted households to report higher than average satisfaction 
with the quality of the irrigation system. 
 
Table 9 Restrictions, hybrid seeds and the number of cropping seasons  
  Dependent variable: 
  
Hh used hybrid seeds in at least 
one season in the last 12 months
Number of harvests in last 12 
months 
Must grow rice in at least 
some seasons 0.077 0.076 0.365 0.347 
 (5.15)*** (5.18)*** (11.10)*** (10.73)*** 
Plot has irrigation facilities  0.278 
  (12.55)*** 
Number of rice harvests in 
last 12 months  0.085   
  (9.15)***   
Constant 0.297 0.144 1.864 1.633 
 (45.58)*** (8.07)*** (129.41)*** (70.17)*** 
Fixed effects Household Household Household Household 
     
Observations 6,205 6,205 6,205 6,205 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.72 0.73 
All models are estimated with OLS.    
Only plots planted with rice in at least some seasons are included.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
An important determinant of rice yields is the type of seeds used. In particular, the introduction of  
“hybrid” seeds is an important factor behind the improvement of rice yields experienced in Vietnam 
over recent decades. Table 9 shows the effects of restrictions on the probability that a plot is sown 
with hybrid seeds in at least one season in the last 12 months, using OLS regressions at the plot 
level with household fixed effects. The regressions only include plots sown with rice in at least 
some seasons. The measure of restrictions used is an indicator for the restriction that the plot must 
be sown with rice in at least some seasons. The results show that restricted plots are more likely to 
be sown with hybrid seeds than other plots. This indicates that better seeds are supplied to restricted 
plots than to other plots, either because authorities favor these plots or because restricted plots are 
more likely to be endowed with characteristics necessary for successful use of hybrid seeds, such as 
irrigation. 
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Another crucial determinant of annual crop yields is the number of times the plot is harvested in a 
year. Again using only plots sown with rice, Table 9 shows that the number of harvests is 
significantly higher on restricted plots than on other plots. This also holds when the availability of 
irrigation is controlled. This indicates that plots of higher quality are indeed more likely to be put 
under restrictions than other plots. When the average number of harvests per year on a household’s 
plots and the average number of seasons with hybrid rice are added to the income regressions, the 
coefficient on restrictions drops moderately. However, all point estimates of the effect of 
restrictions remain positive. 
 
In sum, the evidence indicates that restricted households do not obtain better prices of fertilizer or 
better access to extension services. Restricted plots are more likely to be irrigated, but the quality of 
irrigation services is not perceived to be higher on restricted plots than on other irrigated plots. 
Restricted plots are more likely to be sown with hybrid seeds and the number of harvests per year 
on restricted plots is higher than on other plots. It seems that plots of higher quality, in terms of 
irrigation as well as other factors, are more likely to be put under restrictions, and that restricted 
plots might be supplied with higher quality seeds than other plots. However, even when we attempt 
to control for these factors in the income model, we still find no negative effects of restrictions.  
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that restrictions on crop choice are common in Vietnamese agriculture. 
Restrictions are more prevalent in the North than in the South, although they are found in both 
regions. Restrictions impose real constraints on the behavior of farmers, and because most 
restrictions compel farmers to grow rice, they prevent agricultural diversification. Specifically, 
restrictions on land use work as a barrier to investment in perennial crops.  
 
We find no direct, negative effect of restrictions on income from cultivation. However, we find that 
restrictions have an indirect, negative effect working through the returns to land titling. More than 
three out of four agricultural plots in Vietnam now have a land use certificate, and it is hoped that 
this strengthening of formal property rights will lead to increases in productivity, because titling 
potentially increases households’ willingness and ability to invest. The results presented in this 
paper indicate that land titles do indeed have a positive and quite strong effect on investment in 
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perennial crops, and on income from cultivation. However, this effect is only found among farms 
facing few restrictions on crop choice. On highly restricted farms, titling makes no difference.  
 
The results indicate that land use restrictions should not be ignored in analyses of land policies in 
Vietnam and other transition economies, most notably China, where restrictions on crop choice are 
also common. In these economies, the tendency in the literature to focus on transfer rights instead of 
use rights should be re-considered. 
 
In terms of policy recommendations, the results do not provide a basis for recommending a 
comprehensive dismantling of state intervention in Vietnamese agriculture. The failure to find a 
direct, negative effect of restrictions on income suggests (tentatively) that the intervention regime 
does not lead to large inefficiencies. However, the negative interaction uncovered between the 
restrictions regime and the land titling program indicates that there are negative synergies between 
different elements of agricultural policy, and that a goal for future policy making should be to avoid 
such inconsistencies. For example, it might be optimal to lift restrictions on crop choice, in order to 
allow the full returns to land titling to be realized. The state could in parallel continue to intervene 
in other ways to solve collective action problems such as cross-pollination issues, pollution, 
investment in major infrastructure, management of large irrigation schemes and dissemination of 
information.
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  Descriptive statistics, plot level   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Choice of crop restricted 0.53 0.50 
Must grow rice in all seasons 0.19 0.39 
Must grow rice in some seasons 0.30 0.46 
Other restriction 0.04 0.20 
   
Area, ha. 0.16 0.50 
Planted exclusively with rice in last 12 months 0.54 0.50 
Planted exclusively with perennials in last 12 months 0.13 0.33 
Sales value, 000 VND 507,012 1,619,545 
Has LUC 0.82 0.39 
   
Slope:   
Flat 0.68 0.47 
Slight slope 0.18 0.39 
Medium slope 0.12 0.32 
Steep slope 0.02 0.13 
   
Mode of acquisition:   
Given by state 0.67 0.47 
Inherited 0.12 0.33 
Bought 0.07 0.25 
Cleared 0.13 0.34 
Exchanges 0.00 0.06 
Other mode of acquisition 0.00 0.04 
   
Land quality:   
Class 1 0.11 0.31 
Class 2 0.43 0.50 
Class 3 0.23 0.42 
Class 4 0.06 0.23 
Class unknown 0.17 0.38 
   
Number of seasons irrigated, last 12 months 1.41 1.02 
Distance from family home, km. 1.02 2.29 
Number of harvests in last 12 months 1.84 0.66 
Planted with hybrid seeds rice in at least one season 
in last 12 months 
0.21 0.41 
n=9,532. Only plots owned and operated by the hh are included. 
Aquaculture-, forestry- and purely residential plots are excluded. 
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Table A2  Descriptive statistics, household level 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
      
Northern Vietnam 0.60 0.49 
Income per ha, 00 VND  (log) 9.17 0.87 
Farm size, ha. (log) -0.91 1.14 
Hh labor, days per ha. per year (log) 4.84 0.86 
Hh used extension services in las 12 months 0.42 0.49 
Other people think respondent is a good 
farmer 
0.13 0.33 
   
Years of schooling of hh head 5.82 3.81 
Female hh head 0.18 0.38 
Age of head 49.90 13.31 
   
Share of land rented 0.06 0.17 
Price of fertilizer, 000 VND/kg. (log) 1.23 0.43 
Amount of fertilizer used in last 12 months, kg 
(log) 
5.57 1.24 
   
Uses public or cooperative irrigation 
infrastructure 
0.65 0.48 
Never too little irrigation water from from 
public/coop. ir. facilities 
0.26 0.44 
Irrigation water always available when needed 0.38 0.48 
Never too much irrigation water from from 
public/coop. ir. facilities 
0.35 0.48 
   
n=1976. Only the households included in the first regression in table 5 are 
included. 
 
 
Table A3  Descriptive statistics, commune level
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
      
Commune has land use plan 0.71 0.46 
Plan regulates crop choice 0.60 0.49 
Plan regulates crop choice in all seasons 0.41 0.49 
Plan regulates choice of rice seed 0.36 0.48 
   
Share of annual land with LUC 0.76 0.30 
Share of households using electricity 0.83 0.24 
Daily market present 0.48 0.50 
n=458, except share of annual land titled (n=450). 
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